

The Seleukid Empire of Antiochus III (223–187 BC)

John D. Grainger



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
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SELEUKID KINGDOM, 223–187 B.C.



SYRIA – PALESTINE



THE EASTERN EXPEDITION



GREECE, THE AEGEAN SEA AND WESTERN ASIA



Introduction

This is the second of three books, collectively describing the history of the Seleukid Empire from the time of Alexander the Great and its final extinction by a casual word from Pompeius Magnus. This volume deals with the reign of just one of the dynasty's kings, Antiochos III, another who has been given, or in his case had taken, the title of 'great'. He reigned for thirty-five years, longer than any other member of the family, and since his reign was chronicled by the historians Polybios and Livy, we know much more about his work than we do of almost any other of the kings. He was also in effect the second, or perhaps the third, founder of the empire.

The Seleukid state was a rickety structure, which was always liable to break down, or to shed the occasional province, or both of these. The crucial moments in its history were always at the death of the kings. The original founder, Seleukos I, had cobbled his kingdom together province by province through a career lasting three decades, but had not been able or had time to integrate the whole properly, and it went through a civil war when he died. His son, Antiochos I, put the kingdom back together, and defended it from attacks by Galatian invaders in Asia Minor and Ptolemaic enemies in Syria, but it collapsed again in 246 BC when his son Antiochos II died, leaving a disputed succession between three of his sons. This time putting the kingdom back together took much longer, and the breakdown continued for twenty years. When Antiochos III unexpectedly inherited the kingship he was king of only the central regions of Syria and Babylonia. The rest had broken away.

So Antiochos' work was to put his inheritance back together. Had he died in the first ten years of his reign it is very likely that the kingdom would have disintegrated into competing fragments. In fact he had a very successful career in restoring the kingdom of his ancestors, and made some attempt at devising ways of holding it together. So just as Antiochos I had revived his father's kingdom in the 270s BC, Antiochos III did so after 222 – he was thus the third 'founder'.

This was not an easy task. He suffered major defeats in two of the greatest battles of the Hellenistic age, yet he recovered after each one, and turned to other tasks. He died in the course of yet another attempt at recovery, and

handed on a united and well-governed kingdom to his son, one which was larger than that which he had inherited.

It is very difficult to gain a sense of the man's character through the sources for his life which remain to us, but it is clear that persistence and determination were prime elements in it. His work ensured that the kingdom he ruled lasted, if in a slow and erratic decline, for another century. It is an achievement that deserves respect, more than it has been accorded, and certainly more than the ancient historians (and the moderns), hypnotized as they are by the growth of the Roman Empire, have done.

Chapter One

The New King's Survival

Within a little over four years (227–222 BC) the male members of the family of Antiochos III were reduced from four to one, and the last one, Antiochos himself, was only 20 years of age at his accession. In June 227 his uncle Antiochos Hierax, who had for nearly two decades ruled all or part of Asia Minor, either as governor or as a rebel king, was murdered in flight after escaping from imprisonment.¹ A year later Hierax's brother and Antiochos' father, King Seleukos II, against whom Hierax had been in rebellion, died in a fall from his horse in the war against Hierax's ally in Asia Minor.² Then in late 223 or early 222, the next king, Antiochos' brother Seleukos III, was assassinated, again in Asia Minor, by two of his mercenary officers.³

This last event brought Antiochos to his brother's throne, wholly unexpectedly and pitifully unprepared. So unprepared was he, indeed, that he was in 'the interior', probably Babylon or Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris, when his brother died, two or three weeks of travel away from the real centre of the kingdom, which was in northern Syria.⁴ It was perhaps a reassurance that there were in post a group of capable men, as governors of provinces or as ministers of the former king, who proved to be fully capable of governing on the new king's behalf. However, their capability was such that they rapidly developed ambitions of their own, and only one life, that of Antiochos himself, stood in their way.

The group which dominated Antiochos' first years as king was headed by Hermeias, the first minister of Seleukos III, a native of Karia in southwest Asia Minor. We know little of his earlier life, but he had probably been an active official of the Seleukid dynasty for a considerable time. He it was who held the central government together in the immediate aftermath of the death of Seleukos III, and he may well have had the same role in the emergency of the sudden death of Seleukos II three years before.⁵ He certainly showed great ability, but, as with all men in such a position – he was quasi-regent – he faced even greater problems in internal affairs than he did in foreign.

The interpretation I give here is based on the notion that Hermeias, being

the dead king's minister, was already in control when the king died, and that the prominent men who will be noted in the following paragraphs, were originally part of the king's royal council. This is an institution which is repeatedly mentioned in the reign of Antiochos III and may be presumed to be a permanent fixture of the governing system. In the absence of a ruling king it clearly became a fractious group, but the prominence of Hermeias was such that he was able to exert a large degree of control, though only by removing his most able opponents to distant tasks. This turned out to be as dangerous a measure as any other solution; he also tried violence, but mainly against the lesser council members. The other members, those who Polybios mentions, were too powerful to be killed, and were his competitors; the object they strove for was to replace Hermeias as regent.⁶

One of his competitors was Akhaios, whose claim for access to power was his relationship to the young king. He was the grandson of the first Akhaios, a notable landowner in Asia Minor, who had been favoured by the founder of the dynasty, Seleukos I, with gifts of land once that area had been conquered.⁷ In fact it seems probable that he was the younger son of Seleukos, and so the brother of Antiochos I.⁸ He certainly married his family into royalty: his daughter was the first wife of Antiochos II, and another daughter married a member of the Attalid family of Pergamon and was the mother of King Attalos I. His granddaughter Laodike (daughter of his son Andromachos), married Seleukos II, and so she was the mother of Antiochos III. Akhaios the younger was therefore Antiochos' maternal uncle and his nearest male relative. As such he was clearly entitled to be part of the king's council.

Another senior member of the court was Epigenes. It is probable that Epigenes was the nearest to a professional soldier that the Seleukid empire could produce – he had been with Seleukos III on campaign in Asia Minor, and he brought back to Syria some of the soldiers after the king's death.⁹ Such professionalism, implying a concentration on a single activity, was uncharacteristic of the age, except for mercenaries; the lower social orders might make a living as clerks or ordinary soldiers, but at the level of commanding generals, generality of action and experience was expected. Men of this rank, described often as *philoi*, royal Friends, were employed by the kings as judges or governors, military commanders or envoys, or on any other tasks which needed to be done. Indeed, the ability to command armies in battle or on campaign was an expected skill of all high officials – Hermeias commanded, for example. Epigenes seems to have specialized to the extent of founding his advice in the royal council on military considerations.

A fourth member of the council was Molon. His origin and the basis of his importance are unknown, but he was able to pose such a challenge to Hermeias because he had been appointed to the governorship of Media – the 'Upper Satrapies' – by Seleukos III at the same time as Hermeias was made first minister. Molon's younger brother Alexander was also made governor of Persia.¹⁰ (Exactly what is meant by 'Persia' is unclear, but it was part of Iran,

though not apparently the regions known as Persis or Elymais.) The presence of two brothers in command of neighbouring provinces was clearly a danger in this unstable time, and a third brother and their mother were also in the east, thus leaving no hostages on whom Hermeias could exert pressure; between them Molon's family controlled more than a third of the empire.

It seems possible that Hermeias was operating on the assumption that if a man was posted to a distant province with a dangerous frontier he became less of a problem than if he was present at court. The assumption was thus that all these men were primarily loyal to the concept of the kingdom and of the king, however inexperienced or incapable the king was. The actions of Akhaïos had perhaps reinforced that perception. Akhaïos had accompanied Seleukos III on the expedition into Asia Minor at the beginning of which he was assassinated. The murderers were caught and killed at once by Akhaïos himself. He was then offered the kingship. Who made the offer is unclear, but it was part of the Macedonian tradition that kings could be acclaimed as such by the army, which would in this case probably mean the officers – perhaps including Epigenes.¹¹

Akhaïos had, in fact, several options at that point. He could accept the offer and proclaim himself king. Or he could accept the offer and proclaim himself regent for the young king Antiochos III, on the recent pattern of Antigonos III Doson and the young Philip V in Macedonia. Or he could refuse, though this would leave him in a dangerous position, suspected of concealed ambition yet now unsure of the support of his army. There was also yet another possibility: he could ignore all three choices and stay where he was, in effective command of the royal army in Asia Minor, and continue the campaign begun by the dead king. This would simply put the offer of the kingship on hold; he could possibly take up the job later.

We do not know what messages, instructions, pleas, or intrigues passed between Akhaïos and Hermeias. One officer with the army, Epigenes, certainly left and returned to Syria with part of the army, where he became a thorn in Hermeias' side in the royal council. If Akhaïos chose to accept the offer of the kingship he would probably have faced a civil war between his army – or that part of it which accepted him – and the rest of the royal army. Taking up the position of regent, with or without the royal title, might lessen the conflict, but to be regent for a king who was already twenty years old would invite derision and would set him on a route to conflict with Hermeias and the rest of the council. In the event, probably by arrangement with Hermeias and the others in the council, he took up the last possibility, taking official command of the expeditionary force to campaign in Asia Minor against Attalos I of Pergamon, his first cousin. Thus he supported, for the moment, another relative, Antiochos III.

These decisions – Akhaïos to Asia Minor, Molon to stay in Media – were taken, one must presume, soon after the death of Seleukos III, while Antiochos himself was travelling to Syria from Babylonia, a journey which

would have taken some weeks. As a result Hermeias was left in firm control of the central government, and Molon and Akhaïos both could be presumed to have plenty to do in their provincial commands. Antiochos himself may or may not have been consulted on all this, but from his distant situation he could scarcely have much effect on the immediate decisions. When he arrived in Antioch in Syria all had been arranged.

It is necessary at this point to consider the source we have for this and subsequent events. Apart from brief comments and fragments of other historians, the essential source is Polybios, who provides an extended account for the first years of Antiochos' reign. This is clearly based on another account which was biased strongly in favour of the king and made Hermeias the villain of the piece; by contrast, Molon and Akhaïos, who directly challenged Antiochos, get off lightly. Polybios was probably relying on an account of events produced not long after the death of Hermeias, perhaps generated by the Seleukid government to excuse the actions of the king. The bias is generally clear and must be taken into account, which I shall try to do, without going too far the other way.¹²

Another project which was necessarily undertaken as soon as Antiochos succeeded to the kingship was to find a bride for the new king. This task was allotted to Diognetos, whose later career included the command of the Seleukid navy.¹³ He was, in fact, probably one of the officials who could be used for any policy purpose; in this case he became a diplomat. A wife had suddenly become a political and diplomatic necessity. Antiochos was the last living male in the direct line of descent from Seleukos I; unless he was married swiftly, and produced a son as rapidly as possible, the dynasty might expire – or Akhaïos could legitimately claim the kingship. Diognetos in fact found a suitable girl, Laodike, the daughter of King Mithradates II of Pontos, though it is not known if Diognetos had much of a choice.¹⁴ The number of eligible and nubile princesses was suddenly rather limited, and in fact Laodike may have been the only one available. She was in fact another cousin of the king, her mother being Laodike the daughter of Antiochos II (and so sister of Seleukos II) who had married Mithradates II a generation earlier.

Diognetos' mission may have been urgent from the Seleukid dynastic point of view, but in Pontos the problem was probably seen in a different light. A royal marriage required careful and serious negotiations, and this one required that some sort of stability must exist in the Seleukid kingdom before Mithradates would allow his daughter – a precious political and personal resource – to be married there. Assuming that Diognetos' mission began relatively quickly after Antiochos' accession, he will have reached the Pontic court fairly early in 222, but would know by then that the kingdom he was representing was disrupted by a new civil war. The marriage negotiations were likely put on hold for the rest of the year.

In fact it may well have been news of Diognetos' mission which was the stimulus for the civil war. If he succeeded in negotiating a marriage quickly,

the dynasty was half way to safety; nine or ten months later it would probably be reinforced by the first of a new generation of the royal family. For an ambitious man who felt he could be a better king than an untried boy, the likelihood of a royal marriage was a starting gun for intrigue and rebellion. Akhaïos had already made his choice; Hermeias as a Karian was hardly eligible for the kingship; but Molon was probably of Macedonian descent, with a large part of the Seleukid army under his command, and was governing nearly half the kingdom. He felt he had a good, and indeed a unique, opportunity in the next year.

In all this Antiochos did not necessarily have any say. Hermeias was based at Antioch in Syria, though his family lived at Apameia. He had been left in charge of the central government by Seleukos III when the latter set off on his expedition into Asia Minor. Antiochos had been sent into 'the interior', as Polybios rather vaguely puts it. This may be understood to be Babylonia, where a royal presence was a regular and necessary occurrence. The rituals of the Babylonian religion benefited particularly if a king or a prince participated, and with the king on campaign, the favour of the gods would be a useful blessing.¹⁵

Seleukos III himself had been a turbulent character, so much so he was nicknamed *Keraunos*, 'Thunderer'. Such a man would be dangerous to be close to, a factor which raises a number of awkward questions concerning his assassination. For one thing it is to be assumed that there was a wider plot involved; it is unlikely that the assassination was a purely personal matter for the two murderers. The fact that Akhaïos had the murderers themselves instantly murdered rather suggests a wish to avoid the one really central issue as to who also was involved in the plot. Akhaïos himself must be a candidate, and the way he elected not to be made king may imply that he was being very careful to avoid the suspicion that he had contrived the king's death in order to replace him. Nor had he, as it turned out, forsworn such an ambition. Perhaps the one constructive decision the Thunderer had made was to ensure that his younger brother was safely separated from him when his death was organized. Killing both brothers when they were together would have been a very great temptation to the plotters.

The whole issue of the king's death was carefully avoided, or evaded, in the aftermath, which raises much suspicion. That none of the royal council apparently wanted to investigate it is likely to be significant. Of course, the killers had been killed, the army was on campaign, there was a great deal to do in the emergency, and the new king was a long way off and unable to insist on an investigation; these are all good sound reasons why there was no investigation. When the king arrived at Antioch, the senior men had been scattered to their new jobs. Given all this, however, some sort of investigation was surely to be expected. Yet it did not happen. One must wonder how many of the men around the new king were involved in the assassination plot, however distantly.

The kingdom which Antiochos had inherited so abruptly was the largest state in the world. The only competitors were the Mauryan Empire in India, which had begun to split up after the death of the Emperor Asoka in about 230, or China, where the Qin dynasty's 'First Emperor' had just succeeded in crushing the last of the independent dynastic states which were its competitors, but had yet to expand significantly beyond the Yellow River Valley and the central and lower Yangzi. But the Seleukid kingdom was also, like the Mauryan Empire, undergoing fission. Two states, Baktria and Parthia, had been formed out of its eastern extremity, and Asia Minor had recently been seized by Attalos of Pergamon after being effectively independent under Antiochos Hierax since the 240s. It was these losses which should have preoccupied Molon and Akhaïos. Akhaïos did set about reconquering Asia Minor with some success during 222; Molon, however, whose Parthian frontier was quiescent, had other intentions.

Hermeias had been left in control of the central government, and, when he arrived, that included the king. Within the council, Hermeias was at particular enmity with Epigenes. According to Polybios Hermeias had already crushed other dissenters, by execution or other means, but no names are mentioned.¹⁶ Clearly, however, he was unable to do this to Epigenes, who evidently had support among the soldiers. He had brought back to Syria those men Akhaïos did not need for his campaign (or perhaps he rid himself of those he did not trust).

Molon rebelled not long after Antiochos reached Syria, and so some time in 222. His quarrel was with Hermeias, whom he presumably wished to replace as the king's minister, but Hermeias successfully evaded the issue. At a meeting of the royal council, with the king present, Epigenes recommended that the king take command of the army and march east to confront the rebel. Presumably such an expedition would have had Epigenes in effective command of the army, with the king in a more or less titular role. Hermeias would not allow this, in part because he must have feared that Epigenes might be able to make common cause with Molon against him, or be able to use the army to remove him, or might turn the king against him. He agreed that an army should be sent to confront Molon, but not that the king should be involved. Given that Molon's quarrel was with Hermeias, and that he had done nothing yet to threaten any violence, it is likely that Hermeias was right; a massive response might have been counter-productive. Two generals, Xenon and Theodotos Hemiolios, were to command, though they were not given a large force; indeed they may well have been expected to rely mainly on the forces already in the east.

Hermeias now began to emphasize that the opportunity existed for an attack on the Ptolemaic kingdom. This opportunity had in fact existed for several years, since the death of Seleukos II, at which point the peace treaty he had agreed with Ptolemy III in 241 had expired. Seleukos III had obviously taken the view that it was more important to suppress internal dissent – the rebellion

in Asia Minor – than to launch a new war on Ptolemy. It was also the case that Ptolemy III was in full control of his kingdom during Seleukos III's lifetime, and he was a capable king and possessed a large military and naval power. But Ptolemy died late in 222, and the situation in the Ptolemaic court soon became disharmonious.¹⁷ It is at this point that Hermeias began recommending an invasion of the Ptolemaic territories.

Hermeias had also his own reasons for advocating a Ptolemaic war. If the king was preoccupied with an Egyptian war, Hermeias' own position, at his side, would be safer. Molon had contacted Akhaïos with a view to coordinating their rebellions, but Akhaïos was busy, and at the same time was eventually thinking of seizing the kingship, not merely displacing Hermeias.¹⁸ He presumably assumed that Hermeias' measures would be sufficient to defeat Molon, so Molon had no wider support, and Akhaïos was busy. Both men had protested their loyalty to Antiochos, whose attack on Ptolemy, the traditional enemy of the Seleukid dynasty, might well puncture any personal ambitions they had.

The position at the end of 222, therefore, was that in Asia Minor Akhaïos had been successful in driving Attalos back to Pergamon, but was still at war with him; in the east Molon was facing the threat of attack by the army commanded by Xenon and Theodotos; in Syria Hermeias was working to persuade Antiochos to attack Ptolemy. This last task was evidently a slow process, with Antiochos apparently reluctant to agree; eventually Hermeias produced a letter, which Polybios claims to have been a forgery, in which Ptolemy is depicted as urging Akhaïos to claim the kingship, and promising to assist him with ships and cash.¹⁹

There seems no reason to believe that this letter was really a forgery. The situation was such that it would be expected that Ptolemy would contact Akhaïos – his father had contacted Hierax, and he himself was in contact with Attalos – and, in the interests of self-defence (for he must have been aware of the policy recommended by Hermeias, if not in detail, then from an appreciation of the general situation), that he would offer an alliance. Ptolemy III had already intervened in support of Attalos in his war with Antiochos Hierax, and had sent his younger son Magas to Asia Minor in command of a military force.²⁰ The defeat of Attalos by Akhaïos coincided more or less with the death of Ptolemy III, and the new Ptolemaic regime turned against Magas, who was soon recalled and killed.²¹ Since the main object of Ptolemaic policy in this area was to oppose the Seleukid power, it would be expected that the alliance with Attalos would be abandoned and replaced by one with Akhaïos, particularly if he showed signs of being ambitious to attack Antiochos and Hermeias. Here the 'forged' letter could well be part of a Ptolemaic diplomatic campaign; there is no need to believe it was forged.

The argument at the Seleukid court was not much of a secret with so many men involved and the passions which were evident. It must have been all too clear that there was a threat of a Seleukid attack on Ptolemy's territories. So,

even if, as Polybios claimed, the letter was a forgery, it did reflect accurately the political situation. Polybios' case is somewhat weakened by the same accusation made about letters Antiochos is said to have sent to officers serving under Molon, threatening them with punishment if they should persist in doing so. Again, this is just the sort of action which the situation would require, and Polybios' claim that Molon forged them is probably nonsense. What this does do is imply that Polybios was using as his source an 'official' account of the events put out by Antiochos or his people after these crises had been overcome, and that therefore it is necessary to have a care in accepting his interpretation.

Hermeias' argument in favour of an Egyptian war made progress in the aftermath of the production of the letter, which Antiochos clearly accepted as genuine. Preparations for war were set in train, even though this would mean that the Seleukid army would be fighting on three fronts at a time when the attack went in. Meanwhile the marriage negotiations had succeeded. The apparently decisive actions by Akhaios in Asia Minor and in confronting Molon had obviously persuaded Mithradates that all was well, and Diognetos had escorted Laodike to Syria. Bride and groom met at Seleukeia-Zeugma on the Euphrates, which suggests that she had travelled by land through Kappadokia – another kingdom with a Seleukid queen. The marriage took place at once, with the appropriate splendour, and no doubt much publicity. The bride was then taken to Antioch, again a publicity gesture. The message was that the king was married, had allies, and the kingdom was heading for dynastic safety.²²

It all began to go wrong soon after. The generals Xenon and Theodotos, starting from north Syria, will have taken at least a month to reach Babylonia, perhaps longer if they had a contingent of soldiers with them. Molon, having begun his rebellion well before that, had several months to prepare his response. He had the support of his brother Alexander and some of the local governors whom Polybios does not specify; he did not, it seems, have the support of the satraps of other nearby provinces, for the governors of Susiana and the Persian Gulf province came out publicly in support of the king later. But Molon had enough support among the officials and soldiers of Media to begin a march westwards, coming down through the Zagros Mountains by the Bisitun Pass, and so heading for the great cities of Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris and Babylon.²³

He encountered the Xenon-Theodotos army on emerging into Babylonia. The two generals had not been able to make any attempt to reach Media, either due to their late arrival, or because of a lack of military strength. They were shocked to find that Molon was in greater strength than they had expected, and they retreated into the cities.²⁴ Molon based himself at or about Apollonia, which was evidently the first city he reached out of the pass, and planned to advance to attack Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris, the place the Babylonians called 'the royal city'.²⁵ He found it impossible to cross the

Tigris, however, because a local governor, Zeuxis, had collected all the boats. Molon made his winter quarters at Ktesiphon, just across the river from Seleukeia.²⁶ The two royal commanders had thus failed in their primary mission, to suppress the rebellion, but at least had prevented Molon from advancing any further.

While this crisis in the East was developing, the king, persuaded by Hermeias, embarked on the invasion of Ptolemy IV's kingdom. The region specifically in contention was the rest of Syria. The boundary of the two kingdoms lay along the Eleutheros River, south of Laodikeia and the island city of Arados (a Seleukid subject state). The valley of the river formed a major routeway, sometimes called the Homs gap, between the interior of Syria and the Mediterranean coast. The northern half was largely under the control of Arados, which also controlled a considerable length of the coast itself, north of the river's mouth.²⁷ Two major cities, Laodikeia on the coast (north of Arados' territory) and Apameia close to the Orontes, had been developed by Seleukos I as his defensive fortresses, blocking any Ptolemaic invasion from the south along the coastal route or that along the plateau edge paralleling the Orontes Valley. In this the cities had been successful, for the only Ptolemaic invasion of the Seleukid part of Syria (in 246) had had to come by sea.

South of the Eleutheros Valley were the mountains of Lebanon, two major mountain ranges which divided the land into three north-south lowland areas. The coast, between the Lebanon range and the sea was studded with fortified cities from Orthosia and Tripolis to Tyre and Sidon, a situation which had foiled at least one earlier Seleukid invasion.²⁸ Inland, between the Lebanon and Antilebanon ranges, was the valley of the Orontes River, called here the Bekaa Valley, a region which had been developing economically since the Ptolemaic conquest at the end of the wars of Alexander's successors.²⁹ East of the Antilebanon Mountains was the Syrian Desert, and along the foot of the mountains ran a desert route which was suitable for caravans of camels, but was not seen as a viable route for an army.

Antiochos' forces thus had the choice of three invasion routes, the coast, the Bekaa, the desert. Inevitably he, or his generals, chose the Bekaa. The cities of the coast road were designed, at least in the minds of the Ptolemaic government, if not those of the inhabitants, to slow down or stop any invasion; the desert route was assumed to be too dry and difficult for an army. So the Bekaa was the obvious route for an invasion. Unfortunately the Ptolemaic generals had made the same calculations, and the Bekaa had been converted into a great cul-de-sac in which to trap an invader. Between the high mountain ranges the valley leads deceptively easily south. But there were few exits from the valley, and no easy ones. One pass lead over the Lebanon Mountains to the coast near Berytos (still the only reasonable route, taken by the modern road), and another exited southeast towards Damascus through the Barada River gorge; neither was easy and both were easily blocked.

The Ptolemaic defence relied on this geographical situation. Ignoring the pass towards the coast (for the coast road south was blocked by the cities to both north and south of Berytos) they had concentrated on preventing the invader from reaching the pass towards Damascus. At two neighbouring settlements, Gerrha and Brochoi, strong garrisons had been established, and at a narrow passage flanked by a lake and (presumably) the mountains, a palisade and ditch had been constructed to block the route. Behind this position the Ptolemaic army, commanded by Theodotos the Aitolian, stood on the defensive, preventing any further Seleukid advance. Polybios does not mention it, but it would be reasonable to suppose that the food supplies in the valley north of these fortifications had been collected and removed. At any rate Antiochos fairly quickly found himself in some difficulty.³⁰

The news of the check to the Xenon-Theodotos campaign in Babylonia had reached Syria while Antiochos was on campaign in the Bekaa. Hermeias, without much difficulty, persuaded him to send another commander, Xenoetas, to take over in Babylonia.³¹ It does not seem that Xenoetas was given any more troops, and so it is not surprising that he also eventually failed. Hermeias' clinching argument for sending a general rather than that the king himself should go was that it was the task of a king to command over all, planning the strategy, and if it came to a fight, he should combat another king, but that rebels should be confronted by generals. One might suppose that Hermeias based his decision on rather more information than we have, and understood that Xenoetas was a more capable commander than those already defeated.

Xenoetas began with some sensible moves. He based himself at Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris, facing Molon's winter camp at Ktesiphon, and called up the forces commanded by the satraps of Susiana (Diogenes) and of the Persian Gulf satrapy (Pythiadas), and joined them with the forces in central Babylonia. He also was encouraged by the arrival of deserters from Molon's army.³² This was something which Epigenes had predicted would happen, but he had pointed out that the desertion was likely to be much more vigorous if it was the king the deserters were joining. Xenoetas, however, had already developed an arrogance which had alienated some of his friends and colleagues; the appearance of deserters further increased his over-confidence. The deserters, of course, claimed that the whole of Molon's army was ready to join the royal army if Xenoetas would only cross the river.³³ (Polybios does not take the opportunity to claim that this was part of Molon's misinformation, but it is quite possible.)

One or other of the rival armies would need to attack, which meant one of them crossing the river. Xenoetas made a plan. Feinting to make a crossing at one place (though since he made no real preparations, it was really feinting a feint; Molon ignored it), he got an advanced force across further away, and Molon's counter-attack, using a cavalry force, collapsed in the mud and marshes and canals. (This makes it clear that it was in the spring, when the

rains come.) Xenoetas brought across the rest of his forces and moved up to threaten Molon's camp directly.³⁴

Molon withdrew, though in sufficient disorder to seem to be in flight, leaving the army's baggage in his former camp. So far, therefore, Xenoetas had been successful, though Molon's army, less the deserters, had not joined him en masse as he had expected. Instead the enemy troops had gone off with Molon, who stopped not far along his march and thought. It is possible that he had either spies near Xenoetas' camp (possibly late arrivals or escapees) or a good idea of what would happen there. Xenoetas' confidence was high, and at this point he made his mistakes. He brought his full force over the river from the city and now he gave his soldiers a speech claiming that Molon had fled and that tomorrow they would pursue the beaten enemy.³⁵ But he did not send out scouts to locate the enemy precisely.

The soldiers, taking their cue from their commander, celebrated, and having the supplies collected for Molon's forces to hand, proceeded to eat and drink and then fall into a drunken sleep. Molon returned, saw his enemy stupefied, and recaptured the camp. Many of Xenoetas' soldiers died in their beds, others in trying to swim the river. Xenoetas, finally realizing his mistake, charged into the enemy and was killed.³⁶ More constructively, other commanders escaped the slaughter to resume their official responsibilities.

Diogenes returned to Susiana and garrisoned the city of Susa and its acropolis. Molon immediately threatened Seleukeia; Diomedon, the city's governor, withdrew with his forces; then, with Zeuxis, he pulled back to the north.³⁷ (The whereabouts of Pythiad as is unknown; perhaps he had died in the battle at the camp.)

It is worth pointing out that this was the first violence in Molon's rebellion. The army of Xenon and Theodotos Hemiolios had not stood to fight. Of course, violence was implicit in Molon's actions, but he could claim to have been threatened in his satrapy by Xenon-Theodotos and that his advance into Babylonia was defensive. It would not be much of an argument, but his original quarrel was with Hermeias, and it might have been possible to settle the dispute by negotiation. Such an approach was never attempted, so far as we know. And now, with extensive casualties among the royal army, the position on both sides changed.

Molon pursued Diogenes, who reached Susa first. The city itself fell to Molon's forces, but not the acropolis, where Diogenes held out.³⁸ This was one of the treasure repositories of the Seleukid kingdom, which was probably why Molon went so far out of his way to attack it. Diogenes remained defiant, and Molon returned north to Seleukeia, then moved on further north, following Zeuxis and Diomedon, to seize the fortified town of Doura-Europos on the Euphrates and Doura on the Tigris as advanced defensive posts, or posts from which to advance further, whichever became needed.

This clearly took some time. The defeat of Xenon-Theodotos happened late in 222, for Molon soon after went into winter quarters. Xenoetas had travelled

east in the winter and launched his attack in the spring, and Molon's cavalry attack had blundered into the wet lands ('pools and marshes') which had been made wetter/drenched by the spring rains. The actual fighting clearly took only a few days, but then Molon diverted to attack Susa. This is 400km from Seleukeia, a journey, even if he took only his cavalry, which would take at least three weeks – and then three weeks for the return journey. He spent some time seizing Susa and vainly attacking the acropolis. He returned north to Seleukeia and then went on to the two Douras, more marches of 400km. So, from the victory over Xenoetas to the occupation of Doura was at least ten weeks, and quite likely half as much again. If the battle took place in the spring, it was high summer before Molon's army seized Doura-Europos and Doura.

So, whereas Molon had benefited in his first year from the slow response from Syria to his advance – due mainly to the distance that Xenoetas had to travel – he had now forfeited that advantage. The news of the defeat of Xenoetas will have reached Hermeias rapidly, quite possibly by a courier crossing by the desert route by way of Doura and Palmyra, and then Antiochos almost as quickly. And one further piece of news will have arrived: Molon had taken the royal title. Polybios does not mention this, but coins were produced at Seleukeia in his name as king.³⁹ After winning battles, especially that against Xenoetas' army, it is quite likely that the army had insisted he make himself king. It was a move which might well solidify his support in the forces, either by suggesting confidence in his powers or by implying that they were complicit, and therefore would be regarded as traitors by Antiochos. Thus Molon had been driven by his victory to that proclamation; it was now quite impossible for him to make any compromise, either with Hermeias or with Antiochos. (The absence of the mention of Molon's kingship by Polybios is another sign that he was using a pro-Antiochos source, which would have, no doubt, consistently denigrated Molon's claims.)

This was also the news which finally destroyed Hermeias' argument. If Molon was now a king, he was clearly a suitable object for Antiochos to attack. He was also now a direct threat to Antiochos himself, and not just to Hermeias, and this was also a solution to the obvious necessity of marching the full royal force to deal with the rebel. It also rescued Antiochos from the lack of progress in the Bekaa Valley. He could now abandon the offensive there with a clear conscience, as there was a more urgent matter to be dealt with.

A royal council held at Apameia degenerated into a slanging match between Epigenes and Hermeias, the former recommending a rapid march to the east with the king in command. Hermeias, clearly feeling his political footing unstable, abused Epigenes, but the latter had the better of the argument so that Hermeias swung round to support him.⁴⁰ This is presented by Polybios as deviousness and insecurity on Hermeias' part, particularly in

his decision to change his position and support Epigenes' argument for rapid action. And yet this, as noted before, is just what the royal council was for: to discuss responses to crises. There is obviously scope for disagreement, and with the importance of the issue, no doubt the argument was heated. It is a later interpretation, reflected in Polybios' account, which insists that Hermeias was entirely selfseeking and unpleasant.

By now, however, the army was disgruntled. It had not been paid, and, whatever arguments had been advanced for abandoning the offensive in Syria, the soldiers knew they had suffered a clear defeat. Confidence in the king was no doubt at a low ebb, and the news of disagreements in the council cannot have helped the soldiers' morale. Now they were about to be ordered to march east for a new campaign, a march which would take perhaps two months. A mutiny developed, demanding their pay.⁴¹

The royal coffers were empty. The constant campaigning of the past three years (and earlier) had been expensive, and there will have been no revenues coming in from Asia Minor (for the last twenty years) or from the east (since Molon's rebellion). Babylonia was the major cash cow of the treasury, and nothing will have come in from there for the past year, since Molon's conquest, or even before, since money will have been needed to organize resistance. So when the mutiny at Apameia began, the king was trapped. Hermeias seized the opportunity this offered to regain his influence. He offered to meet the soldiers' demands from his own resources. That he was so rich he could pay for an army of perhaps 25,000 men might, to the suspicious mind, suggest that one of the reasons the royal treasury was empty was that Hermeias had been looting it. Whatever suspicions the king might have had to be suppressed, and he accepted Hermeias' offer. But Hermeias had his own price, which has that Epigenes should not be allowed to accompany the king on the eastern campaign. Reluctantly Antiochos agreed.⁴²

Then Hermeias is said to have developed a plot which saw that Epigenes was implicated in Molon's intrigues. Another letter was found, from Molon to Epigenes, presumably soliciting his support. This is claimed by Polybios to be another of Hermeias' forgeries. The letter is said to have been planted in Epigenes' quarters by a suborned slave, then found by the commander of the citadel at Apameia. The king being off on campaign, Epigenes was forthwith executed for complicity in the rebellion.⁴³ There are, yet again, no reasons necessarily to accept the accusation of forgery; the disputes between Epigenes and Hermeias were well known, and Molon would obviously take advantage of it, so a letter from him to Epigenes is fully to be expected. Epigenes should, of course, have reported the letter to the king, but then his access to him was through Hermeias.

It was another sign that Hermeias felt that his position was under threat that he increased the guard around the king, a quite reasonable precaution given the mutiny and the fact that the king was heading for a new war. No doubt Hermeias expelled any man he did not feel he could rely on. He also decided

to accompany the king on the eastern expedition. Part of the army, a regiment or corps called the Kyrrhestai, continued their mutiny (the rest expressed gratitude to Hermeias, who evidently made sure his action had been well publicized). The Kyrrhestai were a group of soldiers who had presumably been recruited from the northern region around the city of Kyrrhos. They marched away, presumably going home, but were pursued, defeated, and suppressed by a loyal force commanded by generals, though the fighting lasted for most of the year.⁴⁴ The king ignored this and marched east.

That march took a long time. He went by the northern route, that used a century before by Alexander, along the better-watered lands along the foot of the mountains. Antiochos halted at the Euphrates, presumably to gather and organize his forces. A winter camp was made at Antioch-in-Mygdonia, which is the old city of Nisibis (this is the present Nusaybin), where the army stayed for ‘forty days’ – a period of time effectively vague.⁴⁵ The army moved on to the Tigris in the spring.

At some point Antiochos linked up with the force under Zeuxis. (Diomedon drops out of the account; perhaps he was in command of the forces on the Euphrates.) By approaching along the northern route Antiochos was avoiding the more difficult route along the Euphrates, and at the same time protecting the forces there. Molon had concentrated his forces at Babylon, the better to be able to strike in whatever direction the king approached, and he still had to be concerned about the undefeated Diogenes in Susa.

It is clear that Antiochos had learned a good deal about military campaigning. He was accompanied by Hermeias, who had some notion of military strategy, and it may have been by his advice that the northern route was chosen. But having collected Zeuxis and his forces the king had also gained access to independent advice. Zeuxis had been a middle-ranking officer before Molon’s invasion, and had emerged as a sensible commander under the pressure of events and as his superiors were killed or otherwise driven away. He had thus come to command all the remnant royal forces in northern Babylonia. The rest of the royal council had been intimidated into supporting whatever Hermeias was saying, but Zeuxis arrived free of that influence, though it is said that he knew of the fate of Epigenes, which means he knew of Hermeias’ part in contriving that fate.⁴⁶

The army moved on from Nisibis to a place called Libba. This is not located, though one modern historian puts it at about the site of the former Assyrian city of Assur, just north of the junction of the Tigris with the Little Zab River. Certainly Libba must have been somewhere in that area. A council was held to decide the next stage in the campaign. In the knowledge that Molon was in Babylon or nearby, Hermeias recommended a march along the west bank of the Tigris, no doubt with the aim of trapping the enemy army by getting between Seleukeia and Babylon. Zeuxis, however, who clearly knew more about the local geography than anyone else present, recommended marching along the east bank of the Tigris. He pointed out that the west bank

was less well supplied with provisions, and that the army would eventually reach the Royal Canal, which it would be unable to cross. The Royal Canal connected the Euphrates and the Tigris, reaching the latter at Seleukeia; Molon would thus be able to use it for protection on his north. This must have reminded Antiochos of the cul-de-sac he had marched into in the Bekaa Valley. The east bank, however, had ample provisions and Antiochos would have the Tigris as a flank protection. By moving swiftly the enemy army could be trapped inside Babylonia and would be unable to reach Media. It was clearly desirable to finish him off without having to conduct a campaign in Media. The key was the Diyala Valley, in which Apollonia was – this was the place Molon had used as his base after his irruption from the mountains.⁴⁷

The two armies had about the same distance to march to reach Apollonia, but Antiochos' set off first. It would take a few days for the news of Antiochos' direction of march to reach Babylon – the straight line distance from Libba to Babylon is about 250km – so he had that much start. Molon immediately understood the threat and marched off at once to try to reach Apollonia first. He failed, in part because he had first to construct a bridge over the Tigris to get his army across. The two armies camped about 7.5km apart.⁴⁸ Molon appreciated his problem, which was that his army was now less reliable than ever, and that he was outnumbered. He tried to organize a night attack, usually guaranteed to cause panic in the victim, but during the march he found that a ten-man unit had deserted and he had to assume that Antiochos now knew of his intention; he returned to his camp, causing a brief panic at the unexpectedness of his arrival.⁴⁹

So it came down to a battle. Antiochos must have hoped to avoid one – the enemy was his own troops, after all, and casualties amongst his forces had not been light in the last years – but Molon had no choice now. The battlefield appears to have been in a wideish pass where the Diyala cut through the Jebel Hamrin. The terrain did not favour the usual phalanx attack, being uneven.⁵⁰ So both commanders put the phalanx in the centre, on the least unfavourable ground, with cavalry on each flank. But Antiochos took out a force of infantry and cavalry for a reserve, in two sections. The disposition of the armies was thus traditional, but Molon had concentrated much of his cavalry on his left wing, where they faced Antiochos himself. The two cavalry wings were to be the active elements, and Molon and his brother Neolaos commanded right and left wings respectively; Antiochos took command of his right (facing Neolaos) and the royal left was under the joint command of Hermeias and Zeuxis (an interesting combination). We are not told who commanded the phalanx forces, probably because once launched they were uncontrollable, and in this case were scarcely involved.⁵¹

Polybios' account of the battle suffers from his use of a source which favoured Antiochos over Hermeias and Molon probably produced by Antiochos' propaganda department a short time later. He attributed the victory to the king's presence, which induced Neolaos' forces to surrender as soon as

the fight began. It has been pointed out, however, that Neolaos' force was largely composed of Median horsemen, who were much less automatically loyal to the dynasty than the Macedonians of the phalanx.⁵² This does not preclude their surrendering, of course, particularly since the officers were probably Greeks and Macedonians, and so susceptible, but it leaves the Polybian explanation less compelling, particularly as it had been evoked all too often in the previous pages. It has therefore been suggested that the reserve was used as a surprise flanking manoeuvre, and this may be so, despite there being no evidence for it. Whatever the reason, Neolaos' wing surrendered.

The wing under Molon himself did well, but having lost a large part of his army, Molon himself was defeated. The phalanx could now be taken in flank, and this always induced a rapid surrender. Molon committed suicide, and his forces either fled or surrendered. It seems that casualties were relatively few, at least among the ordinary soldiers and junior officers. The high command, however, knew that the king would take his revenge, and 'all who had taken part in the plot' fled and killed themselves. Polybios is vague on numbers and details, but illustrates the matter by describing the end of Molon's family: Neolaos killed his mother, his own family, Molon's family, persuaded Alexander to commit suicide, and then did so himself.⁵³

This was sufficient for the king's purposes. He displayed Molon's body in the pass leading to Media as a clear warning, and as a message to all concerned that the rebellion was over. Then, having complained about their conduct, he accepted the surrendered troops back into his service.⁵⁴

Antiochos is credited with the victory by Polybios, but to go from incompetence and bad planning to a clear strategy and victory in a few months suggests that others were involved. The account of the decisive royal council before the advance on Apollonia alternatively suggests that the king had few clear ideas of his own, if the advance was really a matter of choosing between the plans of Hermeias and Zeuxis. Yet this is exactly what a council is for, and that he chose the better of the options placed before him (and the more adventurous) implies a modicum of sense in the king. In the actual execution it would seem he had the services of competent officers, for his staff work – the march, supplies, the disposition of the forces, perhaps the use of the reserve – all suggest professional expertise. In Hellenistic warfare it was the advance preparations, and such simple notions as using a reserve unexpectedly, which produced victory; once battle was joined the commanders usually had little influence over events other than to unleash the reserve at the right moment; indeed they usually fought in person, which would surely prevent any carefully thought-out decisions in the heat of the action.

Nevertheless the king would necessarily receive the credit – he was, after all, in overall command – and this would obviously enhance his personal authority in the council, and among the soldiers, and build his own

confidence. Hermeias was nevertheless still a potent force. The balance of internal power was shown in the aftermath. The surrendered army was given new officers and sent back to their Median home. The victorious army had to go home the opposite way, and some were presumably sent off almost at once. The governing group went to Seleukeia from where new arrangements for provincial affairs were made.⁵⁵

The city had played an equivocal role in the rebellion. Having first been held by Diomedon after Xenoetas' defeat, it then apparently tamely surrendered to Molon, though to be sure this was after Diomedon and Zeuxis had withdrawn with their forces. It was well fortified and had a large population, and was on the west bank of the Tigris, so it could have been defended for some time. Zeuxis had originally prevented Molon crossing the river by seizing all the boats in the vicinity, but this was probably not possible this time, for they had been used to transfer Xenoetas' army across the river and were no doubt now scattered along both banks. Molon would therefore need to besiege the city, but this did not happen; evidently it surrendered at Molon's arrival.

Hermeias set about ordering punishments. Those who arranged the surrender were the city magistrates, who had the old Macedonian name of the *Adeiganes*. He exiled them, and others who had supported them were punished 'by mutilation, the sword, or the rack', as Polybios graphically puts it. The distinction between the responsible magistrates and others implies that the *Adeiganes* had only surrendered as a result of pressure from the citizenry, and that the city greeted Molon in a divided and no doubt fearful state. Hermeias also imposed a fine of 1,000 talents on the city collectively.

The king allowed this to go on for a time, then intervened, reducing the fine to 150 talents (harsh enough in all conscience). The punishments had created even more fear and disturbance, and it was apparently this which persuaded the king to call a halt.⁵⁶ It is noticeable that he did not rescind the other punishments – Polybios' pro-Antiochos source would undoubtedly have pointed this out had it occurred. He depicts the matter as a dispute between Antiochos and Hermeias, and so it may have been, but only in retrospect. Hermeias' policy largely prevailed, and it was only when it became obvious that harshness was causing even more trouble that the policy was relaxed. Without that interpretation one might see the affair as evidence of a double-act operation of good-cop-bad-cop, the king's forgiveness being a political ploy, possibly pre-arranged with Hermeias, to bring the city back to loyalty. It is evident that Hermeias was still able to make policy on his own.

The governors of the region all needed to be replaced. Molon's position in Media went to Diogenes, the loyal defender of the Susa acropolis, whose decision to return there after the defeat of Xenoetas was important in distracting Molon for a decisive couple of months; his post was now filled by Apollodoros, otherwise unknown, presumably one of the officers and royal *philoï* who had proved himself in the past year as both loyal and competent.

The Persian Gulf province, formerly governed by the now disappeared Pythiadas, went to Tychon, another man who had presumably proved to be both loyal and able during the campaign.⁵⁷

In Iran there were other problems. The southern regions of Elymais and Persis were semi-autonomous, but were far too distant for the king to deal with when he was in Seleukeia, and meanwhile affairs in the west were demanding his attention. In northern Iran, however, was another sub-kingdom, Media Atropatene, whose King Artabazanes had evidently supported Molon in his rebellion. He may, in fact, have had no real choice in the matter, but the situation was uncertain enough to require royal attention. Artabazanes was also the nearest of these sub-kings to Seleukeia and to reduce him to subservience would have a useful wider effect on the other sub-kingdoms. He was regarded as the 'most important and vigorous' of the sub-kings, according to Polybios; his support of Molon now that Molon had gone, may have translated into full independence. Also Hermeias opposed the idea of the royal expedition in Iran, which was an inducement for Antiochos to undertake it.⁵⁸

Two items of news received from the west illustrate the instability of these court politics. Queen Laodike gave birth to a son – Antiochos had evidently done his dynastic duty with despatch – which would be a cause for celebration.⁵⁹ To Hermeias it was another opportunity. He changed to supporting the king's campaign into Media, in the knowledge that it was quite possible that the king would not survive it, and that then he would have the opportunity for a lengthy regency for the infant. Once again the interpretation of Hermeias' actions is put in the worst possible light. As a senior royal adviser coping with the aftermath of Molon's rebellion it must have been obvious to Hermeias that the expedition against Artabazanes was a sensible idea. It is quite possible he did anticipate, even hope for, the king's death, and it would be remiss of him not to take the possibility into account; it is even possible that he attempted to secure the king's death, but this looks like an interpolation by later pro-Antiochos propagandists, for nothing actually happened.⁶⁰

Antiochos took a force into Media and successfully intimidated Artabazanes into surrender.⁶¹ While on this campaign the second piece of news from the west arrived, that Akhaïos in Asia Minor had declared himself king. Polybios links this with Antiochos' expedition and the possibility of his death on campaign. This conjunction and interpretation might be thought to imply that Hermeias was involved somehow in Akhaïos' usurpation, but Hermeias was out for his own hand, and having Akhaïos as king would hardly be in his interest; we may assume that Akhaïos thought the moment right for his declaration – he may possibly have heard a rumour that Antiochos had been killed on campaign. He was, in fact, now as much of a threat to Hermeias as to Antiochos.⁶²

This was an even more urgent matter for the king than to view his own new

son. It was to be expected that Akhaïos would attempt to secure control of north Syria as soon as possible. He might thus be able to seize control of the new prince, who, if Antiochos died in his adventure, he could become regent for, or kill. Or he could take up with the Kyrrhestai, still holding out in their mutiny; even if Antiochos survived his adventure in Iran, Akhaïos in control of Asia Minor and Syria (and possibly allied with Ptolemy) would be in a powerful position to defeat a royal counter-attack, and Antiochos in such a case will have had to rely to a degree on the Median army he had just defeated.

Yet another piece of news had its effect on all involved. The death of Ptolemy III had produced a nasty crisis in the court in Alexandria. The first minister, Sosibios, had evidently felt under threat, and had reacted with a series of murders – any of the new king's relatives he could reach, including at least two of his brothers and his mother. In this he was acting very much with the king's agreement.⁶³ Clearly this was destabilizing far beyond the confines of the court, and Antiochos may already have become aware that the governor of Koile Syria, Theodotos the Aitolian, who had defeated his attack in the Bekaa Valley, was now disaffected and fearful for his own safety. There was thus much to bring Antiochos back to Syria, but first he had to solve his own court problem and get free of Hermeias.

Hermeias' reputation has suffered severely from his treatment in Polybios' narrative – the only source available. There is enough information in it, however, to provide an alternative story. For one thing he was clearly an able man. A foreigner, perhaps not even a Greek, he had secured his high position by his own ability, for he can have had no source of influence in the Seleukid kingdom. His advice may not always have been followed, but it had always been in the interest of the king, even if it also was to his own benefit. His mistake was no doubt arrogance, to be expected in a man in his position, and he clearly used violence, both overt and covert, to stay in power. But his main error was to stay on too long. There was no tradition of graceful retirement in the ancient world, though it would have been best, both for Hermeias and for the king, had he invented such a manoeuvre. But once in power he had no choice but to stay there, and having surrounded the king with guards, both men were stuck in their positions, the one unable to let go, the other unable to get free except by violence.

The story of the elimination of Hermeias has some curious aspects, one of which is that it is unclear just what happened despite the apparent detail of Polybios' account. Polybios places it after the submission of Artabarzanes, but apparently before the news of the rebellion of Akhaïos arrived; nor is it clear where it took place, though the implication is that it took place in Media, and soon after the expedition into Atropatene ended. But the story is almost free of connections with other events, as though Polybios was consulting a version which was essentially free-standing.

The account Polybios presents is that Antiochos, already uneasy about

Hermeias' power and intentions, was contacted by his doctor, Apollophanes, who expressed his own fears for the king's safety (and incidentally his own).⁶⁴ Given that Hermeias' conduct for the past year and more had been overbearing and even threatening, one would have thought that such an exchange of views was coming rather late in the day. The involvement of Apollophanes may well be emphasized (or invented) in order to deflect criticism from the king, for it is the doctor who is described as organizing the plot which removed the minister, with Antiochos given a purely passive role. In fact, these roles might well be reversed to provide an even better narrative. A pretence at illness allowed the king to be isolated from the guards who surrounded him – guards who were primarily loyal to Hermeias – and for contacts to be made with those whom Antiochos trusted. Hermeias was then summoned to a meeting at an unusually early hour, unaccompanied by his own people; he was stabbed to death by Antiochos' conspirators.

The plot, once the king had achieved his pseudo-medical isolation, did not need the doctor, and he fades away from the story. In fact it is clear that the king was the prime mover in the whole sequence. In the actual assassination he is said to have gone aside, leaving his followers to commit the murder, a transparent device of the storyteller to transfer the guilt away from the king, and one which, after all the plotting and secrecy, is wholly unbelievable; if Antiochos was so keen to eliminate Hermeias that he contrived, or even organized, the plot, he would surely be present to see that it was carried out.

The deed is said to have met with widespread approval, and the king on his way back to Syria was greeted approvingly, which may have owed more to his defeat of Molon and the relief felt at the end of the war than any knowledge people had of the death of Hermeias.⁶⁵ One wonders also if the apparent approval masked a certain fear; a king who could kill his own senior adviser in a secret plot may well inspire widespread fear. (It is also possible, of course, that the approval was invented by the author of Polybios' source.) In Apameia it is said that Hermeias' wife was killed by stoning by the women of the city, and that his sons similarly by the children.⁶⁶ One can believe that the family was murdered, for this was the standard practice to prevent a vendetta arising, but the allocation of the task to women and children leaves a very bad taste.⁶⁷

Chapter Two

The Fourth Syrian War

As he returned to Syria in late 220, Antiochos was free of the insistent force of Hermeias, his interference, and his advice, but he was also now in a position where he had to rely on his own resources of character and intellect. Having disposed of his senior adviser in such an unpleasant and underhand fashion, no other adviser could feel himself wholly safe, at least for some considerable time. On the other hand, he had also collected some able colleagues – notably Zeuxis and the doctor Apollophanes – who had shown that they were not afraid to argue against such a man as Hermeias, and might be relied on to offer advice without the fear shown by other members of the council before Hermeias' death. No doubt Antiochos now regretted the loss of Epigenes, but at least two soldiers, Ardys who had commanded a lancer unit against Molon, and Theodotos Hemiolios, who had commanded the failed first attempt to block Molon, had been promoted; evidently failure was not final with Antiochos.

He now faced two major problems which had been put aside while Molon was dealt with, but which had to be attended to right away: the war with Ptolemy and the insurrection of Akhaios. In addition, Antiochos had by this time set himself quite deliberately to restore the kingdom he had inherited to its original size and power, an ambition he had quite possibly acquired from Hermeias. These two aspects of his intentions, of course, coincided, and solving the first, the immediate problems, would go a long way to achieve that wider and longer-term ambition. From the perspective of north Syria, he could appreciate anew the interconnectedness of the enmity of the Ptolemaic court and the rebellion of Akhaios in Asia Minor, and even that of Molon. Even without the benefit of recent Ptolemaic interventions in Asia Minor, or the 'forged' letter which Hermeias had used to induce Antiochos to invade Ptolemaic Syria, it was obvious that the Ptolemaic-Akhaios alliance could go far to paralyse any Seleukid actions. Hermeias had in fact been quite right in urging an attack on the Ptolemaic kingdom, since it was Ptolemaic enmity which was at the root of all Antiochos' present problems.

Antiochos was, of course already at war with Ptolemy IV, and since Akhaïos was a rebel against his authority he was at war there as well. These were the two immediate problems he had to deal with. A cooperation of the two enemies might well inflict such a defeat on his forces – reduced as they were already by the casualties, mutinies, and desertions of the past four years – that he might be forced into a humiliating peace. Yet there were several factors which subverted that possibility.

The new Ptolemaic king, Ptolemy IV, had opened his reign by killing his two brothers, Magas and Lysimachos, and his mother Berenike II.¹ He did this having formed a partnership with his father's minister Sosibios, who was perhaps the actual organizer of the killings. Sosibios was a man of the calibre of Hermeias, but more successful, in part because he was able to retain his influence over successive kings, Ptolemy III and IV, and in part because he was clearly more able.² He was assisted by Agathokles of Samos, whose sister Agathokleia had installed herself as the king's mistress.³ (Ptolemy IV married his own sister, Arsinoë III, during 220.)⁴ This grouping, however, alienated others who might feel that they had, by virtue of their persons or their positions, the right to be heard in the royal council. One of these was the former king of Sparta, Kleomenes III, who was at first confined, and when he broke out and tried to rouse the Alexandrian population, was cornered by his pursuers and committed suicide.⁵ Another was the governor of the Ptolemaic possessions in Syria, Theodotos the Aitolian, who had defeated Antiochos in 221, but who felt unappreciated, and feared for his life; evidently a successful subordinate in Ptolemaic government was regarded as a threat.⁶

The fates of the king's mother and brothers, and that of Kleomenes, were clear warnings that opposition to Sosibios and Ptolemy IV would not be tolerated, and that to make opposition overt was to court death. This was superficially a similar situation to that in the Seleukid kingdom, where Hermeias had seen to the death of some (unnamed) members of the council and Epigenes, but in the Seleukid kingdom the king was a much more active political player. He had proved, at least to some extent, to be decisive, and with the removal of Hermeias, he was not apparently inclined to carry out any further purge. The punishment of rebels, such as Molon and Akhaïos, was a different matter. Ptolemy IV was more devoted to personal pleasure and self-indulgence – one of the elements which alienated Theodotos – and in this he was encouraged by Sosibios, Agathokles, and Agathokleia, so leaving Sosibios in supreme political control. But this was obviously a precarious situation for him, and internal opponents such as Kleomenes were liable to be forcefully removed.

For Antiochos, therefore, the possibility of an attack from the Ptolemaic territories was slight. Sosibios' internal campaign against Kleomenes occupied a good part of 219, so in effect the Ptolemaic court was unable to react to the attack Antiochos had made earlier. The campaign against Molon could go ahead without interference from Egypt, though this was probably

luck rather than calculation on Hermeias' part. It was also soon understood in Antioch that Theodotos was uneasy, and in such conditions he was more concerned over events in Alexandria than in the Seleukid kingdom, especially when the Seleukid army marched off to the east. There was thus no immediate risk of the Ptolemaic war heating up, unless Antiochos himself applied the flame.

Antiochos' other problem was Akhaïos, who had campaigned with success against Attalos in 222. He had certain advantages. He had been, at least until the conquest of the Seleukid territories by Attalos, a major landowner in Asia Minor, one of a group of 'dynasts' who had all held large estates. They usually owed their lands to Seleukid favour, either because they had switched sides at the right moment when Seleukos I attacked Lysimachos, or were rewarded by Seleukos later. They were thus liable to take the Seleukid side if competition existed, though they were also liable to look to their own interests first. This was clearly what Akhaïos now did.

He drove Attalos' forces back to his Pergamon base, and there the war stalled, at least for a time.⁷ It is not known whether Akhaïos aimed to remove Attalos altogether, but Pergamon was sufficiently well fortified and defended to defy him. Attalos was another of those Anatolian dynasts whose position was largely due originally to Seleukid favour, so it may be that the two men saw themselves more or less as equals. Certainly Akhaïos did not insist on Attalos' total submission, and at some point they made peace. This took place probably in 221 – the campaign having occupied the remainder of 222 – while Antiochos was fighting in Syria and then in the east (and so unable to react immediately). Akhaïos also became involved in a brief war between Byzantion and Rhodes and Prusias of Bithynia in 220, a problem which probably delayed his further actions. Then, also in 220, he gathered his army and set off to seize control of Syria.

We have a problem here in what forces Akhaïos commanded. He had taken command of the royal army of Seleukos III when that king was killed, and some of the soldiers were then returned to Syria with the Epigenes soon afterwards.⁸ Akhaïos' swift conquest of Anatolia implies that he had a substantial force with him in that campaign, certainly one capable of defeating Attalos' army. He probably had support from within Asia Minor from other dynasts, and from Seleukid loyalists, but a considerable army was clearly essential at least at the beginning of the campaign in order to convince these men to join him. This army will have been disbanded once his success was assured, and its men, if Seleukid subjects, will have returned to Syria, leaving Akhaïos reliant on the local levies of Seleukid Asia Minor (formerly presumably mobilized by Attalos) and any mercenaries he had recruited to finish off the war. So when he set off to claim the full Seleukid inheritance, his army was largely made up of men from Asia Minor.

The Rhodian-Byzantine war was settled during 220, and by that time Akhaïos had reached a settlement with Attalos which left the latter in control

of the small kingdom he had held before his brief conquest of the rest of Asia Minor. This placed Akhaïos as the dominant power in Anatolia, to whom Attalos and Prusias were subservient. During 220 he will also have been watching events in the main Seleukid kingdom with care. By the middle of 220 he had reached the point of decision: the war with Attalos was settled, he had contact with Ptolemy IV which implied support, the Byzantine-Rhodian war was ended, and the rebellion of Molon was ended.

The offer of the Seleukid kingship made to Akhaïos in 223 was still in effect on the table. The elimination of Hermeias must have felt like a warning of Antiochos' future intentions; he seemed to be replacing his father's advisers with men of his own. At the same time the end of Molon and Hermeias effectively removed two of Akhaïos' competitors. By the end of 220 Antiochos would be back in Syria at the head of a victorious army, and with his council at last under his own control. For Akhaïos it was necessary to make his move if he was ever to do so.

He mobilized his army and marched east. Only after perhaps several days' march and 100km, when the men reached Laodikeia-ad-Lykon, did he have himself proclaimed as king.⁹ No doubt the ground had been well-prepared among the soldiers, and there is no indication that his army objected. But there was clearly a divergence of understanding which soon sabotaged Akhaïos' plans and made Antiochos' problem much easier. The march east continued as far as Lykaonia, perhaps 300km further on – say, another three weeks' march. It finally dawned on the soldiers that Akhaïos' intentions were to make war on Antiochos in Syria. The plan seems to have been to link up with the Kyrrhestai, still maintaining their mutiny.¹⁰

The timing of all this is unclear, but by the time Akhaïos and his army were in Lykaonia, the news had presumably arrived that Antiochos had defeated both Molon and Artabazanes, and that he and his victorious army were on the march back to Syria.¹¹ (Some men had been sent off earlier, after the victory over Molon.) This would mean that the forces which Akhaïos would find in Syria were at least part of the royal army even if he arrived before the king; and if Antiochos arrived first, Akhaïos would face the full royal army. Antiochos' forces had obviously suffered casualties, and the Kyrrhestai were still in mutiny, but they were still several times bigger than any levy of Asia Minor. A little later Akhaïos was able to deploy a force of 6,500 men in an attack on a city in Pisidia; this may be regarded as the minimum strength of his army in Lykaonia; his total available force was probably somewhat bigger, but some troops at least had to have been left to guard against any revival by Attalos.¹² If he could link up with the survivors of the Kyrrhestai, who had originally been 6,000 men, but had by now suffered casualties in their year-long defiance, he may be able to muster a substantial force, perhaps, at a guess, 10,000 men, but this would still be smaller than the royal army.

Polybios reports that when Akhaïos' army realized where he was taking them, they mutinied, claiming that they would not fight against their 'original

and natural king'.¹³ If this is so, they did nothing further to display their supposed loyalty. If that had been their attitude, it is very odd that they had accepted Akhaïos' self-proclamation at Laodikeia several weeks earlier, for that was obviously an act of treason against their 'original and natural king'. And now, having made their feelings clear, they still did nothing to return to their 'natural' allegiance. So what we have here is yet another example of Polybios accepting the interpretation of events put out by Antiochos and his court. He was quoting Seleukid propaganda.

The army's reaction to its appreciation of Akhaïos' intention was not therefore so much due to a recovery of the men's 'natural' allegiance as to their understanding that they were being led to invade Syria and were then expected to fight a larger and victorious army. The news of Molon's defeat – a rebel army fighting a larger royal force – was an obvious lesson. So one of the factors in the mutiny was an unwillingness to be lead into a difficult war and to probable defeat. The soldiers may also have been annoyed that Akhaïos had kept his intentions from them. Since he had done so, it may be he feared that they would be unwilling to follow him. Surely he hoped he would be able to get his army into Antiochos' territory before that realization dawned. Or he may have believed that, as king, his army would automatically do as it was ordered – not a mistake sensible kings usually made.

The question of the 'natural allegiance' of the soldiers must also be discussed. These were men from the western part of Asia Minor, Greeks and Macedonians whose ancestors had settled in the region during the last century, since the time of Alexander the Great; in this they were like Akhaïos himself. Their fathers and grandfathers had arrived and had gained their estates mainly during the reigns of Antigonos I, Lysimachos, and Antiochos I, that is between about 315 and 260 BC. The ancestors of Akhaïos' men had fought under Antiochos I against the Galatians, but since 246 they were the subjects first of Antiochos Hierax and then of Attalos I. During that time no legitimate Seleukid king had ruled in Asia Minor (except for the brief time that Akhaïos had been loyal to Antiochos III). So these men cannot be said to have had a 'natural' king. They and their ancestors had been subjects of kings from four separate families already; Akhaïos was now the fifth. They do seem to have been monarchists, in the sense of accepting rule by a king, but they were clearly primarily loyal to whoever was in control; they would accept anyone who provided order and protection, particularly against the Galatians (and Attalos had won his battles against them). They were thus quite content to accept Akhaïos as king, just as they had accepted Attalos, but they accepted him as king in Asia Minor, not as a Seleukid. If they had any loyalty above the level of the city they lived in, they probably considered Asia Minor their home. Hence the mutiny in Lykaonia was neither against Akhaïos himself, nor in favour of Antiochos III; the soldiers would be loyal to Akhaïos as long as he ruled in Asia Minor, but they refused to be used to extend his power elsewhere. And to demonstrate the point, they enthusiastically followed him

in a campaign against the turbulent hillmen of Pisidia, who had earned a reputation as raiders of the lowlands second only to that of the Galatians.¹⁴

This thwarting of Akhaïos' wider ambition, however, did enable him to establish a firmer grip on that part of Asia Minor he controlled; at the same time it also relieved Antiochos of any fear that he would be prevented from prosecuting his programme of restoration. No alliance between Akhaïos and Ptolemy could be effective in these circumstances, unless the Ptolemaic army could mount an offensive and defeat the Seleukid army decisively; this it showed no signs of being able to do. The question for Antiochos was now not one of acting on the defensive against a possible double attack, but of a choice of targets.

It must have been tempting for him to take advantage of Akhaïos' limited authority and make his first effort one to recover Asia Minor. This would play to his aim of restoring his kingdom, it would allow him to suppress a rebel, and by gaining control of Asia Minor he would sensibly increase his military strength and his tax revenues. He had more than once sent reproachful messages to Akhaïos, condemning the rebellion, so considerable personal satisfaction would come from defeating him.¹⁵ In addition there were others at or around his council who, like Akhaïos, had been driven from their estates by the wars; they would clearly enthusiastically support a return to Asia Minor.

On the other hand, taking a cool look at the overall situation it was obvious that Akhaïos was no longer a threat to him. Once his own army had stopped Akhaïos from crossing into Syria, he would be unable to restart another attempt at invasion. Yet if Antiochos invaded Asia Minor he might find Ptolemy waking up and moving to assist Akhaïos. So the war he must prosecute was that on Ptolemy. The way was thus open for a new invasion of Ptolemaic Syria, an action which would not produce any interference from Akhaïos. Akhaïos himself could therefore be dealt with later.

The campaigning season of 219 was therefore designated as the time for the resumed offensive southwards. The royal council convened to consider methods, meeting at Apameia. Once again the doctor Apollopheanes is said to have had the decisive voice, which might be considered odd, but for the fact that his advice sprang from personal considerations, and chimed with both the rest of the council and the king's personal and dynastic programme. It might be thought therefore that the Polybios was simply using Apollopheanes' speech as a vehicle for the collective thinking of the council. The decision was made to attack first the city of Seleukeia-in-Pieria, on the Mediterranean coast a few miles from Antioch.¹⁶

Apollopheanes was a native of the city, which had been captured (without a fight) by Ptolemy III in 246 during the succession crisis brought on by the sudden death of Antiochos II. Apollopheanes had thus been a refugee for over two decades, assuming he left early in the Ptolemaic occupation. His recommendation to attack the city will thus have had a personal thrust behind it, but one cannot believe that this would be enough to convince the council or

the king – though it may have impressed them. For the king, however, there were also, perhaps other and even stronger, personal motives in seeking the recapture of the city, and Apollophanes is said to have suggested some of them. It was the first city founded in Syria by his ancestor, the founder of the dynasty, Seleukos I. It held the tombs of at least two Seleukid kings, Seleukos I and Antiochos I. It contained a temple in the Doric style on the acropolis which was the dynastic shrine, and where the royal tombs were. More particularly it was one of only three major ports through which the seaborne trade could move from the interior of Syria and beyond to the Mediterranean. (The others were Arados, which was not under Antiochos' direct control, and Laodikeia, from where inland transport had to go round or over the Bargylos Mountains.) And finally, what might possibly be the crucial point, Seleukeia stood, a fortified city, in the heart of Seleukid Syria, holding, and held by, a garrison of Ptolemaic soldiers. It pointed at the centre of Antiochos' kingdom; it had been used once as a base for an attack, and it could be so used again.

There were so many good arguments for attacking Seleukeia that it may be surprising that Antiochos did not mount such an attack in the first phase of the war. But it was a strongly fortified place, so the prospects for a direct attack were daunting.¹⁷ And, of course, if the earlier invasion of Phoenicia had succeeded Seleukeia might well have fallen along with the other coastal cities. That the decision was now made to start with Seleukeia suggests that some systematic thinking and planning had been going on under the surface during the recent crises. It is quite possible that an attack had been planned to take place even if Akhaïos' threat continued, as a test to see if the alliance of Akhaïos and Ptolemy really worked.

There is another aspect which emerges in the account of the capture of the city, which also applies in every other war Antiochos waged from now on. Contact was made with some of the junior officers in the Ptolemaic garrison in the city; they were corrupted. The governor Leontios, and the senior officers, could not be subverted; it does not seem to have occurred to Leontios that, the bribe having been refused by the commanders, their juniors would be approached instead. Meanwhile the viceroy of Ptolemaic Syria, Theodotos the Aitolian, was, without much difficulty, persuaded to defect. His annoyance at the ingratitude of the Ptolemaic government, at apparent threats to him personally, and at the dissolute court, were enough to make him vulnerable to an approach. Exactly when this happened is not clear – Polybios explains it later – but it seems reasonable to assume that the subversion would happen at both Seleukeia and with Theodotos at the same time. Leontios in Seleukeia was Theodotos' deputy, and it would make sense to approach both at the same time, just as it made sense to approach Leontios' junior officers when he proved loyal and resistant. But these were only plans as yet. Theodotos was only to change sides at an opportune moment, and meanwhile his potential defection meant that he was not to intervene in the attack on the city. Since the best way for the Ptolemaic forces to relieve a siege there would be by sea,

no doubt the subversion of Theodotos was also intended to avoid that by preventing any naval attempt from the ports along the Phoenician coast. This method of securing the co-operation of a willing defector was also applied in other campaigns, but it more usually took the form of contacting another king or city in the rear of Antiochos' enemy; but the principle is the same. It became the preferred method for Antiochos in any offensive he conducted. The attack on Seleukeia was thus more rapidly successful than perhaps might have been expected in the light of the earlier defeat in the Bekaa Valley. The Ptolemaic government in Alexandria seems to have made little attempt to assist the city, perhaps assuming that Theodotos would act, or that the city would hold out easily. Theodotos no doubt obstructed any such attempts. But the main problem for the Ptolemaic government was that the city fell so suddenly and quickly that there was not time for any assistance to reach it.

One Seleukid force was detached to guard the approach out of Ptolemaic Syria from the south; this was commanded by Theodotos Hemiolios, and was placed at a narrow part of the route, though exactly where is not known. There was little to fear from that direction now that Theodotos the viceroy had been enlisted onto Antiochos' side, but not to have guarded the approach would have signalled that his loyalty to Ptolemy was in doubt. Seleukeia was blockaded by the small Seleukid fleet, commanded by Diognetos; from the landward side the city was menaced by three divisions of the army, commanded by Zeuxis, Hermogenes, and Ardys. They menaced three separate sections of the walls. Ardys' force, assisted by Diognetos, broke in at the harbour, at which point those who had accepted Antiochos' bribes pushed the city commander Leontios to ask for terms. The city was then surrendered on favourable terms and a Seleukid garrison installed. The exiles were also brought back.¹⁸

Antiochos turned at once to invade the Ptolemaic Phoenician province, which was usually known as Koile Syria. Theodotos seized control of the provincial capital Ptolemais – the ancient Ake, modern Acre – and sent a subordinate, Panaitolos (another Aitolian mercenary), to seize Tyre. A loyal commander, Nikolaos, brought up the field army and laid siege to Ptolemais. Antiochos marched into the Bekaa Valley as far as the palisade by Gerrha where Theodotos had stopped him two years before. There were still substantial Ptolemaic forces in the area and Antiochos used part of his force to besiege Brochoi, one of the fortified strongholds which lay behind the main position as anchors for the defence. But then, leaving his main force apparently intent on attacking the Gerrha-Brochoi position, he took a light infantry force over the Lebanon and reached the coast road at Berytos. Nikolaos, evidently a decisive commander, sent a force under two commanders to block Antiochos' route south at the pass south of Berytos. This is a narrowing of the road dominated by a steep hill. They arrived first, but Antiochos attacked and drove them off. The rest of the army was then brought across the mountain (presumably leaving part of his force at Brochoi)

and Antiochos moved south along the coast to Tyre and to the relief of Ptolemais.¹⁹

Antiochos' next planned move was another leap ahead, to seize control of Pelusion, the fortress which guarded the entrance to Egypt.²⁰ This would have been a terrific *coup*, perhaps using the Ptolemaic ships which were captured by Theodotos and Panaitolos in the harbours at Ptolemais and Tyre. There were twenty quadriremes and twenty smaller vessels which, with Diognetos' squadron, were quite enough to transport a force strong enough to hold Pelusion if it could be seized by surprise. But perhaps Antiochos' plans leaked out, or maybe the seizure of the ships was too obvious, but Ptolemy – it is said to have been the king himself who organized this – collected a substantial force at Pelusion, and blocked up the local wells; so both surprise and a siege were impossible. The plan was abandoned.

On the other hand, Ptolemy's army was not strong enough to attempt to recover his lost territories, though his navy, despite the loss of ships at Ptolemais, was the greatest in the Mediterranean. Once the plan for a sudden attack on Egypt itself was abandoned, Antiochos had no choice but to set about a systematic conquest. He laid siege to Dor, the next fortified town on the coast of Palestine south of Ptolemais.²¹ The Ptolemaic government meanwhile set about a serious recruiting campaign, and attempted to delay Antiochos by negotiations, soliciting envoys from the cities of Rhodes, Byzantion, Kyzikos, and the Aitolian League to intervene.²² This ploy cannot have distracted Antiochos, since all four of those whom Sosibios induced to send envoys to intercede were Egyptian friends or allies and argued on Ptolemy's behalf. Also the recruitment campaign was so extensive that it cannot have remained unknown to Antiochos. When the envoys met Antiochos during the winter armistice, they found themselves hearing a lecture from the king setting out his reasons for the campaign.

The military measures taken by the Ptolemaic government were extensive and probably very expensive. They gathered together at Alexandria the mercenaries they were already employing, which probably means they brought into Egypt a large part of the men they employed in garrisons in their various Greek and Aegean posts. Recruiting officers were dispatched to the traditional sources of mercenaries; these would include Greece, especially the Peloponnesos, the Pisidian area and other parts of Asia Minor (probably with permission from Akhaïos), and Thrace. The recent (temporary) resolution of the Spartan problem in Greece may have released considerable numbers of soldiers, and the Social War – an attack by allies of Macedon on Aitolia – was winding down. Supplies and weaponry were gathered and training began.

Polybios gives a catalogue of the forces recruited by the Ptolemaic government. The Greek mercenaries were brigaded with the phalanx of the Greeks of Egypt; a cavalry unit was composed of Libyans and Egyptians, and another was formed from mercenaries from Greece; a regiment was composed of Cretans, and another of Libyans; a unit of Thracians and Galatians included

men settled in Greece and more recruited from Thrace and Galatia; a new phalanx of native Egyptians was formed.²³ In total it was a clear demonstration of the original unpreparedness of the Ptolemaic government, brought on by the complacency of the result of the last war with the Seleukids, which had left that kingdom broken. The fact that Antiochos might continue the war he had begun in 219 does not seem to have registered with the Ptolemaic regime; perhaps Ptolemy and Sosibios and company were too involved in securing their internal position to pay attention to foreign affairs; it is, however, a powerful indictment of the government's ineffectiveness, and surely justified Theodotos' disgust.

Antiochos agreed to meet the Greek intermediaries sent by Sosibios at Seleukeia-in-Pieria. The choice of the place for the meeting was a clear sign that he was not going to give up this conquest. He had left Theodotos to guard his conquests in Phoenicia and Palestine with adequate garrisons. At Seleukeia Antiochos told the envoys why he was fighting, thereby laying out his ambitions to restore the full extent of his ancestors' kingdom.

In this he went all the way back to the battle of Ipsos and the fraudulent seizure of Koile Syria by Ptolemy I.²⁴ It is interesting that Antiochos felt he had to put his case in this form, since the division of the country between Ptolemy I and Seleukos I had been tacitly accepted by both men at the time. Certainly their successors had attacked each others' lands, but there is no indication until Antiochos II that they did so in pursuit of the old claim. This is the clearest sign that Antiochos had his own personal and dynastic aims, that is, the restoration – as he would have put it – of the full territories ever ruled, or claimed, by any of his ancestors.

There were other areas of dispute besides these old claims, above all the question of Akhaios. The Ptolemaic proposal was that Akhaios should be included in the proposed peace treaty, which can only mean he was to be recognized as an independent king.²⁵ Antiochos would never allow this, and the inclusion of the proposal was surely understood by the Ptolemaic envoys to make an agreement out of the question, especially as Antiochos' forces were camped in Ptolemy's territory, victorious. That is, the negotiations, wordy, repetitive, and complex as they were, were never expected to succeed.

The military position had been frozen by the winter armistice, and both sides made preparations for the next year's campaign. Nikolaos was retained in command of the Ptolemaic forces, and moved first to seize the initiative. He evaded the Seleukid holdings of Ptolemais and Tyre and placed an advanced force at the Porphyrion Pass once again, north of Sidon, the place which Antiochos had quickly seized the year before; a Ptolemaic naval force under Perigenes advanced north along the coast in tandem, also bypassing Ptolemais and Tyre.²⁶ Antiochos, on the other hand, advanced conventionally along the coast road, capturing the cities along it serially. This would give him a more secure communication once he had broken through into Palestine.

On the way south Antiochos paused to attend to Arados. This city, on its

small offshore island, had long been semi-independent, and controlled the opposing coast (its *Peraia*) and the north side of the Eleutheros Valley. It had accepted Ptolemaic suzerainty in the Third Syrian War, even minting coins on the Ptolemaic standard, and had secured a large degree of autonomy from Seleukos II when he resumed control of the interior. In the circumstances of a new war its condition of near independence and its mainland territory clearly constituted an area of weakness, from Antiochos' point of view. Further, Arados' rule of its *Peraia* was unpopular with the inhabitants, and this gave the king an obvious opportunity. Surrounded by his army he stopped on the march south and received petitions from the people of the *Peraia* asking for relief. He graciously agreed, and set those communities up as autonomous cities of the kingdom – Marathos, Simyra, Balanaia, Gabala. Arados was thus reduced to equality with its former subjects (and with the other cities of the kingdom), and restricted to its own island. It was not a condition which the Aradians liked. But for the king it was presumably yet another step in the process of restoring his control over the kingdom which had been lost thanks to the Ptolemaic attack a quarter of a century before.²⁷

The march south was then resumed. Two places resisted and were burnt (Trieres and Kabouna), and Botrys and Berytos were taken.²⁸ These various events probably delayed Antiochos for some time, so that the Ptolemaic forces were well-established at the Porphyryion pass south of Berytos when he arrived.

The first fight was therefore at the pass. The Ptolemaic forces occupied the pass itself and had fortified it; two more defence lines had been established south along the road. Troops were also posted on the hill overlooking the road at the pass; the Ptolemaic naval squadron was approaching, but was countered by the approach of Diognetos and the Seleukid fleet. The crucial point was on the hill; Antiochos sent two parts of his forces to menace the enemy forces on the road and on the lower slopes; Theodotos took a third force up the hill to attack the enemy there. This was decisive. He defeated the uppermost Ptolemaic force then turned to attack downhill. The Ptolemaic forces broke and fled; at sea the squadron retired.²⁹

Antiochos marched on Sidon. A second Ptolemaic line, at Platanos, seems to have given way at once, and he presumably hoped that the city would fall quickly, but it was here that the fugitives from the fighting, and probably from his earlier conquests, had taken refuge, so the city was well manned, and it was also accessible from the sea. So now another strategic decision had to be made, either to besiege the city or ignore it and move on.

Sidon was not likely to fall easily, and the same could be said of Dor, the other remaining well-fortified Ptolemaic base on the coast, which Antiochos had vainly besieged the year before. The Seleukid fleet, though useful, was not big enough to tackle the full Ptolemaic fleet – they had clashed indecisively while the armies fought at the pass – but it was certainly sufficient to stand guard and defend the conquests from Berytos northwards.

The conclusion was made to ignore the remaining coastal cities and forts and to begin a campaign to gain Palestine by conquest of the interior. The overall strategic aim must have been to reach and capture Gaza, which would either open the way to invade Egypt or act as the defence for Antiochos' hold on Palestine and Phoenicia.

From Sidon, leaving that city under blockade by land and more distantly by sea, Antiochos took his main force southeastwards across northern Palestine to the southern end of the Sea of Galilee. There, the Ptolemaic city of Philoteria was captured; from that base Antiochos worked his way south along the Jordan Valley. The city of Skythopolis was taken – both cities were given easy terms to encourage surrender – and he turned west to capture Mount Tabor, presumably to possess it as a flank guard while continuing his Jordan campaign.³⁰ These successes, combined with the example of Theodotos, who was prominent in the campaign, and the continuing unpleasantness in Alexandria, began the work of persuading more Ptolemaic officers to change sides, of whom Polybios names two.³¹ Antiochos crossed the Jordan and campaigned along the east bank, capturing a series of cities and receiving the submission of some local Arab groups. Three old Macedonian colonial cities – Pella, Abila, Gadara – were captured,³² then he moved swiftly south to take Philadelphia (Rabathamana, modern Amman), which gave him full control of the whole Jordan Valley.³³ A garrison was established in the Samaria region, commanded by defected Ptolemaic officers, and the rest of the army took up winter quarters in and about Ptolemais.³⁴

The ability of Antiochos to command and direct his army was clearly developing well during the campaign. It may be that he was being advised by others – Theodotos was prominent in several fights, and clearly knew the ground from his earlier viceroyalty – but Polybios repeatedly gives the king as commander. And if he accepted advice, this only shows intelligence. The fight at the pass had been conducted well, and had been organized in the only way which could bring a clear and quick victory; at Mount Tabor Antiochos had mounted an attack designed to fail, and had thereby brought down the garrison to be ambushed during the pursuit; at Philadelphia-Amman, he set two of his commanders in a cheerful competition to see who would be the first to breach the walls. And he generously accepted the surrender of Ptolemaic officers and then employed them in commands where they had to show their trustworthiness in order to be fully accepted. He may well be taking advice, but he clearly accepted his share of responsibility and had an army which was operating well.

This campaign from Arados to Philadelphia had therefore taken a full campaigning season, and Antiochos had conquered a good half of the Ptolemaic province, though there were still enclaves holding out, such as Sidon, and the posts in the Bekaa Valley, and Damascus. Next year it was obvious that the rest of Palestine would fall, unless Antiochos' progress was challenged. The delaying tactics of the Ptolemaic high command, first in their

negotiations, then in holding out in the coastal cities so that Antiochos could only continue his campaign in the inland areas, had provided time for the government in Alexandria to use its great financial resources to recruit large numbers of mercenaries in Greece and elsewhere.

All this time the Greek envoys had been vainly travelling back and forth between the two kings, and envoys from Antiochos had been going to Egypt with them, though it is likely that neither king was really interested in making peace at this point. By holding the meetings with Antiochos' envoys only in Memphis the precise extent of the Ptolemaic preparations had been concealed, though such a large recruitment of men could hardly have been kept completely secret.³⁵ But this did permit the Ptolemaic government to hide the fact that they had also recruited a large force of native Egyptians, who were formed into a distinct phalanx. It was the collection and training of this force which had to be hidden. No doubt an emphasis on recruiting in Greece had been in part a distraction.

In the spring of 217, therefore, the two sides watched each other warily. No details are known of the preliminary moves, but when the armies finally met, in June, Antiochos was in the far south of Palestine. He had gained control of Gaza, the frontier city which guarded the southern entrance of Palestine just as Pelusion did the way into Egypt. This meant he had resumed his inland campaign in the spring, probably encountering little resistance from the Ptolemaic forces. It is likely that only brief delaying actions had been fought, since the Ptolemaic commanders would clearly want as many as possible of their trained troops to be with the main army.

The battle therefore occurred because Antiochos had advanced so far southwards as to have gained control of the land he had said he claimed, and now threatened an invasion of Egypt. The Ptolemaic army advanced along the coast road of Sinai and Antiochos brought his army out of Gaza to meet it.³⁶ It is quite possible he hoped to simply prevent the enemy marching out of the desert; he had better supplies of water than the Ptolemaic army. But there is no hint in Polybios' account that Ptolemy's army had any difficulties over water, despite having marched for five days and then camped in the desert for 'a few' days; behind them there must have been a major supply organization.

Of the two the Ptolemaic army was somewhat the larger and a good deal more homogeneous. A 'Macedonian' phalanx of 25,000 men – that is, armed with sarissas in the Macedonian manner – was the central fortress of the line, flanked by a slightly smaller phalanx of 20,000 Egyptians trained in Macedonian tactics and methods. In addition on one flank were three units, also phalangites, each of 3,000 men; on the other flank were two other infantry forces, 8,000 Greek mercenaries and 6,000 Galatians and Thracians, this last more lightly armed; this was a massive force of 61,000 heavy infantry. On either side of the infantry array were two cavalry forces, of 3,000 and 2,000 men. The elephant contingent was split also, half stationed in front of the two cavalry wings, and the rest interspersed with the protective light

infantry, the Cretans. These were African elephants, and probably little faith was placed in their fighting ability, but at least they would occupy the attention of the enemy's elephants.

Antiochos' army was made up of a much greater mixture of forces. His main phalanx was of 20,000 men, with a special elite force of Silver Shields, 10,000 strong, flanking them. He had also a force of 5,000 Greek phalangites, presumably mercenaries. His other units, however, were referred to by their national names – Karmanians, Arabs, Medes, and Lydians. They were undoubtedly less proficient than the well-trained Greeks and Macedonians, and they were placed in the line in positions where they should try to avoid having to fight the Ptolemaic phalanx. Antiochos did have a rather larger force of cavalry, and his elephant corps outnumbered Ptolemy's, 102 to 73.³⁷

The two armies were a good deal larger than the Roman and Carthaginian armies which met in battle at Cannae a year later. The advantage in manpower clearly lay with Ptolemy. Antiochos had the greater numbers in elephants and slightly in cavalry, but Ptolemy had a much greater advantage in infantry; in particular Ptolemy's heavy infantry was both greater in number and was also much more homogeneous. Antiochos' phalanxes, at 35,000 men in total, were substantially smaller than the Ptolemaic phalanxes. The lighter-armed and probably less well-trained national contingents could not make up the difference.

The key to Ptolemy's superiority lay in the surprise appearance of the 20,000 Egyptians. Not since Ptolemy I and the battle of Gaza in 312 had large numbers of Egyptians been enrolled into the Ptolemaic armies, though Egyptians manned the navy. It is a measure of the desperation which must have been felt in the Ptolemaic government that this large force was recruited; it cannot have been expected by the Seleukid commanders. Its presence, whether they fought well or not, was decisive in providing the essential numerical edge and heavier weight in the Ptolemaic attack.

The two armies were arrayed in the normal way, with the infantry flanked by the cavalry, but some of Antiochos' light armed troops were placed in the main line, and it seems that the Ptolemaic phalanx was mustered into a denser array than usual: instead of sixteen lines deep it was perhaps arranged into twenty-four or even thirty-two; the narrowness of the field of battle required this, for there had to be space on either flank for the cavalry.³⁸

The two kings paraded before their troops before the battle began, making encouraging comments. This was obviously expected of Antiochos, but Ptolemy was also present, perhaps to Seleukid surprise. (Theodotos the Aitolian had attempted an assassination the previous night, but had failed.) Ptolemy was also accompanied by his sister-wife Arsinoe, and she paraded before the army with her brother-husband. The Ptolemaic regime was indicating that this was a decisive encounter, and the presence of both king and queen was a clear sign that everything was being thrown into the fight – for there was at this point no living heir to the kingdom. If Ptolemy died in the

fight, the kingdom would collapse. He was staking a very great deal on the loyalty of his subjects.

The elephants clashed first, the Africans of Ptolemy being driven back by Antiochos' more numerous and competent Indians. Some were driven back onto part of the Ptolemaic infantry, but tactics existed to cope with this and the confusion which might have been expected was not serious. The cavalry encounters on each wing resulted in the heavier Seleukid right wing, under Antiochos himself, driving off the Ptolemaic left (where Ptolemy was stationed), but the reverse happened on the other wing. In neither case were these charges at first decisive, since the cavalry fights continued after the initial clash, so that on neither wing could the decisive cavalry attack on the flanks of the phalanx take place.

This turned out to be Antiochos' last chance, for the Ptolemaic right wing cavalry did in fact recover, and succeeded in driving back two of the national contingents in the Seleukid line, the Medes and the Arabs, neither of whom can have been trained as heavy infantry. The defeat of these forces, 15,000 strong in total, meant that the Seleukid line was now decisively weakened, and the phalanx was exposed to an attack in flank. Until this point neither phalanx had shown any enthusiasm to close with the enemy, but now the Ptolemaic phalanx began to advance. It is said that Ptolemy suddenly showed himself in the midst of the phalanx and that it was his presence which inspired the attack, but it was Sosibios and Andromachos who commanded the phalanx's advance to the attack. Ptolemy's move – he had been with the defeated left-wing cavalry – was perhaps a matter of survival, but it was also sensible. The main Seleukid phalanx was inevitably defeated by sheer weight. As it collapsed and the men turned to flee, the victorious Ptolemaic cavalry on that wing got amongst them and did most of the killing.³⁹

The casualties, insofar as the numbers can be accepted, were in accordance with the result of the battle: Antiochos lost 14,000 infantry (10,000 killed and 4,000 captured), whereas Ptolemy lost only 1,500. Ptolemy lost 700 cavalymen, Antiochos only 300. Of the elephants Antiochos lost five, but Ptolemy had sixteen killed and the rest were mainly captured.⁴⁰

These losses, plus the demoralization of defeat, and the probable scattering of the fugitives (though the elephants and the captured Ptolemaic elephants apparently survived without trouble), made it impossible for Antiochos to continue. He had hoped to collect those fugitives and make a stand, a not unreasonable idea since Ptolemy may well advance his army by sections, which could be defeated in detail, but the fugitives went right on past him and into Gaza. He followed them, perhaps acting as a rear guard, and next morning, no doubt after getting a clearer idea of his remaining resources, he asked for a truce to bury the dead, the traditional way of admitting defeat by failing to admit it.⁴¹

This truce covered more than the burial of the dead, for at the end of it Antiochos marched his army away without any interference by Ptolemy. He

still had, of course, at least 50,000 men under arms, and this was not a force to be attacked with impunity. Ptolemy settled down to the agreeable task of accepting the submissions of all those towns and cities which had surrendered to Antiochos, a process which will have involved the presentation of tribute to him.⁴²

Antiochos sent envoys to arrange a more permanent truce. His envoys were his 'nephew' Antipater and Theodotos Hemiolios. Since his brother had never married and his sister was not yet married, the precise relationship of Antipater to Antiochos is unclear; he is unlikely to have been a son of one of his wife's brothers. But Polybios throughout the account of this campaign is prone to mistakes of detail, perhaps because he seems in his account of events around the battle to have been using a Ptolemaic source. It is probable that Antipater really was a member of the Seleukid family, but perhaps no more than a distant cousin of the king's, and the relationship was 'improved' in order to butter up Ptolemy. The task of the envoys was to arrange a truce during which a peace treaty could be agreed. Ptolemy complained for a time to them, but then agreed, and assigned the task of negotiation to Sosibios.⁴³

The terms of the treaty agreed at Antioch are nowhere specified, but can be discovered from later events and incidental comments. Ptolemy recovered all Antiochos' conquests in Palestine and Phoenicia, as far as the Eleutheros River, probably without conditions, and without Antiochos paying any indemnity. Once Antiochos was back in north Syria, he was essentially out of reach. The Ptolemaic army would not be able to attack him there, and so the peace, once this was clearly understood, was easily arranged. The only territory formally transferred from one to another was the city of Seleukeia-in-Pieria, which passed back into Seleukid hands. If he felt like deceiving himself, Antiochos could therefore claim to have been the victor, though there is no sign that he did.

In terms of the general political situation, this peace signalled the end for Akhaios. The peace was made between Antiochos and Ptolemy, and once the oaths of ratification had been administered it would hold until one of them died. This meant that no alliance between Ptolemy and Akhaios was of much use, since Ptolemy would not break his oath of peace. Protection of Akhaios had been intended to be included by Ptolemy in the former negotiations in the winter of 219/218, and had been decisively rejected by Antiochos; it was presumably not raised by Sosibios in the latest sessions. Akhaios was doomed.

Chapter Three

Akhaaios and Attalos

Among the commanders of military units on the Seleukid side in the battle of Raphia was a man called Themison. This unusual name connects him with Themisonion, a city evidently founded by and named for another man of that name.¹ It seems probable that the Themison at Raphia was a descendant of the city-founder and was serving Antiochos III because he had been expelled from his home city during the various complicated wars in Asia Minor during the previous twenty-five years; he will, of course, have hoped to return.

In 246 or 245 Seleukos II had appointed his younger brother Antiochos Hierax as his viceroy in Asia Minor while he attended to the more important matter of recapturing north Syria from Ptolemy III. Antiochos made himself independent and took the royal title, quite possibly with the encouragement of his mother, the daughter of the first Akhaaios. Hierax had to fight several enemies to make his claim and rule effective. In this he was eventually unsuccessful and he left Asia Minor in a political mess.

Themison of the city was one of several dynasts who held large estates, particularly along the Royal Road which connected Syria with the western part of Asia Minor. Akhaaios was another of those men, also Lysias and Dokimos. Elsewhere there were settlements of Macedonians, particularly in Lydia, around Sardis, and even older settlements of Iranians from the Akhaimenid Persian period.² These men all had estates of some size and were of considerable wealth. Akhaaios was (probably) the grandson of the second son of Seleukos I, and first appears in Asia Minor in 267.³ Others were either there already when Seleukos conquered Lysimachos, or were given estates by Seleukos himself. Akhaaios was evidently of the second type, as perhaps was Lysias; Dokimos had been a survivor from Alexander the Great's time; and the most vigorous of them all, the family of Attalos I, rose to power under Lysimachos.⁴ The Macedonians had arrived at any time between Alexander and Seleukos or his son Antiochos I.

These men had considerable local power and it was on their allegiance that

the royal authority was to a large extent based. When Lysimachos began to forfeit that allegiance in his last years, it was these dynasts' desertions which opened the way for Seleukos' invasion and conquest – Attalos' ancestor Philetairos was notable in this. At the time the dynasts could apparently see nothing better than to be attached to a king. The family of Lysias appears to have maintained their loyalty to the Seleukid family long after Antiochos III's expulsion from Asia Minor, since a Lysias acted as regent for Antiochos V in the 160s; not all these men deserted when the pressure was on. But when a king's vigour failed they were very liable to switch sides, and since 246 the Seleukids had been failing. This meant that Asia Minor was a country which had to be approached with a certain political delicacy. Loyalties were now very fragmented: the Attalids claimed complete independence; some dynasts, like Dokimos, had disappeared, leaving it seems no heirs, but having founded cities. The attempt by Attalos I to seize control of the Seleukid territories may well not have pleased the other dynasts, who probably regarded themselves as his equals.

Not that these dynasts were the only political entities to be considered in Asia Minor. There were also the old Greek cities strung along the coasts from the Bosporos to Pamphylia, some large and wealthy like Ephesos and Miletos, others small and struggling; but all of them were proud and they all valued their autonomy. Given the choice they all preferred complete and unfettered independence, though in a time of powerful kings their choice was hardly free, and some of these cities were as interested in holding a little empire of their own as in being independent themselves.

In the interior the Galatians had been settled by Antiochos I after he had finally beaten them so decisively that he was able to impose his will. Not that the Galatians remained quiet, though instead of raiding more or less indiscriminately they now hired themselves out as mercenaries. Every king and many cities employed them – there had been Galatians on both sides at Raphia – but those who remained at home had developed a political organization which in many ways mimicked that of the Macedonian dynasts; they were constituted as three tribes, which appear to have had oligarchic governments, or perhaps aristocracies; each tribe could act as a state, or they could join together as a federation. Within each tribe also there were sub-groups which could act and operate independently. It made the plateau of the interior even more complicated than the rest of Asia Minor.⁵

The north coast held two kingdoms, Bithynia and Pontos, whose rulers dated their authority from the time of Lysimachos. The first kings had taken the royal title after each defeating an army sent against them by one of the greater Macedonian rulers. Neither state was of any great power, but the kings had proved to be adept at using the complications of Asia Minor politics to protect themselves. So the Bithynian kings had a long-standing alliance with the Galatians, and King Ziaelas had married his daughter to Antiochos Hierax; the Pontic kings had a marriage connection with the Seleukids. As the interior

settled down a new kingdom had emerged in Kappadokia, encouraged by the Seleukids.

This therefore was a land which would be difficult to control, and would require constant and detailed attention from a ruler who aspired to do so. This had not been Antiochos Hierax's way, and his authority had gradually crumbled. His main successor for the moment had been Attalos I, who recorded in an inscription that he had fought several battles against Hierax, against the Galatians, and against the generals sent by Seleukos II. His range of activity was mainly in western Asia Minor, but he clearly aspired to wider power, and may well have been accepted as king by some of the other dynasts. Certainly he gathered several cities into his kingdom, notably those along the Aiolian coast just to the west of his main base at Pergamon, but he also struck alliances with several cities further afield, particularly in the Troad and Mysia.

It was inevitable that a Seleukid king would make another attempt to recover lost Asia Minor after Antiochos Hierax's death in 227 and that of Seleukos II in 226. His son Seleukos III brought his army some way into the interior before being murdered, and Akhaïos then took up the cause. As one of the dynasts, and one who had presumably been displaced by the success of Attalos, he had a powerful personal interest, and he had the local contacts which would no doubt assist his reconquest.

Akhaïos began his campaign from somewhere north of the Taurus Mountains in the east-centre of Anatolia. It may be presumed that the army he commanded – part of the former Seleukid royal army – had marched through the Kilikian Gates to arrive in Lykaonia, and from there he campaigned west along the Royal Road.⁶ Both Kappadokia to the north and the Pisidian Mountains to the south were avoided, and the cities and dynasts strung along the road surrendered to him or joined him serially, or at least can be presumed to have done so. It was not until the army reached the lake district of west-central Anatolia, where a whole series of cities had been founded by Seleukos I and Antiochos I that any sort of opposition from Attalos I would have been encountered, and from there on it must be assumed that Attalos put up some resistance. We do not know how strongly he fought, but it can be assumed that the closer Akhaïos' forces approached to the traditional Attalid patrimony around Pergamon the more determined would become the resistance.

Akhaïos began his campaign in 222, after the death of Seleukos III and after negotiating with Hermeias and Epigenes and perhaps Molon over their plans. It was not until sometime in 221 that he had driven Attalos back into either his 'ancestral dominions' or into the city of Pergamon – Polybios used both terms.⁷ Akhaïos' progress in all this in part dictated the timing of his claim for the whole Seleukid kingdom. So long as Attalos was active in his resistance Akhaïos could not make a serious attempt to invade Syria. It would also be difficult for Akhaïos, as a dynast, to drive Attalos, another dynast, completely out of his lands, for this would send an unwelcome message to

other dynasts; but shutting him up in his city would do for now.

It may be presumed that most of the fighting in Asia Minor was over during 221, if not already in 222. Early in 220 Byzantion, involved in its war with Rhodes and Prusias, appealed to both men either for help or to mediate.⁸ If they were fighting each other this appeal could not have been made with any hope of success, for it might well simply have raised up yet another enemy for the Byzantines. So it may well be that Akhaïos and Attalos had come to some agreement by then, but what it consisted of is a problem. In theory at the time Akhaïos was still acting as viceroy for Antiochos, and so any peace agreement should have been ratified by Attalos and Antiochos, as the principals in the conflict. There is no sign that this happened.⁹

The war between Byzantion and Rhodes had developed out of the former's need to acquire the means of paying tribute to the Keltic kingdom of Tyllis, which controlled – or terrorized – a large part of Thrace, close to the city's landward border.¹⁰ They were already in dispute with Prusias of Bithynia over several other matters.¹¹ Their appeal for help to Attalos and Akhaïos may well have included a mediation effort to bring them to the peace, but only Akhaïos had the power to assist them. How much he did is not clear, but by aligning himself with Byzantion he was threatening Prusias. Rhodes had made an attempt to influence Byzantion by mounting a blockade of the Hellespont, but the city was more effective in diplomacy.¹² The Rhodians persuaded Ptolemy to release Andromachos, Akhaïos' father, who was either a hostage or a prisoner in Egypt. This brought Akhaïos to Rhodes' side.¹³ Byzantion's own diplomatic efforts to bring a Bithynian pretender to threaten Prusias failed when the man died.¹⁴ Having lost all allies, Byzantion was ripe for a mediator, who turned out to be Kavaros, the Keltic king to whom they paid tribute. He brokered a peace on all sides, helped by another maritime threat from Rhodes.¹⁵

In all this neither Attalos nor Akhaïos had done anything decisive. Attalos had apparently gained an end to his war with Akhaïos, and Akhaïos gained the liberation of his father, but neither had taken any action on behalf of either Byzantion (theoretically Akhaïos' first ally) or Rhodes (his later ally), though the possibility of his intervention probably persuaded Prusias to make peace. In fact it very much looks as though these alliances did not exist in any active sense, but were being used by participants as threats against their enemies. The only real fighting was between Byzantion and Prusias. In that respect it is clear that Akhaïos' power was very limited in the north. Polybios several times claims he was the dominant power in Asia Minor, and controlled all 'this side of Taurus', and this may have been the case in formal terms, but it looks more as if Polybios was merely repeating a formula – for this was the commission Akhaïos had been given by Hermeias (actually technically Antiochos) – to recover the Seleukid lands 'this side of Taurus'. Polybios is also either confused or careless about the timing of Akhaïos' self-promotion as king, several times referring to him as king when he had not yet made the

claim. The march to the east only took place once he could be sure of being at peace in some way with Attalos, and clear of any threat from any of the warring states in the West.

The episode seems that have cleared the air in the west. Once Kavaros had mediated peace Rhodes turned to deal with a problem in Crete. But the results in the north had been to expose the hostility which existed between Prusias and several other of the local states. He had made peace with Byzantion, but was not friendly in any sense with Attalos or Akhaios.

The situation as between Akhaios and Attalos presumably affected the actions of both with respect to the Rhodian-Byzantine war, which rather suggests that no more than a brief truce of some sort, at most, was agreed between them, possibly with a time-clause included, and just possibly, with clauses setting out the geography of their respective authorities. The fact that Akhaios set off almost at once on his march eastwards implies that he knew that Attalos was no immediate danger to him. Any agreement between the two men could only be provisional, since as soon as Akhaios took the royal title at Laodikeia-ad-Lykon, on the road east, he was branded a rebel by Antiochos. If his agreement with Attalos had been in Antiochos' name it was no longer valid, and if it was in his own name, it would need to be superseded by a new agreement in the name of Akhaios as king. In either case any earlier agreement ceased. Akhaios' selfpromotion had wider effects than just his relationship with Antiochos.

Akhaios' march east was stopped in Lykaonia.¹⁶ Exactly where is not known, but it was clear to the soldiers that to go any further would take them into the lands loyal to Antiochos. Akhaios had no choice but to accept this soldierly referendum, and turn his attention to building up his authority and military power in Asia Minor. He will have assumed that Antiochos would attack him sooner or later and he was no doubt relieved when Antiochos turned to invading Ptolemaic Koile Syria in 219. This provided him with several years – three as it turned out – for preparation, but it will also have been clear that Antiochos' attack when it came would be all the stronger.

In that time Akhaios campaigned twice into Pisidia, and recruited his army to gather greater strength. The first campaign into Pisidia came when he vented his frustration at being denied the invasion of Syria by turning his troops into the hills. The main aim was to reassure his soldiers by giving them the opportunity to gain plunder; it could hardly compensate for his disappointment.¹⁷ It seems he spent 219 still hoping to be able to achieve some success in Syria, for Polybios comments that Antiochos was concerned at Akhaios' plotting while he was on campaign against Ptolemy.¹⁸ It is evident, from this and for later notices, that Akhaios had his supporters in Syria, and he may have been hoping for some sort of coup at Antioch so that he could seize power there without having to bring his Asia Minor army into Syria. Akhaios' alliance, or friendship, with Ptolemy evidently still operated, though Antiochos' refusal to consider including Akhaios in the peace

discussions closed the door on any accommodation with the rebel.

When Akhaïos attacked the Pisidians in 220 he also of course set up a hostage to fortune. The Pisidians were very likely to take the side of any enemy who attacked Akhaïos, such as Antiochos. But the Pisidians were not a united people, rather they were a group of cities, who were as often at enmity with each other as with non-Pisidians, a situation which provided opportunities for such as Akhaïos to intervene. In 219 in a quarrel with its neighbour Selge, the small city of Pednelissos, under siege, appealed to Akhaïos. He sent an army of 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry under a Pisidian called Garsyeris to assist. This gradually involved other Pisidian cities as well as some of those in Pamphylia.¹⁹

The fighting and its attendant diplomacy and treachery eventually involved Akhaïos directly. After being frightened by internal discord, the Selgeans submitted, agreeing to pay a substantial indemnity.²⁰ Polybios' account of the war includes references which show that Akhaïos was able to recruit soldiers in Mysia²¹ (Attalos' traditional country), and that he had been able to use the Selgean crisis to extend his power into Pamphylia and into the region of Milyas, an area west of Pisidia which gave him access to possible expansion into Lykia, Pamphylia, and perhaps Karia.²²

The tenuousness of Akhaïos' control in other areas was demonstrated while he was fighting in Pisidia. Attalos, who in 220 had been confined to Pergamon and little else, was able to set off on a campaign of his own while Akhaïos was busy. Clearly Akhaïos was using the majority of his forces in Pisidia, and was unable to prevent Attalos from venturing out. In 220 Akhaïos had been in control of most of Attalos' old territory, which had presumably been the main factor which allowed him to recruit the Mysians he was using in the Selgean war, and, as it later appears, he had placed a governor in their area. Now Attalos' campaign undercut that control.

Attalos had hired one of the sub-tribes of Galatians, the Aigosagai, who had been brought over the Hellespont from Thrace.²³ The kingdom of Tylis, whose King Kavaros had mediated the end of the Byzantine-Rhodian war, had soon after collapsed under his rule, and in 218 the remnants of his forces were defeated by the Thracians, who, like Byzantion, had been dominated and exploited by them.²⁴ The Aigosagai arrived as a migratory horde, complete with women, children, animals, and wagons, and Attalos hired them for his campaign. These are the only troops Polybios mentions at first, but no doubt Attalos brought his own forces to march along with them. He concentrated at first on the cities along the Aiolian coast, recovering their allegiance, either by persuasion, or by threat of force. Others were persuaded to join him as allies; those were cities south of the Kaikos River, including Smyrna, Phokaia, Teos and Kolophon.²⁵

Attalos turned inland and northeast and moved into Mysia. A commander called Themistokles had been left there by Akhaïos, but he held only two forts, which he surrendered. This evidently opened all of the northwest to

Attalos, and he crossed the territory of Thyateira (presumably by agreement) and over Mount Pelekas into the valley of the Makestas River, which flows north into the Propontis.²⁶ Perhaps it was the mountain crossing which finally broke the will of the Aigosagai, who had a hard time on the march, burdened as they were by their families, animals and wagons. They withdrew to camp separately and then refused to obey Attalos any more. He could not leave them there to mount raids into the nearby lands and cities, for he wanted those as friends. He negotiated with them to plant them as a formally established settlement in the region, not far from the Hellespont.²⁷

In this area he had old friends, notably Kyzikos, and also the cities of Lampsakos, Ilion, and Alexandria Troas. These had remained his friends and allies since Hierax left the region. In all this march Attalos had recovered control of the kingdom he had originally inherited, and had also brought into it several of the cities which had been taken from him by Akhaïos. Farther afield he had established binding links with several more distant cities. These places all had their autonomy in internal affairs, but were expected to adhere to Attalos in foreign affairs.

The result of the two campaigns conducted by the Anatolian rivals in 218 was that both had gained in strength, Attalos in the northwest, Akhaïos in the south. But overshadowing them both were the campaigns of Antiochos III into Koile Syria. As long as that war lasted Akhaïos was safe, and he must have been quite pleased to see that Antiochos was involved in such lengthy campaigns. Antiochos is said to have been concerned in 217 after his defeat at Raphia that Akhaïos might take advantage of it, but either this is simply an assumption by Polybios, or Akhaïos' supporters were becoming active again, or Akhaïos was unable still to mount an attack.²⁸

But Antiochos had taken note of the situation in Asia Minor as it had developed under Akhaïos, and Polybios points out that he was fully informed of Akhaïos' difficulties, which suggests another weakness in Akhaïos' rule. There was now a rich collection of possible allies for Antiochos in his intended invasion – Pisidia, Attalos, perhaps the Galatians, Prusias – all of whom had been or had become Akhaïos' enemies in the past three years. Sensibly Antiochos chose the best organized and the most powerful of them, and made an agreement with Attalos.

The nature of Akhaïos' rule, apart from his wars, is almost entirely unclear. There are no inscriptions recording his relations with the cities, and the only source is Polybios, whose focus is entirely on the warfare. Modern attempts to discuss his rule are generally unsuccessful for this reason.²⁹ The one item which provides any indication of his intentions and policies is his coinage, issued from the Sardis mint. The first issues were in the name of Antiochos III, but the later were in Akhaïos' own name, though retaining the same symbols as the Seleukid coins.³⁰ This clearly shows that Akhaïos had not given up his ambition to replace Antiochos as king of the whole empire. The to-and-fro contest between Ptolemy IV and Antiochos surely encouraged him

in this; if Antiochos died or was captured in the war, or even was defeated with much greater loss than at Raphia, the opportunity might come again. Later Akhaïos felt, even when besieged in Sardis, that he could still find support in Syria. Information flowed in both directions, it seems.

Akhaïos reached out for allies, just as did Antiochos. He could call on old ties with Ptolemy, who, although protected from attack by Antiochos by the Treaty of Antioch, cannot have been pleased at the prospect of Antiochos' increase in power which his potential control of Asia Minor would involve. It may also be that Akhaïos contacted the Aigosagai, who broke out of their Hellespont reservation in 217 or 216 and attacked Ilion. This city was, of course, one of the allies of Attalos. So if Antiochos was allied with Attalos in Akhaïos' rear, it would make sense for Akhaïos to make trouble for Attalos. On the other hand, the Aigosagai were clearly unwilling to stick with any agreements and are very likely to have taken the opportunity of an outbreak of war elsewhere in Asia Minor to strike out for themselves. Their siege of Ilion was broken by a militia force from Alexandria Troas, which drove them away northwards. They seized the town of Arisba in the land of Abydos – not one of Attalos' allies – and began raiding from there. At this Prusias of Bithynia came along and massacred them all, men, women, and children.³¹ It is noticeable that Attalos did not intervene personally, even though the Aigosagai had broken an agreement with him; it is also worth noticing that they could be defeated and driven away by a force of only 4,000 men from Alexandria Troas, even if that army was obviously assisted by the relieved Ilians: this was not a very large Galatian force. Perhaps Attalos realized that they could be dealt with locally; perhaps he also hoped they would survive to be a source of mercenaries, and a standing menace to his friends so that they would continue to be loyal to him.

This action appears to have taken place in 217 or 216; perhaps the events spread over both years. By 216, Attalos had been recruited as an ally by Antiochos, who brought his army over the Taurus after the passes were open, and began his campaign to remove Akhaïos. (Maybe it was this which distracted Attalos from supporting his Hellespont friends when the Aigosagai broke out.)

We do not know the terms of the agreement between Antiochos and Attalos, but they must have included a guarantee by Antiochos of Attalos' territories, and a hostile stance by Attalos against Akhaïos, even if he was not able to make a serious attack. This would scarcely be difficult for Attalos since he had probably been fighting Akhaïos continuously since the two of them finished their rival campaigns in 218.³² The agreement will have restricted Attalos to his traditional lands, and prevented him from expanding further. This cannot have been much of a price to pay, since he would not be able to expand against Akhaïos if Antiochos stayed in Syria, and might well be beaten again. For Attalos the guarantee would be a good bargain – always depending on the definition of his lands, of course – and having the guarantee

from Antiochos will have allowed him to merely act as a menace to Akhaïos without having to exert himself.

Most of the campaign by Antiochos is missing from Polybios' account, but it is evident from what survives that he had driven Akhaïos into Sardis by 214. This was therefore a campaign of two seasons, 216 and 215, which was much the same length as that which Akhaïos had conducted against Attalos in 222 – 221, though probably a little longer, since Akhaïos was probably a more formidable opponent. Much the same result developed, in that whereas Attalos was shut up in Pergamon, Akhaïos was shut up in Sardis. The city was besieged for a year with constant skirmishing between the opposing armies, until a weakness in the defences was spotted by a Cretan mercenary, Lagoras, who went direct to the king with a plan.³³ Lagoras, Theodotos the Aitolian, and Dionysios the guard captain led a small group of climbers up to the weak spot, while the king organized a diversionary attack towards one of the city gates. (The personal participation of such high-ranking officers in the assault is very impressive of the spirit which had developed in the Seleukid army.) The climbers let in a detachment of 2,000 men who had been placed in cover. Those of Akhaïos' men who had gone to protect the gates by a sortie turned back when they realized this, but the gate was left open long enough for the king's men to get into the city. Needless to say, having been taken by storm, the city suffered a sack.³⁴ Akhaïos fought on even after the walls were breached, and then took refuge in the acropolis.

While the siege of the acropolis continued, an attempt was made by the Ptolemaic government to rescue Akhaïos. The originator was Sosibios, who used as his agent another Cretan, Bolis, who was assisted by two of Akhaïos' agents, one in Rhodes, the other in Ephesos.³⁵ Bolis, however, contacted another Cretan who was serving in Antiochos' army, Kambylos, and between them they arranged to betray Akhaïos to Antiochos. The idea was to carry through the rescue and then deliver Akhaïos into Antiochos' hands. The involvement of Antiochos was necessary for the plotters to be able to communicate with Akhaïos in the acropolis without being apprehended. Akhaïos was slowly convinced that the plot would work, and intended, according to Polybios, to head straight for Syria when he was released to raise the rebellion there against Antiochos. It seems, by this comment, that Akhaïos knew he had support in Syria still, which would help explain some of Antiochos' anxieties earlier during the Egyptian war. A curious reference in Polybios' account to the 'good reception' Akhaïos expected 'in Antioch and throughout Koile Syria' rather suggests that he also expected Ptolemaic support from there once he was in Syria and acclaimed.³⁶ It would be a new version of the expedition of Ptolemy III in 246.

Of course, all this depended on the rescue being successful, and the Cretans made sure it was both successful, in that they got Akhaïos securely out of the acropolis, and unsuccessful, in that they ensured that he was delivered to Antiochos. Akhaïos was, quite reasonably, suspicious and insisted on going

out with several of his officers and friends, and dressed himself in disguise, so that Bolis, who was running the show, for a time did not know which was Akhaios. But the king's friends turned to help him in difficult parts, so Bolis soon identified him by their attitude. The fleeing group was ambushed, and Bolis seized him, and handed him bound to Antiochos' tent.³⁷

Akhaios was treated by Antiochos in much the same way as Molon had been treated, with the difference that Molon was punished after his death, while Akhaios was still alive, briefly. He was punished by cutting off his arms and legs, then decapitated; the remains were sown into an ass' skin, and were then crucified. (This was actually a decision arrived at in the royal council, not necessarily merely Antiochos' personal revenge.) The point was to inflict the maximum humiliation on the rebel, to remove any indications of his royalty, and, of course, to warn others contemplating rebellion.³⁸ In the acropolis Akhaios' wife (who was a daughter of Mithradates of Pontos, and so a sister of Antiochos' own wife, with the same name, Laodike) carried on the fight for a time, but the commander of the city, Aribazos, disagreed with her, and the garrison divided between them. One group thereupon surrendered, so the other did also, though which gave way first is not known.³⁹

The removal of Akhaios and his supporters restored Seleukid authority, but the underlying problems of governing the region continued. Akhaios (and Antiochos Hierax before him) had gathered local support in part because he ruled only in Asia Minor and did not have to share his attention with other areas and provinces; the refusal of his soldiers to follow him into Syria may have been because they expected to be beaten by a bigger force, though Polybios' assertion that they did not wish to fight against their 'natural' king is unconvincing, as pointed out earlier. They were, however, quite prepared to support him as their king within Asia Minor, as shown by their enthusiastic raid into Pisidia, and their willingness to go on fighting against Attalos (for years) and Antiochos (whose campaign took three years in the end). This implies that their priority was to have a local ruler who could attend to local matters. This had probably been the basis for the local acceptance of Antiochos I, for he had fought to defend the Greeks and Macedonians against the Galatians, and Antiochos II had spent much of his reign in Asia Minor and was married to Akhaios' sister. But Hierax had let the Galatians loose again by allying with them, and it was Attalos I who had then defeated them. Akhaios, as a local dynast, was acceptable as a replacement for Attalos, another local dynast, and it may be that Attalos had considerable local support, for Akhaios refrained from deposing him.

So Antiochos had to work hard to reassure the dynasts and Greeks and Macedonians of Asia Minor that he would be effective as the lord of Asia Minor. It was a good start that he had an alliance with Attalos, even if the latter was not permitted to extend his territories. Indeed, the expedition he had led in 218 into the north was apparently not accepted by Antiochos as an extension of Attalos' lands. Presumably relying on the earlier power of

Akhaïos in the area, it is probable that Antiochos took control of Mysia.⁴⁰ Attalos had apparently lost any control he had established in Mysia to Akhaïos in the fighting which followed Akhaïos' return from Pisidia.

So Attalos, though preserved and recognized as independent, was also fully contained. Prusias of Bithynia had intervened near the Hellespont in 216 to suppress the troublesome Aigosagai, but he did not retain control over the area, for Antiochos took it over. At some point, therefore, probably during the siege of Sardis, Antiochos sent a force into the northwest and secured control over Mysia.

The immediate issue after the removal of Akhaïos was Sardis. The city had been sacked, and was then occupied by the victorious army. Tribute had been extracted, a new tax was imposed, troops were billeted in private houses, and the gymnasium was taken over by the army.⁴¹ This was all very unpleasant for the surviving population, and it may well have been repeated in any other city which had supported Akhaïos. Of course, by the time Antiochos had reached Sardis, most of the rest of the kingdom had probably been occupied, and in the campaign no doubt most of the cities had submitted as soon as summoned, just as those in Koile Syria had offered submission and tribute to Ptolemy IV after the brief Seleukid occupation. But Sardis was the main city, the place used since the Akhaimenid Empire as the government centre, the provincial capital of Asia Minor, and so it had necessarily to suffer the most as a stern example to the rest.

Antiochos had been through this process before, at Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris, where the imposition of punishment had been attributed to Hermeias. It was, of course, a recognized ploy to do so and then to relax the punitive measures as a gesture of 'forgiveness'. At Seleukeia Antiochos had been able to gather the credit for the relaxation while casting the blame for the punishment onto Hermeias; at Sardis he first punished and then relaxed those measures himself, thus deploying two messages: stern measures for rebels, and generosity for submission.

The wider issue of the government of the region as a whole was solved by the appointment of the loyal Zeuxis as viceroy over all Seleukid territories on 'this side of Taurus'. How far east his authority ran is not clear, but it certainly applied in the western regions. (The geographical term 'this side of Taurus' is in fact vague; there is no evidence of Zeuxis operating in, say, Lykaonia, which might have been put under another governor, possibly as Zeuxis' subordinate.) There was certainly a need for a governor in the west, since it seems probable that there was still some resentment at Antiochos' conquest. The delicacy of the general situation is suggested by the actions of the *strategos* Themistokles who had defected from Akhaïos to Attalos in Mysia in 218, and now reappears at Seleukeia-Tralleis defecting from Attalos to Antiochos.⁴² (This would make sense if he was one of Akhaïos' officers in his original campaign in 222, and so presumably originally an officer also of the Seleukid army; with Antiochos' arrival he then reverted to his original

loyalty.)

One measure which Antiochos took, a little later, was to recruit 2,000 Jewish families in Babylonia and dispatch them as colonists to Lydia and Phrygia. The letter noted by Josephus recording this was addressed to Zeuxis and it is usually dated some time after Antiochos set off on his campaign into the east.⁴³ The assumption must be that these families were settled in the area to combat unrest. This, however, is certainly an unusual action for Antiochos III, who rarely, if ever, colonized anywhere, and a certain doubt must exist as to the accuracy of Josephus' account. Continuing partisans of Akhaïos in the area have been suggested as the opponents, though with Akhaïos dead this seems unlikely. But there were (and are) wild areas in Asia Minor, and banditry and dissension have been common throughout the land's history. Further, there was certainly a substantial Jewish community in the Lydian region later, whose origin may well lie at this time. Planting a loyalist group in a dissident area would certainly help Zeuxis to control the region, and Zeuxis was already familiar with Babylonia – maybe it was his idea. The soldiers amongst the families would be a useful source of authority for him, for he may well have had difficulty in calling up the old soldiers of Akhaïos in such circumstances.

A further measure, clearly designed to attract the loyalty of the wealthy in Asia Minor, was the institution of a royal cult. One was organized in Sardis while Antiochos was there in 213 in the name of his wife, who had joined him there.⁴⁴ Later a wider cult was organized, supposedly the revival of one which had existed under Antiochos II (or just possibly Akhaïos I – the reference is to Antiochos III's grandfather). These cults would require the appointment of locally important men as priests, which were also positions of obvious authority and profit, and the whole scheme is clearly on one level designed to attract those locally prominent men to loyalty to the dynasty. The chief priest, Nikanor, the king's chamberlain, was appointed over 'all the shrines in all the land beyond the Taurus'.⁴⁵

Antiochos began an expedition to the east in 212, the year after the end of Akhaïos. He had spent some months in Asia Minor after his victory, and on his departure, probably late in 213, he had made it clear that Zeuxis was now in charge, even deflecting a request onto Zeuxis to be answered.⁴⁶ It would be useful to know something of where Zeuxis came from, whether he was a native of one of the Asia Minor cities, and so familiar with the region's problems, or from elsewhere and so able to act as a neutral.⁴⁷ It is hardly to be expected when Antiochos left Asia Minor that Zeuxis would hold his viceregal authority in the region for the next twenty years, but it may have reassured those in Asia Minor who still hankered after independence that the region was being governed as a unit, and that a man with the confidence of the king would attend to local matters. Zeuxis was thus the next in the line of a series of local rulers – Antiochos Hierax, Attalos, Akhaïos, Zeuxis.

Chapter Four

The Expedition to the East

The suppression of Akhaïos' rebellion in Asia Minor was no more than the first of the tasks which required to be done in restoring the Seleukid Kingdom, the project which Antiochos had embarked on. He had also clearly envisioned a 'recovery' of Phoenicia and Palestine, but this was not now possible, since he was now oath-bound to keep the peace with Ptolemy IV, until one of them died. There were, however, plenty of other targets for his ambition. He could probably remember the failure of his father's expedition into Iran in about 235, which was foiled partly by the resistance of the rebellious kingdoms he was attempting to recover, and partly by trouble elsewhere in the kingdom, particularly Babylon. It followed that, before he could move into Iran the territory which would be 'behind' him – Syria, Asia Minor, Babylonia – must be secured.

He had already attended to Asia Minor, where Akhaïos had been a continuing threat, and might have invaded Syria at any time; even if his local army had refused, if he had the resources he could have always hired mercenaries. He clearly had supporters in Syria, and it is unlikely Antiochos was unaware of this. Akhaïos had also been hampered by the continuing hostility of Attalos I, whom Antiochos had neutralized by making him an ally. His suppression had solved the main problem in Asia Minor, even though it must have been clear that the ambition of Attalos had not been quenched, but only, like Antiochos' own aims in Syria, delayed. In Syria also Antiochos had established better control by bringing Arados into closer relationship with the rest of the country, while the elimination of Akhaïos had taken away the most likely figurehead of any local dissidence. The risk of Ptolemaic intrigues having an effect while he was away was thereby reduced – the lethargy into which Ptolemy IV had sunk after his victory was also encouraging.

One of the main difficulties his father had experienced had been in Babylonia, where periodic outbursts of trouble in Babylon itself involving the guard in the royal palace had distracted him. This may have been one of the reasons why Antiochos himself had gone to Babylonia during his brother's

reign, and his defeat of Molon will have administered a salutary lesson to any dissidents there. This was all the more important since Babylonia was the major economic region of the kingdom, and therefore the main source of tax revenues. Control here was perhaps even more vital than in the Asia Minor. (And later the kingdom survived the loss of Asia Minor, but the loss of Babylonia reduced it to a minor state.)

When he surveyed the task of recovering the east, therefore, Antiochos could be confident that the west and Babylonia were safe. He had no fears of insurrection – despite possibly irritating issues in Anatolia – and he could see no external enemies likely to attack him while he was on an eastern campaign. Therefore the priorities in the east could be mapped out and decided.

There were two major issues to be dealt with: one was how to deal with the territories which had shifted into independence in the past generation, notably Parthia and Bactria; the other issue was that several other areas were apparently heading in the same direction, helped by the recent neglect of the central Seleukid government, preoccupied as it had been with the wars and rebellions in the west over the past two decades. The inability of Seleukos II in 235 to recover control in Parthia and Bactria had surely encouraged the local powers in peripheral areas to take power to themselves and to ignore the Seleukid King. The rebellion of Molon must have encouraged this attitude further, since he will have gathered up many of the soldiers in the east in the face of the successive attacks by Antiochos' government to suppress him. The internal control of the kingdom was sensibly weakened as a result, and the only way to recover it was by the presence of the king himself in the eastern territories.

Antiochos had, of course, already experienced this effect himself. He had seen that the king's presence had had an effect, no doubt exaggerated in the succeeding propaganda, but nonetheless it had had a powerful effect on the soldiers being led in rebellion by Molon. He had followed up his victory over the rebel by imposing his own governors in several provinces, but he had also visited Media Atropatene, a peripheral area which had long been a subordinate kingdom, and its King Artabazanes had immediately submitted. Antiochos had not made any move to bring the kingdom into more direct central control; after all, his mission was to restore his ancestral kingdom, and the king of Media Atropatene had always been a part of that structure. The condition of other regions which were in much the same case, including Persis, Karmania, and Gedrosia in the south, and areas of central Iran further east, is unknown. In addition many mountainous areas were inhabited by communities which resisted the imposition of any government. The Akhaimenids and Alexander had faced the problem, and had either paid blackmail or had fought expensive campaigns to subdue them – which only had their effect briefly. But these were only a problem if the king wanted to get through the hills; they could be bypassed fairly easily – alternatively a campaign could be undertaken as a means of intimidating others, and this was

part of Antiochos' mindset, as the examples of Molon and Akhaïos showed.

The extent to which he could or should impose his authority on these various provinces and kingdoms called for a nice judgement. He would have a powerful army with him, and there could be no doubt that in most cases he would be able to crush any opponent. Whether it was worth the effort, the casualties, and the time was the main problem. There was a need to be flexible. The advantage of instituting a programme of 'restoration' after the previous turbulent century was that Antiochos could pick and choose precedents for almost any solution to any political problem; in the result it would be seen that he was as flexible as he could be, but that he did require a general submission from all his rebels and any enemies. (And that meant that he had to pick his enemies carefully.)

The reduction and subjugation of independent and semi-independent parts of his ancestral kingdom was a vital part of Antiochos' programme, and he did require that this be acknowledged. He had forgiven the soldiers of Molon, but not Molon himself; he had left the Atropatenian king in office after his timely submission. The message was clear; the restoration of the Seleukid kingdom was not necessarily going to be accomplished over the broken bodies of kings and subjects, and yet by taking a large army to the east with him he would make it clear that force would be used if he felt it was necessary. No doubt forgiveness was fully in accord with Antiochos' own personal feelings, and it was also good politics and sensible governance, but whether it would be sufficient to hold the kingdom together in future was a different matter. However, faced by the need to govern a state 3,000km long, there was no point in a gratuitous brutality which would only drive local communities into rebellion as soon as he went on to the next problem.

It is this consideration of the need to guard his back which explains the unexpected beginning of Antiochos' expedition. He invaded Armenia, and attacked its royal city of Arsamosata. Polybios places this in the 'Fair Plain', 'between the Tigris and Euphrates', though modern geographers place it actually on the Euphrates' southern source (the Murat Nehri).¹ In either case it was clearly accessible from Antiochos' territories, either by way of a march up the Euphrates Valley from Syria, or from Asia Minor. The local king, Xerxes, resisted for a time, but then escaped from the city which was under siege.

The location of Arsamosata on the southern of the two rivers which unite to form the Euphrates puts Xerxes' kingdom into the southwestern section of Armenia. How far into the interior to the north and east his authority stretched is not known, though later there were Armenian kingdoms in the Araxes Valley, 400km to the east. It would be very difficult for Xerxes to control the Araxes Valley from Arsamosata, so it is possible there was already a separate kingdom there. To the south and east of the Araxes was Media Atropatene, already a Seleukid sub-kingdom. The location of Arsamosata therefore presupposes that Antiochos either already controlled the Euphrates Valley in

Kommagene, or had already conquered it, perhaps from Xerxes in this Armenian war. Between Kommagene and Arsamosata was the region later called Sophene, which later became a minor Armenian kingdom, and again this was either already his or one of his conquests also. This uncertainty compounds that evidently felt by Xerxes over his authority. The region was clearly unstable, exactly as one would expect from a frontier area in the wake of the Seleukid civil wars.

Antiochos later claimed that Xerxes' father had defaulted in paying his required tribute.² In fact the matter was rather more complicated. The father, Arsames, had supported Antiochos Hierax, at least during his attempt to invade Syria in about 240, and had given refuge to, or had captured, Akhaïos' father Andromachos (who ended up in Egypt as a prisoner before being released at Rhodes' behest). Xerxes' aim was, no doubt, to secure his own independence, of which refusal to pay the tribute was an obvious assertion. So Antiochos' expedition, as in the case of Xerxes' neighbour in Media Atropatene, was aimed at restoring Armenia's tributary status, not at extinguishing the kingdom's independence. Once Xerxes realized this he proposed to meet Antiochos. Polybios claims that Antiochos was advised by some of his friends to keep Xerxes in captivity and put his relative, who is described as 'Mithradates, his sister's son' in office as the replacement king.

This account bristles with difficulties. One of them is this Mithradates. If he was the son of a sister of Antiochos he must have been no more than a child. Antiochos' father was not married until he became king, in 246, so any daughter of his cannot have been more than 30-years-old at the very most in 212, and was probably several years younger; any son of hers was at the most 12 or 13. The sister is not named, but we know of one called Antiochis, who appears in this story later. If she is the 'sister' we do not know who her husband was, though it would seem he must have been dead by the time of the expedition. At the same time one of Antiochos' own children was named Mithradates, and this may well have been the person whose elevation to be Armenian king was suggested. But, again, he cannot have been more than a child in 212, probably less than 5-years-old.³ The suggestion that he be enthroned can hardly be taken seriously, no matter who is meant. (It is clear, however, that Polybios is generally inaccurate in his references to Antiochos' family in this part of his history.)

Xerxes' stated reason for coming in to Antiochos – in effect to surrender – was that he found that if Arsamosata fell his palace would also be taken and 'the rest of his dominions will be thrown into a state of disturbance'. This suggests that Xerxes' hold on the kingship was not too secure. The capture of the palace would thus seem to be an event which would cancel his royalty and release his people from any loyalty towards him. This is a similar concept to that of Antiochos' treatment of the body of Molon, and of the living person of Akhaïos; he went out of his way to humiliate both in order to destroy any charisma of royalty attached to them. In Armenia it was evidently the

occupation of the royal palace which gave a man such a charisma, and the threat of it being occupied by another king, or being destroyed, was sufficient to bring Xerxes to terms. Surrendering was thus the only way he could remain as king.

He presumably knew that Antiochos would be generous when he arrived for the meeting. The advice to carry Xerxes off and put in a replacement was, if ever tendered, rejected. Instead, the major part of the tribute owed (at least to Seleukos II and III, and probably to Antiochos since he became king), was remitted, though not all of it. Xerxes handed over what Polybios quaintly calls a 'present', 300 talents, 1,000 horses, and 1,000 mules. (The Armenian kingdom was thus even then noted for its horses.) Xerxes was restored to his position as king, no doubt having given oaths to continue to accept Antiochos' authority, and was presented with Antiochis as his wife. This Antiochis is said to be the king's daughter, by Polybios' account, but since Antiochos III had only been married for nine years and his eldest son (and first child) was born in 220, it seems unlikely that Xerxes' wife was the king's daughter. It is therefore assumed that it was Antiochos' sister who is referred to; perhaps, if she had been married before, she was already the mother of the Mithradates whom the king's friends had suggested as the replacement for Xerxes. This marriage arrangement was accepted by Xerxes, who indeed had no choice in the matter.

This adventure apparently took long enough to satisfy Antiochos' ambitions for 212. We do not know where he was in 211, but Polybios included in the book which is mainly concerned with that year a paragraph on the Euphrates River, which may well be one of his geographical digressions within his account of Antiochos' march eastwards.⁴ In that case King Antiochos will have spent some time in Babylon, where a king was always expected to participate in the local religious rituals, and at Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris, 'the royal city', as the Babylonians called it, that is, the government centre; no doubt this was also the mustering point for the army in preparation for the march to the east.

Much of the king's attention will have been devoted to organizing the army for his expedition – the horses and mules taken from Xerxes were obviously part of his preparations. It was necessary to take with him a balanced force, since all kinds of terrain were to be expected. But above all the open territories of the east required cavalry. Media was another major source of horses, and both the Parthian and the Baktrian kingdoms were strong in cavalry. Yet there were also cities to be captured, and large parts of the east were mountainous; military operations against cities and in mountains always required infantry, both heavy and light. He had sampled some campaigns of these types in Koile Syria, in Armenia and in Atropatene, and the siege of Sardis had taken a year. Then, of course, Iran was a dry land, and major logistical preparations to feed and water both men and horses would be required. The troops might not be able to purchase supplies in such a land.

The capabilities of the Hellenistic states in such matters had been demonstrated by both Antiochos and Ptolemy in the Raphia campaign, conducted in the Sinai Desert without any obvious problem of supplies by either side. Behind Antiochos' field army, there will have been a long tail of suppliers bringing forward all kinds of needed goods. In emergencies it was, of course, possible for an army to live off the land, but Antiochos was surely unwilling to resort to this, since this was the one sure way of antagonizing local populations, and ruining a land by looting it would destroy its taxable resources.

It followed from this that the first major resource, after the army itself, was money. The resources of the kingdom were large, though not so enormous as those commanded by the Ptolemies – but then the expenses of the Seleukid king were less than Ptolemy's, since he did not maintain a large Mediterranean navy. Nevertheless Antiochos had a large army, and this was necessarily expensive. In the Raphia campaign he had a force of 62,000 men, partly his regular army, partly 'native' troops, and partly mercenaries. But this was only the army on campaign. There were also troops in garrison throughout the empire, placed to deter an invasion – such as that feared by Akhaïos, or from Parthia – or to maintain internal control. (Seleukos II had left a garrison in Babylon – and so probably another in Seleukeia – when he marched into Iran.) Every city would have a garrison, and there were less comfortable billets such as the caves at Karafto facing Media Atropatene.⁵ No doubt the garrisons had been thinned out for the campaign against Egypt; most of them cannot have been abandoned. One must assume that Antiochos had at least two-thirds of his overall forces in the field at Raphia.

There was also provision for calling out militia troops, men who had done their time as young soldiers for one or more years and then had chosen not to stay in the army. These might take the place of garrisons to release the professionals for the campaign, or they could be used to fill up the regular units. The latter is their more likely use; no Seleukid king went to the trouble of including an acropolis in every city to have it garrisoned by the city's own citizens – that way could lead to insurrection. So the army of 62,000 at Raphia probably included a large contingent of the militia; taking this into account it seems probable that Antiochos commanded a regular army of perhaps 70,000 to 80,000 men, which could be supplemented by a further 20,000 to 30,000 in emergencies.

The pay of all these soldiers is generally assumed to be one drachma a day, with about half that added for maintenance.⁶ That is, the drachma was pay, the half-drachma was either handed over as food, or was paid in cash so that the troops could buy their own. No doubt that latter method was preferred by all, except when the king ran short; no doubt also the two methods might change, depending on the local resources. The cavalry was paid double the amount of the infantry rate, and junior officers at least double the basic rate, then more depending on rank. Only the senior officers would get rich on pay alone; the

only way to wealth for the ordinary soldiers was to secure loot.

If Antiochos had an army which amounted to 70,000 to 80,000 men the annual cost was in the region of 7,000 talents and probably more.⁷ (In 189 the Romans confiscated 3,000 talents as part of the truce with Antiochos, which would be 6 months' pay for the army; they then took 12,000 talents in tribute over 10 years, claiming that this had been the cost of their war; the figure fits the presumed cost of the Seleukid army well enough. The tribute-cost was, however, hardly enough to demilitarize the kingdom.) The sum of 7,000 talents was the basic 'peacetime' cost of the army, though Antiochos was never at peace. He went on campaign every year, so there is unlikely to have been any serious reduction in the regular cost. The militia forces, however, were only called up in emergencies – as in the Raphia campaign – and the practice of putting the army into winter quarters for a third of the year probably reduced the overall charges. Nevertheless these were only relatively minor savings; the normal cost must have been in the region of 7,000 or 8,000 talents a year, peace or war, and rising higher in the great emergencies.

There seems little doubt that Antiochos remained quiet in 211 in order to prepare for the coming expedition. One of the preparatory actions was no doubt a gathering of financial resources – the 300 talents paid over by Xerxes would help, but it would pay for the army on the expedition for less than a month. Antiochos would also be selecting the forces he would need to take on the campaign. This was not one of his great emergency campaigns, such as Raphia or Magnesia, or the Sixth Syrian War, and so he would not need the full military resources of the empire.

No catalogue of the expeditionary army exists, as it does for the great formal battles at Raphia and Magnesia, but the records of two fights give some notion of the contents of the army he had with him. In the crossing of the Elburz Mountains there is mention of a unit of 1,000 cavalry, one of 2,000 Cretans, the phalanx, light infantry, pioneers, and mercenaries, though the strengths of these latter units are not given;⁸ at the battle of the Arios River, facing '10,000' Baktrian cavalry – though this is clearly only an estimate, and possibly an exaggeration – Antiochos had a cavalry guard of 2,000 men, and a second cavalry force probably a good deal larger than that, 10,000 peltasts, and some other light infantry (apparently different from the peltasts); the phalanx was not present.⁹ Putting these together, and assuming some overlap, Antiochos had a phalanx of heavy infantry, at least 4,000 and probably double that number of cavalry, 10,000 peltasts who might include the light infantry and pioneers; there were also mercenaries, of unknown strength. In actual figures we know he had at least 15,000 men; in addition he had more cavalry, plus the whole phalanx. The Seleukid phalanx at Raphia was 20,000 strong, and at Magnesia 16,000; and in each case there was the elite unit of 10,000 Argyraspides (Silver Shields). Assuming in the light of these figures that the known strength of the eastern armies lay in their cavalry, that part of the phalanx was left in garrison in the west, perhaps he took 10,000 to 15,000

heavy infantry with him; this would quite likely be the Argyraspides (a regular unit) and half as many others. The 2,000 cavalry at the Arios River fight were only the king's guard; at Raphia and at Magnesia he had 6,000 cavalry, and taking the whole of his available cavalry on this eastern campaign would make sense. Therefore, as a result of this speculation, it can be suggested that the eastern expeditionary army probably consisted of at least 6,000 cavalry, 15,000 heavy infantry, and 10,000 peltasts and perhaps more light infantry units, 2,000 Cretans and some pioneers – say, about 35,000 men.¹⁰

A number of officers are named in the accounts of the actions. Polybios appears to distinguish the Seleukid officers from the mercenaries by naming the home cities of the latter, and so it is likely that men whose city is not named were Seleukid subjects. So the Diogenes who commanded the light forces in the Elburz campaign was probably a Seleukid subject,¹¹ and moreover was probably the man who had been the governor of the Susiana in 221, and who had defied Molon; he was then promoted to be governor of Media – his presence on the campaign in his own province would be mandatory.¹² A cavalry commander was Nikomedes, who is probably identical with the Nikomedes of Kos who later commanded a light infantry force.¹³ A commander of mercenaries was Hyperbas, probably one of Antiochos' subjects – placing a clearly loyal man in command of a set of well-armed foreigners was a sensible precaution.¹⁴ But by contrast, the Cretan contingent was commanded by Polyxenidas of Rhodes; the long association of the island and his home-city probably explains this, and indeed one would not be surprised if Polyxenidas had actually recruited the men he commanded.¹⁵ Nikolaus the Aitolian¹⁶ was no doubt the man against whom Antiochos campaigned in Palestine in 219 – 218; evidently he had left Ptolemaic service and enlisted with Antiochos; similarly Panaitolos, who had deserted along with the Theodotos in 219 was the commander of the cavalry at the Arios River battle, and arrived in time to save the king from a likely defeat.¹⁷ The presence of so many senior commanders in the king's several campaigns is a mark perhaps of the loyalty Antiochos evoked – Polyxenidas was still fighting for him twenty years later. But it may be explained in a less elevated way: Antiochos was on campaign, unlike Ptolemy; these men cannot have reached their high commands without enjoying fighting and being ambitious to gain wealth and fame in their profession; Antiochos' campaign would attract such men without difficulty, in search of fame and loot.

This, or something like it, was the force which Antiochos led from Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris through the Bisitun Pass of the Zagros Mountains and onto the Iranian plateau. They passed on the way the site, and possibly the sight, of the crucifixion of Molon's dead body, and a series of triumphant inscriptions on the walls of the pass lauding the achievements of earlier conquerors who had passed that way. The time of year is not known, but the pass was probably snow-blocked in the winter, when the army would have

been in winter quarters, so we may assume the late spring of 210.

The presence of his large army, passively, may well have been necessary for the next task. Antiochos had been at Ekbatana, the old capital of the Median kingdom, in 220 in his brief campaign against Artabazanes of Media Atropatene. He therefore probably already knew that in the temple of Aene in the city there was a cache of gold and silver, some in the form of metal 'bricks', others in the form of 'tiles' plating parts of the building. Earlier Macedonian conquerors – Alexander, Antigonos, Seleukos I – had helped themselves to some of the treasures of other temples in the city; now Antiochos did the same. If there were any local objections, we hear of none, but then the presence of the army would be a sufficient deterrent; the booty, when collected (one wonders how much slipped into the soldiers' pockets), allowed his minters to produce coins of the value of almost 4,000 talents.¹⁸ This was certainly a handy supplement to his regular income, and may be seen as enough to pay the expeditionary force for almost a year; but he still relied mainly on his regular taxation revenues.

From Ekbatana Antiochos and the army headed east, travelling along the old Akhaimenid Royal Road which led from Babylon to the east. At least we may assume so, but the sources for this eastern expedition are not continuous. The only detailed source is Polybios, but this part of his history is now fragmentary, and the fragments deal briefly with just the two main campaigns – part of that against Parthia and two parts of that against Baktria. We do not know if Antiochos had problems in other areas as he went along, though it seems quite likely that he did.

Of course, it was Parthia and Baktria at which he was aiming. Both had detached themselves from the parent Seleukid kingdom a generation earlier, but had gone about it in different ways. Parthia had been the name of one of the Seleukid satrapies east of Media; it had been invaded by nomads from the north, where a kingdom had existed since about 300 BC, at least if the production of coinage implies an organized state. The invaders, who were probably a mixture of peoples and were led by a man called Arsakes who had been a prominent enemy of the Seleukids for some time, took the name of the satrapy – or perhaps were simply awarded the name by their neighbours and enemies. This has led to a certain confusion between the extent of the Parthian kingdom, the old satrapy of Parthia, and the later Parthian empire.

The kingdom was originally based north of the Kopet Dagh, the mountain range stretching east from the southern end of the Caspian Sea, a continuation of the Elburz Mountains. The early political centres of the new kingdom, at Dara and Nisa and Asaak, were all north of the Kopet Dagh, which is in effect the northern edge of the Iranian plateau.¹⁹ From there the Parthian cavalrymen, into which Arsakes had converted his nomad warriors, raided all their neighbours, which would mean Baktria, the rump Parthian satrapy, and the peoples of Hyrkania, the fertile land between the Caspian and the Elburz. At some point, probably in the 230s, they captured the city of Hekatompylos,

the administrative centre of the satrapy.

This was thus in its origins a nomad society, but it had developed a cavalry aristocracy and included a population of both farmers and nomads, and a people speaking variously Greek, Iranian, and the nomads' language. It included towns and one or two cities populated by Greeks and Iranians, and the fertile lands by the Caspian, populated by Iranians. Its royal city, Dara, had been founded by Arsakes, and he began producing coins; a new calendrical era beginning at 247 BC, was concocted, though probably by a back calculation considerably later. This was, in other words, aspiring to be a normal Hellenistic state. The achievement of the first kings – Arsakes I, who had died just before Antiochos began this eastern expedition, and Tiridates the second king, who was apparently Arsakes' son, and adopted the throne name of Arsakes – in melding this diversity of peoples and traditions into a viable state was remarkable. The kingdom was essentially still only a minor state, but one which Antiochos had to regard as a serious enemy.²⁰

Beyond Parthia to the east was Baktria, another former satrapy, but this had been taken into independence by its own satrap, whose son had finally taken the royal title in about 235. Since then this son, Diodotos II, had been overthrown by Euthydemus of Magnesia, who had ruled as king since about 225. The history of Baktria has been even more difficult to sort out than this usurpation-on-top-of-a-usurpation already suggests. It seems clear that the lands north of the Hissar Mountains, that is, the valleys of the Polymelitos River (the modern Zarafshan) and the Jaxartes River (the Syr Darya) had been lost or abandoned by Diodotos II or his father, and had then been occupied by nomads. The Baktrian kingdom therefore was now concentrated in the valley of the Oxus (the Amu Darya) and in the valleys of its tributary rivers. This had long been an urban society, with a fundamental population of Baktrians who had been partly Persianised by inclusion within the Akhaimenid empire, and now had an overlay of Greeks and Macedonians. It was a vigorously commercial country trading north to the nomads beyond the Hissar Mountains, and northwest into Chorasmia south of the Aral Sea (another urban country), southeast into the former provinces of the Maurya empire in India (in northern Afghanistan), and west towards the Mediterranean; it was in contact with India proper, and the king had a herd of war elephants he had presumably bought from there. A distant trade with China seems to have existed as well, through many intermediaries. The main urban centres of the kingdom were mostly close to the Oxus, including the capital at Baktra, a large and well-fortified and ancient city.²¹

Beyond Baktria were the territories ceded by Seleukos I to the Indian emperor Chandragupta Maurya in 303. The Mauryan Empire had declined since the death of the third emperor Asoka in about 230, and the empire had both become divided amongst his children and grandchildren, and had lost control of its peripheral territories, including the lands west of the Khyber Pass. We do not know exactly who ruled in most of these areas – Gandhara,

Arachosia, and Gedrosia, but we know of the king ruling in the Paropamisadai (the Kabul region), a man known as Sophagasenos to the Greeks. It is likely that Taxila and the kingdom of Gandhara at the mouth of the pass was now independent – the city had rebelled at least twice against Asoka and can be presumed to have made a bolt for independence when the empire broke up. Its independence would almost automatically push the provinces to its west also into independence.

This was the region, from Parthia to the borders of India, which Antiochos wished to bring back under his rule. It included at least three kingdoms, several areas ruled by nomads, and his ambition might mean the possibility of a clash with an Indian empire. From Ekbatana it no doubt looked to be a reasonable task to undertake, taking on and conquering, or at least subduing, each of the kingdoms as he came to it. And since the several kingdoms were usually at odds with each other there were plenty of possibilities for diplomatic preparations in advance of the army's march.

Later Antiochos is said to have 'renewed' his alliance with Sophagasenos of the Paropamisadai.²² To renew it, of course, he had to have concluded the alliance earlier. Sophagasenos was thus recruited to play the part in Central Asia which Attalos had played against Akhaios in Asia Minor: he was Antiochos' ally in the rear of Baktria. There is no indication that Sophagasenos did anything, but merely by making it known that he was Antiochos' ally would be sufficient to hold Euthydemos in suspense while Antiochos dealt with Parthia.

There were other preparations which had to be made, once the difficulty and likely length of the task had become clear. In 209, and so probably before the Parthian campaign, Antiochos took measures to secure the succession, though it may also have been as a result of the campaign and its difficulties. Since the measure was promulgated in 209 Antiochos had set off without attending to the issue, but now he did; the conclusion must be that he realized the danger it was in personally. The Arios battle, where his horse was killed and he was wounded, came later, so the danger had been apprehended before then, and the Parthian campaign must have been the occasion. The campaign against Parthia was difficult and in a sense inconclusive, since the king had to make a compromise peace, leaving the Parthian kingdom in existence, if not intact, though we do not know the terms. The fight against Baktria would be more difficult still.

All this could be predicted, and Antiochos, given the experience of his early years as king, scarcely needed to be reminded that the welfare of the kingdom rested with the life of the king himself. Any Hellenistic kingdom only existed and prospered because there was a competent and adult king in charge. The Antigonid and Ptolemaic kingdoms were clear geographic regions and could operate on that basis, even with an infant or incompetent king; the Seleukid kingdom, by contrast, was a conglomeration of separate regions held together only by the person of the king, and perhaps his army. With an incompetent

king (such as Antiochos' father and brother) sections would go their own way into independence; without any king at all, the kingdom would collapse into its component parts and vanish, as had almost happened in the 240s. It had become necessary to regulate the succession.

He appointed his eldest son, Antiochos, born in 220, as joint king, and he then became known as 'Antiochos the Young King'.²³ He was only 11-years-old, but could by now be assumed to have passed the stage of dangerous childhood diseases. And he was backed up by several brothers and sisters (at least two of each), though they were even younger. (Production seemed to have been frequent.) The children were presumably left in Syria with their mother, so there was a functioning court in the west while Antiochos was in the east. If the king died while on campaign in the east, Queen Laodike had a replacement king on hand to take over. In terms of Antiochos' political aims, this might again count as a restoration, since the appointment of a joint king had been the policy in the early years of the dynasty, until one of them rebelled and was executed. This was unlikely to happen, of course, with an 11-year-old.

The campaigns against the Parthian and the Baktrian kingdoms turned out to be rather more difficult than perhaps they had at first seemed. The army marched along the Royal Road which ran south of the Elburz Mountains with the central Iranian Desert on the south. 'Arsakes' – the name taken by every Parthian king – ordered the wells and qanats (covered artificial water-courses leading from the mountains into the desert lands) to be filled or broken, but his men were driven off by a cavalry detachment under Nikomedes. The Parthian efforts were not persisted in, and the army reached Hekatompylos, having marched something over 500km. There is no indication of any other attempt by the Parthians to delay the march, in particular it is clear that the major choke-point of the route, the Caspian Gates, a little to the east of Rhagai, passed without difficulty.²⁴

At Hekatompylos Antiochos rested the army, and no doubt much attention was directed to re-supply. The withdrawal of the Parthians without staging a serious fight made it necessary for the king to turn north. He had to mount an assault on their territories in Hyrkania, and beside the Caspian. The route lay through the eastern end of the Elburz, and required passing through an awkward pass, at the place Polybios calls Mount Labos. Opposition was expected, and the army was organized for a mountain campaign.²⁵ The Cretan contingent of 2,000 men, light infantry commanded by Polyxenidas, went in front. They were accompanied and guarded on their flanks by archers who clambered up the sides of the pass and drove the ambushing hillmen away. This was, of course, a version of the passage of the Porphyrion Pass which his forces had achieved in 218, and was the classic method of defeating an ambush in a pass. The phalanx and the cavalry and the baggage train were useless in this sort of warfare, and the pioneers had to work hard to clear the route through the pass for these units after the Cretans and archers had

secured it. The hillmen had built obstacles – felled trees forming barricades – which were designed to halt the column while they bombarded the men with rocks from above. The preliminary hill clearance prevented this. It is an excellent example of the capture of a narrow pass.

The march took time, Antiochos correctly assuming that the capture of the pass was merely the first stage. And indeed there was a second pass, called by Polybios Mount Labos, where the hillmen had gathered to contest the army's passage by occupying and blocking the pass itself. This was clearly a position where a narrow route could be held by a relatively small force, and the larger army's numbers would not count, and so this was a task for the weight of the phalanx. The battle consisted of push-of-pike, the army having to fight uphill, and the pass was still blocked at the end of the day. The two sides intended to continue the fight next day, but Antiochos again sent his light infantry through the hills to occupy the hilltops behind the hillmen's position. This decided the fight, and the threat to their area compelled the hillmen's force to break up and disperse. It is a measure of the control Antiochos had over the army that he was able to recall the pursuit. The dispersal of the enemy might have been followed up by the dispersal of his own army, rendering it vulnerable; instead he called his men back, reordered the column, no doubt attended to the wounded, and gave everyone a rest.

The march down to the lowland was equally carefully conducted. How far the resistance by the hillmen had been organized, or stimulated, by the Parthians is unknown, but one would expect at the least that Parthian agents will have been active in stirring them up. This may be why Antiochos was so determined to achieve a clear victory: it would intimidate other opponents in such conditions, and it would make it clear to the Parthians that his campaign was aimed at resuming control of his lost lands.

In the lowland he found two towns.²⁶ Tambrax was a large but unwallled city with a royal palace. Exactly whose palace it was, is not said but perhaps it had been a formerly Seleukid establishment, possibly used by the Seleukid satrap of Parthia (who usually seems to have taken on Hyrkania as well) before the nomad invasions, or it could be a Parthian palace. This city was not defended, but nearby was another place, called Syrinx, which was fortified, and where the defendants had gathered. The population included some Greeks, either as inhabitants or as visitors; they were regarded as unreliable by the non-Greek defenders, probably quite justifiably.

The city was besieged. According to Polybios' account, which has the appearance (as does his description of all these events) of being based on a first-hand eye-witness account, the city wall was defended by three moats and palisades. The appearance of strength was delusive, for it proved a relatively simple matter for the attackers, sheltered by mantlets, to fill up the moats, presumably by pushing the palisades and ramparts into the ditches. Polybios also claims that mines were dug, though at this point he is vague and the wording has the appearance of an account based on what he expected a siege

to be like. When the wall was fully breached the defenders murdered the Greeks in their midst, looted the town, and then fled. They were pursued and forced back to take refuge in the city they had failed to defend. Antiochos' peltasts completed the capture.

This is all we know of Antiochos' Parthian campaign, but it is not all that can be surmised. The next fragment of Polybios' account of the eastern campaign which survives is the description of a battle between Antiochos' cavalry and a Baktrian force at the Arios River, which is assumed to be the Baktrian border. It follows that Antiochos had moved on beyond Parthia, and therefore we must suppose that by that time he had made peace with Arsakes II, the new Parthian king. It also follows that the result of his war with the Parthians was a Seleukid victory, for if the Parthians had won he would have had to turn back. The victory and the subsequent peace secured his next march eastwards, and he could therefore invade Baktria without any concerns for his line of retreat, or his line of supply. Further, a Seleukid victory after he had recaptured Hekatompylos and the towns of Hyrkania would imply that he had recovered at least the greater part of the old Parthian satrapy, and that the Parthian king's authority was once again restricted to his lands north of the Kopet Dagh. On the other hand, the Parthian kingdom was not extinguished, for the line of kings continued, with a reduced territory, and the kingdom, of course, later revived and expanded southwards again. Its king had, therefore, been compelled to accept the same status as Artabazanes of Media and Xerxes of Armenia, as a sub-kingdom owing allegiance and probably tribute to Antiochos; and so long as both kings lived they were bound, by their oaths, to maintain the peace.

There are two incidents noted in the surviving sections of Polybios concerning the war between Antiochos and Euthydemos. One is the fight at the Arios River, already referred to; the other is the end of the siege of the city of Baktria. It is assumed that the Arios was the modern Hari-Rud or Murghab, rivers which flow north towards the Kara Kum desert, and so which lay across the route Antiochos had to follow to reach Baktria.

The Parthian kingdom had not reached this land, which was Aria and, to its north, Margiana; the main cities of these regions were respectively Herat and Merv. That the battle took place in Aria does not mean that Antiochos had reached Baktria, only that Euthydemos deemed the river a useful point at which to make a stand. It was quite possible for both provinces to have been reached by bypassing Parthia to the south, even when the city of Hekatompylos was under Parthian control, so it might be best to assume that they had remained under Seleukid authority even while Parthia and Baktria built their independence in the neighbourhood. No evidence pointing to this, or to any other status for these regions during the third century (since about 280), has yet come to light. Excavations at Merv by Soviet, Kazakh, and British archaeologists have not reached Seleukid levels.²⁷

The battle at the river was between cavalry forces, though Antiochos had a

large contingent of peltasts (light infantry) on hand. It is said that Euthydemos deployed '10,000' cavalry, and that Antiochos fought them off with his guard of 2,000 men until Panaitolos brought up more cavalry to drive the Baktrians away.²⁸ These figures are unconvincing. Antiochos' guard of 2,000 men is reasonable, as is the progress of the fight, but the '10,000' Baktrians looks suspiciously like an inflated guess, perhaps taken from a royal dispatch reporting the victory. That Antiochos' force was outnumbered seems likely enough, but not to the extent of five to one. We may, however, accept that the guard fought in a more disciplined and effective manner than the Baktrians, and maybe Antiochos designed the battle to attract the Baktrian forces into a fight until Panaitolos could deliver the *coup de grace*. So Antiochos won his battle, at the cost of a horse and several of his own teeth, and Euthydemos was driven back into the interior of his kingdom.

The next item is Polybios' description of the end of the war, the peace-making process.²⁹ He states that the siege of the city of Baktra lasted two years, which might actually mean a year and a bit, but was certainly a long time, equivalent to the siege of Sardis. What campaigns and battles had taken place between the fight at the Arios River and the peace conference is unknown. Euthydemos threatened to call in the nomads as his allies if Antiochos would not desist from the siege. This might imply that Euthydemos had maintained control over the passes of the Hissar Range even while being driven into his capital city. It also seems to imply that the nomads would be just as concerned that Antiochos might secure as firm a control over Baktria as Euthydemos, with the possibility that Seleukid power, reinforcing local Baktrian strength, would be used to reestablish control north of the mountains. It might also be a bluff.

Antiochos could not afford to spend much more time in the east, while he lay immobile and received casualties. Euthydemos' nomad alliance might or might not be a bluff, but Antiochos' need to return to the west was not. He will have received regular reports of events in the west, which by 206 included the news that Rome's war with Carthage was grinding to a close, that peace had arrived in Greece, and that a serious rebellion was under way in Egypt, crippling the Egyptian monarchy. Matters in the west were clearly approaching a new crisis. So at Baktra Antiochos agreed to negotiations – though it is quite likely that some sort of talks had been going on all the time. After all, Euthydemos' nomad threat was presumably delivered by an envoy directly to Antiochos himself, or at least to his envoy.

The negotiations, as related by Polybios, were conducted by Teleas, who shuttled between the two kings. (It is not clear by whom Teleas was employed, though Polybios implies he was Antiochos' man.) Euthydemos put forth the ingenious argument that it was not he who was the rebel against the Seleukid kings, but he was indeed the man who had removed the rebel, his predecessor Diodotos II. This lawyer-like casuistry is unlikely to have much impressed Antiochos, but he could ignore it but also use it to forward the

discussions. By beginning negotiations for peace he was in effect giving political recognition to Euthydemos as the Baktrian king, so all that remained was to arrange the details – though this might well take some time if the basic positions of both kings did not shift. Euthydemos in the end acknowledged Antiochos as the victor by agreeing to terms of peace and by delivering the contents of his elephant stable to him. Antiochos ‘gave permission’ for Euthydemos to call himself king, and the two rulers made an alliance. This last may have been redundant, or it may have been a gesture to save Euthydemos’ face: by accepting a peace treaty he was obliged to keep the peace with Antiochos and with others of Antiochos’ sub-kingdoms until one of the principals died; by calling this an alliance Euthydemos could claim to be dealing on equal terms. If so, it is doubtful that anyone was fooled. On the other hand, such an arrangement will have acted to support Euthydemos’ internal authority, which, once peace was made, it was in Antiochos’ interest to see acknowledged.

Any other terms in the treaty are not reported, but a mutual boundary must have been agreed. Presumably Aria and Margiana, the lands of the Arios River, were now definitively included in Antiochos’ territories. A suggested marriage between one of Antiochos’ daughters and Euthydemos’ son Demetrios was supposedly discussed, but there is no sign that it ever took place. Euthydemos was thus left in power in Baktria, but reduced somewhat in prestige, and probably in territory as well, and lost his elephants. He had become another of Antiochos’ sub-kings, alongside Xerxes and Artabazanes and Arsakes and Attalos.

Antiochos had kept in contact with the situation in the rest of the kingdom throughout these campaigns. It was in 209, probably when he was in Parthia, that he wrote to Zeuxis to acquaint him with the appointment of Nikanor as ‘high priest of the sanctuaries’ in Asia Minor.³⁰ This was hardly a matter of urgency, and Antiochos dealing with it suggests that a considerable weight of paperwork and decision-making was following the king across Asia.

From Baktria Antiochos crossed over the Hindu Kush – a journey to be made in summer, and so we are probably in the middle of 207 – into the Paropamisadai, the kingdom of Sophagasenos, already his ally. Here the alliance was renewed, but Sophagasenos paid for it with his elephants, and a hefty tribute of treasure, though he had been deliberately collecting the elephants on Antiochos’ behalf.³¹ From this place Antiochos for the first time in the campaign had a choice of routes to follow. He could move on further east, into the next kingdom, Gandhara, whose main city was Taxila; this would open up the possibility of conquering part of the Indus Valley, a project his ancestor Seleukos I had failed to achieve. India, as Sophagasenos’ existence as a local king showed, had relapsed into disunion since the death of the emperor Asoka in about 230. It had not, however, ceased to be a warlike land. An expedition into the Indus Valley would encounter major powers fighting in defence of their independence; this had been enough to deter

Alexander's army a century before, and to bring Seleukos I to defeat.

Alternatively, Antiochos could turn back and return the way he had come. It is unlikely to have been ever seriously considered as an option, given that a third possibility existed. This was to turn south from the Paropamisadai into Arachosia and return to the west through the southern part of Iran. This had the advantage of marching through new territory and so establishing his authority over areas which had not seen a Seleukid king for at least half a century and probably more. Such a march would fit in with his programme of restoration; a second, more propagandistic reason, would be that this was a pseudo-repetition of the march of Alexander from India through to Babylonia, but this time outdoing the master by completing the journey without undergoing a great disaster.

In the Paropamisadai, as Polybios points out, Antiochos was technically in India, for this was territory surrendered by Seleukos I to Chandragupta Maurya in the peace treaty of 303.³² In fact, he had been in Mauryan – or perhaps it was now formerly Mauryan – territory since Aria, which had been another of Chandragupta's acquisitions. This had probably been lost fairly early on, but the Paropamisadai and Arachosia had remained Mauryan until after the death of Asoka; one of Asoka's rock edicts promoting his interpretation of Buddhism has been found at Kandahar, the main city of Arachosia, which had been one of Alexander the Great's Alexandrias. The edict was in Greek and Aramaic, indicating the literary range of his intended audience, and other inscriptions from Kandahar show the presence, a century after Alexander and seventy years after Seleukos handed the area to Indian rule, of Greek speakers with Greek names.³³

India had been a place which in many ways had welcomed the Greeks, once they had been defeated in battle and so were no longer a major political threat. They were hired as mercenaries, even being recorded on some of the Asoka's sculptures.³⁴ They were also welcomed as diplomats (who reported on, and recorded, the whole Indian scene) and no doubt as merchants. Their Indian name was Yavanas or Yonas, and they seem to have been present throughout the country. It follows that knowledge of India among the Greeks and the kings in the neighbouring regions was probably fairly extensive and detailed. It also follows that Antiochos was well briefed on the situation of the collapsing Mauryan Empire, and that in moving into the Paropamisadai he knew he was in no danger from any Indian riposte. He could therefore also take over in Arachosia, another former Mauryan territory, with impunity.

It is not known what authority ruled in Arachosia when he arrived. Possibly Sophagasenos was the ruler, which would make him a more substantial power than just the ruler of the Paropamisadai, quite on a par with Euthydemos in Baktria. If so, Antiochos' route back to the west through Arachosia remained in Sophagasenos' territory for a time. He sent off the collection of elephants he had acquired, about 150 beasts in total, in the charge of Androsthenes of Kyzikos, by the northern route, taking with him the tribute Sophagasenos

owed, when it had been handed over.³⁵ The passage of this large elephant herd, guarded no doubt by a major fraction of Antiochos' army, was surely intended in part to ease the supply problem for his own section of the army, but it would also be a most impressive display of force for Antiochos' Iranian subjects and for the series of sub-kings along his northern borders.

Antiochos himself took the rest of his forces into Arachosia and then southwestwards into the Helmand basin. For once Polybios notes that he had given the troops a 'further distribution of corn'.³⁶ Again it seems clear he was fully aware of the difficulties of supply along the southern route, and had apparently built up a magazine in Paropamisadai. Since this was a 'further' issue of food, at least in the east the soldiers had become dependent on the royal commissariat for their food rations. Presumably the baggage train included more food supplies, but by giving out some of the supplies to the soldiers he would reduce the number of wagons needed.

The journey was fairly slow, or perhaps he set off fairly late in the year. He would have to stop every now and again to rest the army, and to deal with local problems, which had no doubt accumulated over the decades. The Helmand area, called Drangene or Drangiana, was a prosperous region of rivers and a large lake; supplies could be bought there, but the next area to the south, Karmania, was much drier. The arrival of several thousands of troops would undoubtedly strain the local supplies, but Antiochos was able to stay in the region for the several months of winter quarters (207/206).³⁷

The journey resumed in the spring of 206. Polybios says nothing about this section of the march, but it is known that Antiochos spent some time – long or short we do not know – at Antioch-in-Persis, where he met a delegation of envoys from Magnesia-ad-Maiandros. Their city had perceived an apparition of Artemis in 221 and had instituted games in celebration. These were promoted as being of equivalent status to those celebrated at Delphi, but at first no one was very interested. The magistrates chose a difficult time. It was 221, with Akhaios moving into Asia Minor to recover Seleukid lands from Attalos, with Antiochos fighting with Ptolemy and Molon, with the Social War in Greece about to ignite. It also seems they were so enthusiastic that they neglected to invest much themselves in the project. Since that first failure, reforms had been made, and a bigger and more splendid temple was built to demonstrate the city's seriousness, and better prizes offered to the winners of the events of the games. And by 207/206 the Hellenistic world was more settled. Envoys went off to try again for the wider recognition, and therefore to attract a larger audience for the games.³⁸

Envoys visited all the Asian cities again (they had been the targets of the original appeal), all the Greek cities, and all the kings. The response this time was favourable, even enthusiastic. Many of Antiochos' subject cities (and his sub-king Attalos) were now involved, and the Magnesian envoys, when they caught up with him at Antioch-in-Persis, found that the king and the city were happy to comply. It seems unlikely that the meeting in Antioch-in-Persis took

place by chance, for in the city's decree of acceptance (separate from the king's), it was pointed out that the two cities were related: some of the colonists at Antioch had come from Magnesia in the time of Antiochos I.³⁹

This was, of course, yet another of those administrative measures which followed Antiochos throughout his journey requiring a decision. He also sent the Magnesians envoys on to his son at, presumably, Antioch in Syria, and he also issued a decree of his own putting forth similar recognition and encouragement. The record exists because the Magnesians set up inscriptions of the replies to publicize to their visitors this wide support. At the end of the record of Antioch-in-Persis' reply they noted similar answers had been received from seven other cities in the same eastern regions; four of them were Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris, Antioch-on-the Seleia, Seleukeia-on-the-Erythraean Sea, and Seleukeia-on-the-Eulaios (Susa); the others named were another Seleukeia, another Antioch, and an Alexandria, but damage to the inscription leaves their location unspecified. These were presumably the cities visited by the same set of envoys who saw the king – Demophon son of Lycidas, Philiskos son of Philios, and Pheres son of Pheres – and who had clearly been very busy.

The eastern expedition was at Antioch-in-Persis, according to the city's decree for the Magnesians envoys, in the local month of Pantheos, which is said to be in the first half of the local year (though when the year started is not known). The exact calendar of Antioch-in-Persis is not known, nor is the equivalent of Pantheos in any other calendar, but this pair of hints suggests that the army was present at Antioch in the early part of 206, after a march of 500km from Karmania. The army had as much distance still to cover before reaching Babylon and Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris. No doubt Antioch was a welcome resting place.

The city lay on the shore of the Persian Gulf (to the Greeks the Erythraean Sea or Red Sea). To reach it from Karmania, Antiochos and the army had to march through Persis, the region where the Akhaimenid dynasty had originated. He probably took the modern route from Kirman (the obvious place for his winter camp), to Shiraz, which brought him to within a few kilometres of the old imperial city of Persepolis and the recently developed local centre of Istakhr. From there it was about 200km to the camp at Bushehr, which was probably the site of Antioch-in-Persis (or, if not, Antioch was certainly in the approximate neighbourhood).⁴⁰

Part of the Persis region had slipped out of direct Seleukid control during the previous half-century. A fire temple had been established at Istakhr, which made it a beacon of Persian disdain for Hellenic culture. It was probably the source of coins produced in the third century inscribed with a title which can be transliterated as *fratakara* or *fratadara*, meaning 'guardian of the fire'. Thus the chief of Istakhr was the priest of the fire temple, and issuing coins was generally taken to be a mark of some independence.⁴¹

These coins were produced by men who were clearly locals, clearly Iranian,

and by the designs of the coins, they harked back to the great days of the Akhaimenids. They have been interpreted as Seleukid officials, but if so they had as strong local roots as had Artabazanes in Media Atropatene. No doubt they were cautious in their policies, especially in view of the nearby presence of a major Seleukid garrison at Susa. But there had been plenty of opportunity in the recent decades, during the Seleukid civil wars between 246 and 212 for advancing their independent policies. It has to be said that the dates of their coins are not certain, but the imperial problems of the Seleukids after 246 and until Molon's revolt are just the sort of period when control in peripheral areas would loosen, as it clearly had in Parthia and Armenia and Media. A garrison had been in residence at Persepolis for a time in the early third century, and left a series of altars dedicated to a variety of Greek gods there.⁴² The presence of the soldiers (and their gods) may well have been the reason for shifting the fire temple to Istakhr. The garrison of a deserted ancient palace is also very likely to have been one of the first to be removed, by the king or by a rebel, when troops were needed more urgently elsewhere. The passage through their territory of Antiochos III and his army, however, will obviously have curbed the pretensions of local rulers in Persis.

At Antioch Antiochos was either on the shore of, or close to, the Persian Gulf, the Erythraean Sea. This inland sea was lined with commercial towns and cities on all sides. The Alexandria which the Magnesians envoys had visited was probably the Alexandria situated on the Shatt el-Arab, the last stage of the joint rivers Tigris and Euphrates before their waters reached the sea. This was a city in a shifting water-logged landscape, which is said to have been destroyed by the river at one point, but it was an important port, and probably a Seleukid naval base.⁴³ (It was refounded by Antiochos IV in the 160s, but this does not mean it had ceased to exist before then.)⁴⁴ There was also, of course, Antioch-in-Persis on the Iranian coast, and close to the coast between these cities there was Kharg Island, which was occupied, and had a temple of Poseidon built on it.⁴⁵ This suggests the presence of a Greek population, a garrison, and sailors, again probably a naval force based there. On another island, Failaka, off the coast of Kuwait, was a similar settlement, called Ikaros. A dedication to three gods by 'Soteles the Athenian and the soldiers', and the presence of a strongly built, if small, fort, shows the existence of another Seleukid garrison.⁴⁶ These four places established Seleukid control over the upper Gulf.⁴⁷

Further along the Gulf there is little indication of Seleukid control over the northern coast beyond Busheyr, though if Persis had been autonomous for much of the period before Antiochos III's visit, this would not be surprising. The southern coast, however, from Ikaros to Oman, is a different matter. This is a region which had long been a busy commercial waterway, and it still was in Antiochos' time. The island of Bahrain is the heart of the commercial traffic, being halfway between the entrance to the Gulf at the Strait of Ormuz and the entrance to Babylonia at Alexandria and the Shatt el-Arab. Evidence

has been found there of a garrison dating to the 130s, and it is plausibly argued that this was a successor to a Seleucid garrison. It was governed by Kephisodoros at the time of the inscription, and he was called the ‘*strategos* of Tylos and the Islands’, which both gives us the name of Bahrain in the official Seleukid terminology and the presence of a governor. He was governing in the name of Hyspaosines, the king of Charakene (whose main city was Alexandria, by then renamed Spasinu Charax – the ‘fort of Hyspaosines’), but Hyspaosines was a Seleukid loyalist, and had been governor of his Charakene in the Seleukid interest, for as long as possible. The existence of a Seleukid governor and garrison before 130 BC may thus be accepted.⁴⁸

Kephisodoros’ other region, ‘the Islands’, presumably refers to the numerous islands and islets scattered along the Arabian coast west of Bahrain. It might also include the large island at the mouth of the Gulf, Qishm. This is as obvious a strategic point for any power looking to control the Gulf traffic at Bahrain, and there are Akhaimenid and Sassanian remains there, as well as Portuguese, and of course Arab and Iranian.⁴⁹ If the Seleukids were intent on controlling the Gulf, they will have placed a garrison and a naval base on this island.

A number of other places in and about the Gulf are mentioned here and there in the ancient sources, but none have been convincingly located.⁵⁰ A fragment of Polybios describes an expedition by Antiochos III to Gerrha and then to Tylos.⁵¹ Gerrha is probably one of those small states between Bahrain and Kuwait, and judging by its enforced contribution to Antiochos’ treasury – 500 talents of silver, 1,000 talents of frankincense, and 200 talents of ‘*stacte*’ (another incense) – it was a wealthy trading town, with contacts across Arabia with the incense lands of Yemen. The expedition thus re-established Seleukid control of the Gulf at least as far as Tylos, and indicates that, as would be expected from the locations of the known Seleukid posts and cities, a Seleukid naval force was active in the Gulf.

Of the other named places – Larisa, Arethusa, Trapezous, and others – their location can only be guessed at.⁵² They were probably small places on the southern Gulf coast (and perhaps on Qishm Island). Their Greek names imply Greek settlement, but there are other indications that several places had been named and presumably settled by Phoenicians earlier, and these may be the same places, renamed by the Greeks.⁵³ It will be seen that there are considerable uncertainties as to the Seleukid geography of the region, but the expedition of Antiochos to Tylos (at least) indicates that he was able to impose a reinforcement of royal control.

Polybios remarks that from Tylos Antiochos went on to Seleukeia, and, though he does not specify which of the cities of that name he meant, it is most likely that it was the great ‘royal city’ on the Tigris. In between his visit to Antioch-in-Persis, Tylos, and Seleukeia, his route is unknown. From Antioch, though, it is almost certain he will have travelled north to Seleukeia-

on-the-Eulaios – Susa – the governing centre of Elymais (or Susiana). This had been faithfully defended by Diogenes against Molon in 221, and it was surely likely that the king would visit such a place while in the region. Apart from its apparent loyalty (for we do not know the real feelings of the inhabitants, though the visit of the king is likely to have convinced them to celebrate) it was a major fortress, a colony with a substantial Greek-speaking population, and a major mint.

It was perhaps from there that he is most likely to have set out on the Persian Gulf expedition, by way of Alexandria, where presumably the local Seleukid naval force had its main base. On his return he would be able to sail much of the way to Seleukeia, for the Tigris was navigable as far as the city in trireme warships, and indeed in the time of Seleukos I it was itself a naval base for such ships. In this last part of his journey, Antiochos will not have been accompanied by his army. No doubt a detachment accompanied him as his guard on the voyage in the Gulf, but from Antioch-in-Persis onwards he was in settled, controlled, and peaceful territory. The army was no doubt sent on to Babylonia and Syria.

Polybios sums up Antiochos' great expedition by commenting that he had brought the 'upper satraps' under his authority, and had put his kingdom 'in a position of safety'. In this, if we substitute 'kings' for 'satraps', he was accurate enough. The issue of the kingdom's safety, however, needs elaboration. By making face-to-face treaties with a whole series of kings from Xerxes to Sophagasenos, Antiochos had established his control over them, for the treaties ensured that they would remain at peace with him for the foreseeable future, and that they would remain at peace with each other. He had placed himself at the centre of the diplomatic web connecting all his northern frontiers, and so had blocked off any possible trouble from his sub-kings, and therefore from their own enemies beyond them to the north. This achievement meant that, as with Egypt after 217, he could be confident that any further military adventures he undertook would not be interrupted by any northern problem – at least so long as the kings he had dealt with were still alive.

Chapter Five

Asia Minor Again

In summing up Antiochos' achievements in the eastern expedition, Polybios remarked that he had not only reduced the 'Upper Satrapies' of the east to obedience, but had done the same for 'the cities by the sea and the dynasts on this side of Taurus'.¹ The cities, of course, were the old Greek cities strung like beads, or jewels, if you will, along the Anatolian coasts; the dynasts are the semi-independent lords of the interior and the independent kings of various parts of Anatolia, from Armenia to Bithynia and Karia; and 'this side of Taurus' is Anatolia itself.

This Polybian comment in fact looks very like a late revision, an insert implanted in an earlier version of the text, perhaps after it became clear that Antiochos' life was ultimately to be seen as a failure – setting him up for a fall, in other words. Alternatively it could be seen as yet another indication of Antiochos' overall policy of the 'restoration' of his dynastic power over all possible fragments of his ancestors' territories, or any of those territories they had been deprived of, or could be thought to have ruled.

But there was another problem which will have loomed ever larger the longer Antiochos campaigned and the more successful he was. This was the need to bind his kingdom's disparate territories into one whole. Only if he could do this, make the whole kingdom react to his word, prevent any rebellions by ambitious subordinates, and establish a sensible and effective governmental system, would he be able to claim clear success. For 'restoration' was not enough. Gathering together lots of lands under one king was perhaps an admirable and understandable ambition, but it would not produce a viable and lasting kingdom. He had seen, in Asia Minor, in the northern tier of Iranian sub-kingdoms, in the southern Iranian provinces, and in the Persian Gulf, that the impulse to separation, to hive off provinces into independence, was widespread, even universal. He had spent nearly two decades battling this fissiparous tendency, and had not eliminated a single one of these semi-independent states – for Akhaïos and Molon were another problem for the dynasty, in that they had wished to replace Antiochos himself.

That problem at least had been largely eliminated by his own and his wife's fertility. But it must have been a daunting thought that once he died all the agreements made with the several kings he had fought would end, and that they would revert to independence, unless compelled otherwise; the work would then have to be done again in the next generation.

The only institution which was kingdom-wide was the monarchy. The king was the only link between the many different communities which were included in the kingdom; all of them had different customs, belief systems, and traditions, and some had histories of independence and resistance to outside control. In order to prevent the kingdom's disintegration the kings had developed two new institutions, the army and the *philoï* (Friends) of the king.

The army was an integrated force.² The main units were two phalanxes, the Argyraspides ('Silver Shields'), an elite unit descended from, or copied from, a similarly named unit of Alexander's, distinguished by the possession of silver, or silver-decorated, shields and perhaps other items of armour (hence the name). The other phalanx, usually up to twice the size of the Argyraspides, was composed of citizens called up for their military service and those enrolled for a particular emergency. So far as we can tell, all these men were Macedonians or Greeks in origin, but they came from all over the kingdom. There were no geographical distinctions in these units.

The same division and integration existed amongst the cavalry. One unit of 2,000 men composed the king's Royal Guard, a band of long-term professionals, like the Argyraspides. Other cavalry, twice that number, were Greek or Macedonian in origin, and formed a separate force. They may in fact have also included native members, such as Medes, who were noted for their horses and horsemanship, but they fought in the same way as the Greeks and Macedonians – and they presumably had to learn and speak Greek.

These four units, two heavy infantry and two cavalry, were supplemented by a variety of other specialized units, such as pioneers, peltasts, charioteers, light horsemen, which might be of a particular ethnic origin, or might be called such because of their fighting methods. They might be mercenaries, or they might be recruited from the 'native' groups. At Raphia Antiochos had a large force of Arabs, who seem to have been an infantry force, but they did not fight well and are not heard of again. He also had a force of Dahai, light horsemen recruited in the lands between the Caspian Sea and Baktria – from behind the Parthians, so to speak. Some units, which seem to be geographically specific were in fact named for the origin of their fighting methods, such as the Tarentine light horse. The purpose of these different units, as the mountain campaign in the Elburz showed, was to have available specialized forces when needed. Most were as integrated as the phalanx or the cavalry – the large force of peltasts, for example, are never given an ethnic label.

This army went on campaign every year. It did not necessarily fight every year – in 211 and 210, for example, or in 203 – 202, but at least part of it was

embodied and marched somewhere annually. Thus the men were accustomed to continuous activity of some sort – a prime means of developing the mutual trust and loyalty summed up by the phrase *esprit de corps*. It was therefore an institution commanded by the king which operated in every part of the kingdom. There were men who, by 204, had fought in the Sinai Desert, in western Asia Minor, at the sieges of Sardis and Arsamosata and Baktra, in the Lebanon and Elburz Mountains, and had seen (the approaches to) India.

Some of these men were mercenaries. These might, like the Cretans or the Dahai, fight in their specialized units, but others were no doubt incorporated into the regular Seleukid infantry and cavalry formations. Several of the most prominent commanders in Antiochos' forces were originally mercenaries, in the sense that they were recruited from outside. They were, however, included in the royal council, and were rewarded with estates and high pay. This was not quite the usual mercenary system, but it was a long tradition in the Seleukid kingdom. Ever since the time of Seleukos I the kingdom had been open to immigrants from Greece and Macedonia, either as settlers or as soldiers, the latter usually ending as settlers as well.

The drawback with the concentration on recruiting Greeks and Macedonians was that it left little room for the integration of other non-Greek speaking groups. Ever since the disastrous experiment by Alexander the Great in recruiting a Persian phalanx, which provoked a mutiny by his Macedonians, the Hellenistic kings had been very wary of antagonizing their Macedonian subjects by the same sort of measure. Emergencies might well call forth an exceptional measure, such as the Egyptian phalanx recruited by Ptolemy IV in the face of the Seleukid invasion of 218 – 217, but this only proved the point: they were rapidly dismissed with pay and with thanks, but were left with both a feeling of resentment at their treatment, and a sense of their own power, and these feelings were part of the fuel for the Egyptian rebellion which began in 207.

In the Seleukid kingdom the great size of the kingdom swallowed soldiers by the thousand. Every city required a garrison; every province required a guard for the satrap and a force at his disposal for defence; every frontier required guards. Antiochos' field army on the eastern campaign was about 35,000 men and in the great emergencies he could expand that to about double, but at Raphia in 217 and at Magnesia in 190, in battles on the very edges of the kingdom, he could not gather that number. It must have been very frustrating to contemplate the large numbers of non-Greeks in his kingdom and understand that it was effectively impossible to recruit more than a very few of them.

In fact, Antiochos did apparently take some measures towards the integration of the non-Greek population, at least with the aim of softening the ethnic boundaries. In Babylonia there are records of several men, employed in the administration, who had both Greek and Macedonian names; they were Babylonians doing tasks, such as clerical work or governors of town, which in

Egypt would probably be reserved for Greeks.³ From Babylonia also he recruited the band of Jewish settler-soldiers who were moved to Asia Minor.⁴ Yet these were scarcely major developments, and it is likely that the Jewish settlement was a measure of desperation, brought on by the inability or unwillingness of local forces to suppress dissidents in Asia Minor who had taken Akhaïos' part. Antiochos III is not credited anywhere in the kingdom with founding any cities, nor even refounding existing cities by reinforcing and renaming them. This was a major activity of Seleukos I and Antiochos I and II, and its absence during the reigns of later kings suggests that the supply of immigrants had ceased to flow. And yet the measures Antiochos III took to tap the apparent supply of settlers from among his own subjects are feeble. This was clearly a major constraint on his policy.

The other, rather weaker, kingdom-wide link was the king's Friends. This was by now an official title for a group of men tasked by the king with a variety of responsibilities or just as members of his royal council. These were the men sent out as diplomats, as governors, and as commanders. They had existed for years at Antiochos' court, some had grown up with him at his father's court, he knew them well, and they owed their wealth (all of them were wealthy) sometimes entirely to his favour.⁵ They were expected to operate in any of several roles, and those who were appointed as governors were both rulers and commanders, and probably diplomats as well. But they were not numerous. There were perhaps a dozen large satrapies, and as many major military units, for their employment. Others were *epistatai* positioned in the major cities, either permanently or parachuted in for a brief time; however, they were not, for that very reason, likely to be as intimate with royal policy as others. Sub-sections of the great provinces were governed by other officials, who, like the *epistatai*, were unlikely to be close to the king, unless he arrived in their region. (The elevation of Zeuxis from a minor provincial command in Babylonia to viceroy of Asia Minor only happened because he became caught up in the fighting against Molon and so came to Antiochos' favourable attention, but it is an example of the possibilities.)

This was the government of the empire: the king, a limited and variable number of Friends, a royal council, and a trusted set of governors. The actual administration was carried out by lower-level officials who received their instructions from the governors. So, for example, when Antiochos appointed Nikanor as high priest in Anatolia, he wrote to the viceroy Zeuxis telling him so, and then Zeuxis sent a copy of the king's letter along with a covering letter to an official called Philotas, who was probably the commander or sub-governor of a section of Asia Minor, most likely Mysia; then Philotas assigned the task of seeing that the necessary measures were taken to another official called Bithys, who apparently had people at his disposal for whatever work was required.⁶

This was a reasonably efficient system so long as that last section of the chain actually did the work. It would be up to Zeuxis to hound Philotas, and

Philotas would need to ensure that Bithys was efficient. The communication system was also reasonably efficient. Antiochos wrote to Zeuxis from eastern Iran late in the month Dystros; Zeuxis' letter to Philotas was dated at the beginning of Artemision, about six weeks later; Philotas passed on a copy of Zeuxis' and Antiochos' letters to Bithys 17 days later. Given the distances involved, and the need to make multiple copies at each stage, this was not bad going. No doubt both Zeuxis and Philotas will have had to communicate with several subordinates; Zeuxis especially will have had to tell several sub-governors (like Philotas) and all the cities within his viceroyalty about Nikanor's appointment – perhaps a hundred copies of his letter and the king's. So the bureaucracy was another layer of administration in the kingdom; however, as these letters indicate, the clerks had no scope for initiative.

This was not much of a government system, in the sense that it was only a thin layer over the mass of the population, most of whom were scarcely touched by any of the government system. Action depended overwhelmingly on the king if any initiative was to take place, and on a relatively small number of government men, who had to carry out his instructions – if they chose to. There was plenty of scope for delay and evasion, but that is true of any bureaucracy. Efficiency was not guaranteed. (For example, the message from Antiochos through to Bithys did not necessarily result in any action – though since these letters were inscribed and the stone was set up in a public place, we may assume that some action did take place, even if it was only ordering the sequence of letters to be inscribed.)

This thinness of administration was not in fact due to the inability of the Seleukid state to elaborate itself. In Babylonia it seems that there really was a fairly large and detailed administration, partly inherited from the Akhaimenid and earlier regimes, and the Ptolemies in Egypt had produced a powerful and self-perpetuating bureaucracy which was as oppressive in its weight as it was excessive in its cost. The Seleukid lightness of administration was evidently therefore a deliberate choice of the kings. It was likely perceived to be impossible to repeat the heavy detail of the Ptolemaic system for the Seleukid territories, which were much more various and sizeable, and many of which were only thinly populated. It would be impossible to install a detailed and elaborate bureaucracy in such near-desert regions as Iran or Mesopotamia. Above all, there was also the likely large cost. The Seleukid taxation system produced a regular income, but it was directed mainly to the support of the army, the one necessary institution which was required to hold the kingdom together. The lightness of the administration was therefore a necessary result of the size and difficulty of administering the kingdom, and of the priority of the army in the allocation of resources; but, of course, this also meant that the kingdom necessarily remained less than fully integrated since the provincial administrations were largely independent of the centre. The only progress in government which the king could accomplish was to establish loyal men in the main government positions, notably as governors, and by diplomatic

agreements with the various sections of the kingdom which remained outside the provincial system. He had done this with the Iranian and Baktrian and Indian sub-kingdoms; in Asia Minor he had still to do this with the sub-kingdoms there and, above all, with the Greek cities.

It is probable that a good deal of the king's attention had to be devoted to further restoration when he finally arrived back in the central regions of the kingdom – Babylon and Syria – in early 204. If he was claiming to have emulated Alexander in his eastward march, one of the results was probably a significant loosening of government control during his absence. Alexander had had to work hard to re-impose himself on his return from India; there is actually no sign that Antiochos had to do the same, but there was surely a lot of work for him to do in catching up on delayed decisions.

Antiochos' expedition into the Persian Gulf took place during 205, and he was in Babylon in the early part of 204, taking part in a religious ceremonial.⁷ Later in 204 he was in Syria, making arrangements for another expedition into Asia Minor. This took place in 203, though he may have crossed the Taurus in the autumn of the previous year. He remained in Asia Minor over the next winter, and returned to Syria in 202. As ever there were plenty of issues in Asia Minor to keep the king busy, but wider international issues also intruded. These latter matters are best understood once the king's activities in western Asia Minor have been considered.

The record in Asia Minor is preserved above all in a variety of inscriptions from several cities which detail the relations between Antiochos and those individual cities. Since 213/212 and the final settlement after the defeat of Akhaïos, Antiochos had had little to do with Asia Minor. Zeuxis had been left in charge, but only it seems as a caretaker; he had made no moves to expand the kingdom by conquest – not, at least, so far as we know. This may be because he had orders not to be active while the main army was busy in the east, but it was certainly the case that Seleukid governors seem to have taken no initiatives in this respect. It may also be that he had no sufficient force at his command to be able to do anything other than perform internal policing duties. (This again might be the result of deliberate royal policy. A governor with only a small force at his disposal would be much less likely to be able to rebel; there had been too many over-ambitious governors for risks to be taken, even with a man so manifestly loyal as Zeuxis.)

Zeuxis was certainly competent. As soon as Antiochos arrived once more in western Asia Minor the governor was employed in a military role, very successfully. Of course, the possible reasons overlap: he probably had to wait for instructions on any actions of importance, and to prevent any unauthorized initiative he had only the minimum of forces directly under his command. Since the local forces which Akhaïos had used were clearly still available for use in an emergency (such as a foreign invasion) it would seem he was constrained more by his orders. Antiochos, far distant, and having taken the main field army away, would not want a local initiative to create a crisis

which would distract him in the midst of his main campaign.

Antiochos could make use of Zeuxis, whose long governorship had surely brought general peace to the region, and perhaps the local forces in Asia Minor could now be trusted to operate both loyally and effectively as well. Zeuxis was sent on a campaign with an adequate force into Karia, with the object of eliminating the independence of a group of cities in that region. This in fact was exactly the sort of area where particular care was required, since Antiochos' interests were quite liable to clash not only with the cities which wished to retain their independence, but several other considerable powers were also involved.⁸

The most important was the Ptolemaic kingdom, which had much the same ambition to dominate or control the area as Antiochos: both hoped to gain control of as many of the cities as possible. However, during the reign of Ptolemy IV, since 221, the Ptolemaic grip had loosened, and many of the cities had slipped out on his control. Not that their new independence was acknowledged, but without evidence on the ground of actual Ptolemaic control Antiochos could argue that it did not exist.⁹

Rhodes was also interested. Indeed Antiochos' father Seleukos II had actually allowed Rhodes to gain control of Stratonikeia, a city founded by Antiochos II and named for his mother, Seleukos' grandmother. The aim, given that he was involved in wars with his brother and then with Attalos of Pergamon, was presumably to keep the city out of their hands, but it was a startling thought that he had, in effect, given away such a place.¹⁰ Rhodes had long had an interest in controlling the mainland adjacent to its own island, and this interest, like that of the kings, tended to expand with opportunity.

The Macedonian King Philip V also had an inherited interest in the region. Karia had been conquered a century before by Antigonos I Monophthalmos (Philip's great-great-grandfather), and his predecessor as king in Macedon, Antigonos III Doson, had briefly campaigned in the region in 227. When he left, Doson's governor Olympichos (who had switched from being the Seleukid governor to join Doson) had remained in office in control of several of the cities. In the result this had not ended in a permanent Macedonian establishment, and Olympichos' rule that ended a few years before. Philip, as much as Antiochos, was thus a prisoner of his predecessors' and his ancestors' actions.¹¹ In the near future he would himself intervene in Karia and there is no reason to doubt that he already had ambitions in the area.

So when Zeuxis was sent into Karia early in 203 his instructions were probably very carefully worded; above all, he was to avoid tangling with any of the major powers with interests there. On the other hand, he was to push forward the Seleukid interests, and he was given an army to provide real power to his work. The difficulties before him were surely clear. Antiochos himself was not taking part, which is a good indication of his caution. He was carefully not laying his own prestige on the line, and if Zeuxis did get involved with one of the other powers, he could clearly be disavowed; no

doubt Zeuxis understood this aspect as well.

The evidence for Zeuxis' campaigns is in the form of a set of letters sent by him or by Antiochos to the cities which he was attacking or had attacked, and other documents produced by the cities themselves. The Seleukid letters were usually reassurances that a good deal of local autonomy would be observed, or restored. Considerable efforts were directed to avoiding damage to the local religious shrines. At Amyzon, Antiochos issued an order to the 'generals, hipparchs, infantry commanders, and soldiers, and the others' to respect the sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis in the city – all the more so, presumably, because Apollo was the particular devotion of the Seleukid dynasty.¹² (This may also have been in the knowledge of the bad reputation Philip V had gained by his sack of the Aitolian federal sanctuary at Thermon in 206.) Similarly the locally important sanctuary at Labraunda was protected by a letter in which the king prohibited the soldiers from camping in the sanctuary, living in the sacred place, or bringing in pack animals – which gives some idea of the normal military attitude to such places.¹³

The campaign can be traced in part by these letters. Zeuxis mustered his forces in the Maiandros Valley and took the route south along the Marsyas River valley, which had been the scene of earlier Seleukid work. The city of Alabanda, which had been refounded as an Antioch by Antiochos II, was captured; soon after Antiochos sent an envoy to Delphi asking that the city be recognized as *asylōs*, perhaps in recognition of its swift capitulation.¹⁴ From there Zeuxis turned west and took the city of Alinda and then Amyzon (where many of the inscribed documents concerning these events have been found). South again he reached and took the city of Mylasa, and its nearby sanctuary at Labraunda and perhaps (the date of the relevant letter is not clear) another sanctuary at Sinuri.¹⁵ This circular march had effectively secured Seleukid control of the interior of Karia, but several cities had been deliberately avoided. Euromos, for example, lay on Zeuxis' route of march from Amyzon to Mylasa, but was not captured. Nor, as mentioned, was Stratonikeia reclaimed from the Rhodians, though it was not far from Sinuri.¹⁶ The explanation lies in the delicate international situation which had developed since Antiochos made his plans.

This was not a mere military promenade. Fighting was involved at least at Amyzon, where a siege is referred to in one of the documents, and probably at Alinda, the strongest city in the region. The stern measures Antiochos had to take to protect the sanctuaries implies that the army was fired up to fight. Looting obviously took place, including the theft of the sacred slaves at Amyzon, which an envoy of the city recovered only after appealing directly to Antiochos.¹⁷ The loot from the city was collected and stored in the fortress at Alinda, but this was the 'official' loot; individual soldiers no doubt profited as well.¹⁸ Large numbers of the citizens fled the city.

The conquests were then followed by various supplementary operations, partly conducted by Zeuxis or Antiochos, partly by aggrieved citizens. It was

also necessary for a clear Seleukid administration to be imposed. An *epistates*, Menestratos of Phokaia, was put in place at the Artemision in Amyzon, and was later praised by the citizens for acting as an intermediary between them and the more senior officials; Nikomedes was another official, whose duties are not defined. At Alinda an official called Chionis was in charge, presumably as a subgovernor under Zeuxis; he was certainly Menestratos' superior.¹⁹ Once these men were assuredly in command of their responsibilities, the army could be withdrawn, no doubt to everyone's relief. The whole process took several years, at Amyzon at least until 200.

Antiochos himself meanwhile was undertaking a similar, though less violent, campaign to the north. Again this is attested in some inscriptions at a single city – Teos, in this case – and a certain amount of extrapolation has to be used to discern the importance and the results. This is complicated by a dispute over the dates of the documents, which are either contemporary with the Karian campaign of Zeuxis, or later in a subsequent campaign in 197.²⁰ Here it will be assumed that the earlier date, 203, is correct, though more research and new discoveries might overthrow this interpretation. Either way the events took place.

Antiochos, probably taking Laodike with him – perhaps a sign that no serious fighting was expected – and accompanied by his Friends and a section of the army, went to Teos. There he addressed the city assembly and announced the grant of freedom from tribute and various other benefits.²¹ He referred to the city's tribute which had been paid to Attalos, and promised to cancel it. He was therefore intruding into what had been territory where Attalos had had influence, even control, in the past, but had presumably abandoned it after Akhaios had penned him into Pergamon, from which he had emerged to campaign to the north rather than towards Teos. Given the geography it is probable that several other small and ancient Greek cities on the Erythraian peninsula were similarly visited and brought under his control; these would include Klaros, Notion, Kolophon, Lebedos, and Erythrai at least.

This grant of freedom presupposes, of course, that Teos had already submitted to Antiochos' show of force. There is no sign that any violence had actually been used, but the Teian decrees are carefully ambiguous on the point (which rather suggests that some unpleasantness was being covered up). The cancellation of Attalos' tribute, which in the circumstances Antiochos would have been entitled to collect for himself, was not in fact quite as generous as it seemed. A series of four city decrees are recorded covering several years, in each of which it is explained that the city had sent envoys to the king and presented him with a gold crown; that is, the city was still liable for an expensive present, which would be expected on particularly auspicious royal occasions, such as weddings and birthdays and victories.²²

These two brief campaigns had, at little expense, expanded Antiochos' control over substantial areas of western Asia Minor. They may also have been accompanied or succeeded by other minor campaigns, perhaps

northwards into Mysia, and it seems likely that Antiochos was aiming to probe into other areas as well. It was clearly part of his main aim of gaining control over the peripheral regions. In addition, the high priest Nikanor is mentioned several times in the various inscriptions as holding his office. This is one of the measures Antiochos was instituting to bind the kingdom more closely. It was a priesthood 'of the sanctuaries in the region beyond the Taurus', clearly an administrative and supervisory role, and it is in connection with the Artemision in Amyzon that he is mentioned as part of the dating formula.²³ This does not seem to have been, at least at first, a cult of the king or of the royal family on a province-wide basis. Some cities had such a cult – Antioch-in-Persis, for example – but others did not.²⁴ At Sardis in 213/212, however, Antiochos had seen that the city had set up a Laodikeion for his wife, to celebrate the royal family, and this was coming close.²⁵ Nikanor was no doubt expected to arrange the establishment of other such cults in other cities. Teos established a new festival to be celebrated annually, called the Antiocheia and the Laodikeia, which was in part thanks for the king's forbearance and generosity, and in part a reminder of his authority.²⁶

The course of the campaign by Zeuxis provides a clue both to the international situation and to Antiochos' preparations for his general Asia Minor policy. Zeuxis had carefully avoided several cities which were clearly vulnerable, in particular Euromos, which he could have captured easily, and he had kept clear of the cities on the coast. It seems likely that this was done by rearrangement with Philip V, who, as noted already, had a hereditary interest in the region, and for whom the defunct Olympichos had acted as a local governor. Zeuxis, by contrast, had gathered up several cities which had in the past been part of Ptolemy's dominions. The reason is probably that the Ptolemaic claims were not being enforced, but also that Antiochos was aware that conditions in the Ptolemaic kingdom were going from bad to worse.

Ptolemy IV died some time in 204. It is a mark of the nervousness of the Ptolemaic administration that the death was kept secret for several months.²⁷ His successor was his son Ptolemy V, who was only 6-years-old. The regent was supposed to be his mother, Arsinoe III, or so it is generally assumed, but she faced lethal competition from a group of the dead king's ministers, led by Sosibios, who had been first minister for thirty years, and Agathokles. They arranged Arsinoe's murder. That accomplished, the deaths of Ptolemy IV and Arsinoe were announced to the royal guard.²⁸ Ptolemy V had been joint king since soon after his birth; he was now the only member of the royal family left alive.

The dating of all this is uncertain. Ptolemy V's name is first used on an official document in September 204; his father had been dead by then for several months, and his mother for some time; after she was killed the murderers had to concoct a new will to be read to the guard, naming themselves as regents; Polybios condemned it as a forgery, no doubt correctly.²⁹ Even that does not mean that the change of king had become

publicly known, though the announcement to the royal guard would probably mean that it would soon leak to the general population.

Sosibios soon died – he must have been at least 60 years of age – and Agathokles became sole regent. He faced a multitude of problems. What should have been his priority was the rebellion by native Egyptians in the south of the country. This had been going on for several years, and the rebels had captured Thebes and their leader had made himself pharaoh.³⁰ Instead Agathokles chose to focus on another presumed threat, for the death of Ptolemy IV had meant the end of the treaty of 217 negotiated with Antiochos III. It was thus quite likely that, when Antiochos understood the gravity of the crisis in Egypt he would take advantage of it. A war in Syria at the same time as a war in Upper Egypt would surely spell disaster for the kingdom. It was in fact exactly the strategic situation which Antiochos always strove to achieve before embarking on any war: an ally, or at least an enemy of his enemy, in his enemy's rear.

The timing and purpose of Antiochos' Karian campaign is therefore relevant. Zeuxis, no doubt obeying instructions, had carefully avoided any city in which Philip V had had an interest. This implies an earlier agreement between the two kings to divide the region between them, with Philip allocated several of the cities, including those on the coast, when he was able to send an expedition to secure them. Zeuxis' campaign began before May 203, the date of the earliest document in the Amyzon archive, and he reached that city after a campaign of some time. It would therefore seem that one of the tasks of Antiochos when he was in Syria in 204 was to negotiate the partition agreement with Philip. In a way this seems confirmed by a phrase in the first Teian decree, where it is remarked that 'whilst staying on the other side of Taurus' – that is, in Syria – Antiochos 'was responsible for many advantages towards us'; that is, the Teians.³¹ Antiochos had therefore been in diplomatic contact with Teos in 204, and, since the coordination with Philip clearly existed before Zeuxis began his campaign, he had been in contact with Philip at that time as well.

All this had been arranged before Antiochos knew of the death of Ptolemy IV. He presumably had heard of it by the time he set out for Asia Minor, which might have been as early as the autumn of 204 – the meeting with the Ptolemaic royal guard was about that time – or much less likely, in the spring of 203 – for Zeuxis' campaign was largely over by May. The news of his rival's death will have much interested him, for it meant that a new war was possible, but the condition of Egypt was such that he did not need to pay much attention for a time. He went ahead with his plans for Asia Minor, thus cementing his agreement with Philip, which was, as it happens, a necessary preliminary to the campaign against Egypt. It is probably at this point that we should note that Polybios reports that the two kings made a joint offer to Ptolemy to assist him in the suppression of the Egyptian rebellion.³² The comment is undated, but it would fit best in this exchange of messages

between Philip and Antiochos in 204 – 203, and is perhaps another necessary preliminary to their further diplomatic contacts concerning Egypt.

Agathokles made a serious diplomatic effort to stave off the likelihood that Antiochos would attack. He despatched three envoys, Ptolemaios son of Sosibios to Philip, Pelops son of Pelops to Antiochos, and Ptolemaios of Megalopolis to Greece and Rome. The man sent to Philip had a concrete proposal for a marriage between Ptolemy V and a daughter of Philip's.³³ Such a marriage would, of course, not take place for several years, since both children were far too young, but if Philip could be brought to agree he would be politically aligned with Ptolemy. These royal marriages were never true alliances, but no doubt a variety of tempting offers in the form of a dowry or political concessions could be displayed before Philip's eyes, but could be withheld until the marriage took place – or, of course, the whole agreement could be cancelled if a reasonable excuse turned up, after the immediate crisis was over.

This tends to suggest that the Egyptian government was fully aware of the diplomatic contacts which had taken place recently between Philip and Antiochos, and that the marriage offer was obviously aimed at separating them once more. It is said that Ptolemaios also asked for Macedonian assistance if Antiochos should attack, though this, after a century of repeated wars and general hostility between the Antigonids and Ptolemies is a most unlikely request, either to be made or still less to be agreed. The most anyone in Egypt could hope for from Philip was his neutrality, and even that was unlikely.

The envoy to Antiochos, on the other hand, Pelops, could offer nothing which could compete with the possible gains he had in prospect by a new war. Any analysis of the last Syrian war showed that the campaign in Phoenicia and Palestine had been successful; the mistake had been to be tempted into a major battle so close to Egypt. In a new war, with Egypt much weaker and with the government in Alexandria less than firmly in control, it should be possible to repeat the conquests and if a new battle was offered, to ensure that it took place under more favourable conditions. Apart from any other consideration, Antiochos was now a highly experienced commander with several victories to his credit, whereas the Egyptians could not field a competent general. And there was another Ptolemaic weakness. At Raphia the decisive unit had been the Egyptian phalanx; with a rebellion by some of those very men in progress in southern Egypt, it would be impossible to recruit such a unit again. All the considerations lead towards a Seleukid victory in the coming war.

No doubt the same considerations had been discussed in Alexandria, and the same conclusions reached. Agathokles had taken the usual precautions. A mercenary commander, Skopas, had been sent to Greece at the same time as the envoys went on their missions, with orders, and presumably cash, to recruit as large a mercenary army as possible.³⁴ It was a good moment to do

so, since Greece was for a brief time at peace, but it would take time to find and transport the men, and the activity could not be hidden from Antiochos – indeed, it might have been deliberately publicized, for this was the same tactic as used by the elder Sosibios at the time of the previous war, and it had led, or so it could be argued, to Antiochos’ defeat.

The main hope, however, might have been that Antiochos could be involved in a war elsewhere, but the careful campaigns in Asia Minor showed that this was not likely. An *entente* with Philip was obviously in operation. So Agathokles’ envoy to Antiochos saw him in ‘Asia’ – that is, in Asia Minor – during his campaign in Karia and at Teos. Pelops, who had formerly been the governor of Cyprus for over a decade, and so was alert to the military and diplomatic situation, protested at these aggressions against cities which he regarded as Ptolemaic, and tried to suggest that the treaty of 217 remained in effect. This was as weak an argument as he could find, and might suggest that Pelops’ heart was not in his task, or that he understood all too clearly the weakness of the Ptolemaic diplomatic position.³⁵ Antiochos clearly paid no attention, other than perhaps to reject Pelops’ argument. By the normal practices of Hellenistic diplomacy, both men knew full well that the treaty had expired with Ptolemy IV.

Ptolemaios of Megalopolis, the envoy sent to Rome, had the formal mission of announcing the accession of the new king, but surely he was sent also with the hope of inducing Roman intervention in protection of the Ptolemaic kingdom. In fact he got no further than Greece.³⁶ Again one might suppose that, like Pelops perhaps, he was not keen on his task. All these men might well have been more concerned at their position in relation to matters in the Alexandrian court than with their formal diplomatic tasks. Under Agathokles the court descended into riot and murder. The three envoys may well have been dispatched by Agathokles because he saw them as internal rivals. Polybios claims that Agathokles aimed to remove ‘all men of distinction’ from the court.³⁷ It is of interest that the only one of the three who seems to have made a serious effort to achieve his diplomatic mission was Ptolemaios, son of the dead Sosibios, in Macedon, whose father may well have ensured that he had a better understanding of the kingdom’s situation than the others; he was, of course, also the only one of them who had a serious proposal to make.

It may have been this Ptolemaic diplomatic initiative which induced Philip and Antiochos to move their own agreement forward. It was surely obvious to all in the eastern Mediterranean that a new Syrian war was about to begin. The Ptolemaic offer to Philip was probably not a secret. If it was not announced publicly, no doubt Philip would ensure that Antiochos heard of it. In the circumstances one would expect Antiochos to make a counter-offer. He suggested a partition agreement, whereby they would each seize parts of the Ptolemaic empire outside Egypt. (This was, of course, a follow-up to the earlier partition agreement concerning Karia, and may have been suggested by

it.) Philip agreed; he obviously felt that seizing territory for himself was a more certain way of expanding his kingdom than a promise of possible future benefits offered by an unstable Ptolemaic regency. The partition agreement is said to have allocated Koile Syria and Cyprus to Antiochos, and Karia and Cyrenaica to Philip. All of these were lands in which the two dynasties had been interested for decades, and such a partition is one which would be fully understandable.³⁸

This agreement has been much discussed, with reactions ranging from scepticism to acceptance, while it has also been alleged that it was used by Rhodes as a means of alerting Rome to the developing situation in the eastern Mediterranean.³⁹ The problem was that it was clearly kept secret by all parties involved; there was no point in letting the enemy know one's plans. One result is that it appears that the message sent by Rhodes to Rome on the subject was a distortion of what had been agreed, perhaps deliberate, but actually it was probably only a guess at the details of the proposed partition. Then, leaving aside the issue of whether Rome actually needed to be sent such a warning, it was all too evidently in Rhodes's interest to try to find a power which could distract Philip, whose ambitions in Karia crossed with Rhodes's own. But Rome was still at war with Carthage in 203 and, although already seriously annoyed with Philip over an earlier quarrel, was not prepared to fish Rhodes's problem out of a fire which did not directly concern it. The existence of an agreement has been in part confirmed by an inscription from Karia, in which Philip is described as handing over a city which he had just taken to Antiochos, and so during Philip's own Karian campaign. The inscription dates from the 180s, so it is not a direct testimony to other than an agreement over Karia, but the partition agreement was largely a development of that original agreement.⁴⁰

The details of the agreement between the kings are certainly uncertain. (Polybios, writing several decades later, did not know the details.) But the fact of the agreement itself fits very well into the overall situation. From Antiochos' point of view it was only a corollary to the original agreement between the kings, which was confirmed by Zeuxis' campaign in Karia, that he would leave certain cities for Philip to seize when he chose to do so. It also guaranteed that his back was guarded when he invaded Ptolemaic Syria – he cannot have forgotten the nervousness induced by the threat of Akhaïos' intervention during the previous Syrian war. However, the agreement was not an alliance, neither political nor military, as becomes clear when the events in Asia Minor in the next years are considered; Philip's actions in Karia and Zeuxis' in Lydia make that obvious. The agreement was, however, only one more of the items Antiochos had to deal with before launching his new war.

Matters in Egypt continued to descend into confusion. There had been increasingly bold attacks by 'bandits' for several years, and the rebellion in the south gained control of Thebes in late 204, just when the court at Alexandria was learning that Ptolemy IV was dead. Agathokles' diplomatic

efforts during 203 were all failures, and his authority as regent can only have been weakened as a result; he was not helped by his own larcenous nature nor by the scandalous conduct of his sister Agathokleia and their mother Oinante, who were supposed to be caring for the boy king. There developed an increasing opposition to him among the ruling group, who successfully aroused the Alexandrian mob to murder the whole of Agathokles' family.⁴¹ This happened late in 203; the new regents were Sosibios son of Sosibios (Ptolemaios' brother) and the commanding general of the garrison at Pelusion, Tlepolemos. But the internal struggle continued. The younger Sosibios was removed by Tlepolemos, who was despised by the courtiers, and apparently by the administrators who saw the government seizing up because of Tlepolemos' negligence. The coup which removed Agathokles had thus put a general in charge of the government, but the general was not capable of administering the kingdom, even if he evoked admiration as a commander.⁴²

In these conditions Antiochos had plenty of time to prepare. There was one other issue he had to attend to before launching his attack into Ptolemaic Syria. This was Armenia, where his sister Antiochis was Xerxes' queen. In 202 or thereabouts Xerxes died. He is said, in a very late and not particularly reliable source, to have been poisoned by his wife, who was acting on instructions from her brother.⁴³ Poisoning in the ancient world was all too often claimed where political matters were involved – it was too easy to mistake a fatal illness for poison, so we do not need to believe any such accusation without better evidence than a late and dodgy chronicler.

The poisoning of Xerxes is thus unlikely, to say the least, and the method, by his wife on instructions of her brother, nothing less than grotesque. Why should either have bothered? The Armenian kingdom was clearly vulnerable, Antiochos was not under any pressure of time and could have dealt with any Armenian problem relatively easily, and if Antiochis had been queen for ten years, she had presumably enjoyed the experience – Seleukid princesses were not known for their reticence. It is best to conclude that Xerxes died a natural death, perhaps by an illness or by a seizure or a heart attack.

No doubt Antiochis then removed herself to her brother's court in Syria – he would revert to being her legal guardian. If she really had carried out the murder, her presence either at Arsamosata or at Antioch would surely be an uncomfortable one. The effect of this is difficult to estimate. If Xerxes had been an unreliable vassal, he was of course now no longer one, but if he had been, why did he wait until Antiochos was back in Syria in strength before (presumably) revealing his discontent? The problem is clearly insoluble, but by rejecting the poisoning story it does at least become the case of a natural death. The result, however, was that Antiochos did not have to worry about Armenia, even if he had been worried before – and he could claim a new extension to his kingdom.

Xerxes' death was followed by Antiochos imposing a new political regime on Armenia. It would seem that Xerxes and Antiochis had no children, and

that Xerxes was the last of the dynasty (which had originated with an Akhaimenid satrap). Two governors (*strategoi*) were installed, Zariadris and Artaxias. The names seem to be Armenian, or at least Iranian, so Antiochos was installing new rulers who may well have been sympathetic to the inhabitants. Given that there were two of them, it appears that Xerxes' kingdom was divided. Zariadris was probably governor of that part close to Syria which became known as Sophene; Artaxias, more certainly, became established in the northeastern section, and appears to have extended his authority into the Araxes Valley, where he eventually founded a new city, Artaxata.⁴⁴ Thus Antiochos had converted a subordinate kingdom into two new provinces.

From Bactria and the border of India to the west coast of Asia Minor, Antiochos had reduced the problems he had inherited to easily manageable proportions, or he had eliminated them altogether for the foreseeable future. It was time to return to the one problem he had not yet solved, and to gain revenge for his defeat by Ptolemy IV.

Chapter Six

The Fifth Syrian War: Syria

Antiochos had plenty of time to prepare for the new attempt to acquire

Ptolemaic Syria. He had probably known of the death of Ptolemy IV since the autumn of 204, when it was made public by the announcement to the Ptolemaic royal guard, and quite possibly earlier, from agents he probably employed in Alexandria. So he had eighteen months to make his preparations, and had been able to conduct his planned operations in Asia Minor and make the diplomatic arrangements with Philip V. But it is probable that he had been making less obvious preparations even while on his eastern campaigns – and indeed it can be argued that all Antiochos' campaigns since his defeat at Raphia had been preparations for a new Syrian war. The elimination of Akhaïos, the settlement of eastern affairs, the agreement with Philip, the new subjugation of Armenia, can all be seen as the removal of possible obstacles to the new campaign in Syria, so that no interruptions would arrive to surprise or distract him. The now well-experienced army may also have been prepared for a more rigorous and more difficult campaign than it had yet attempted.

The lessons of the former campaign in Palestine, at least judging by the actions Antiochos took in this new war, had been studied and understood. The Ptolemaic military and political system had in the end proved strong enough to win the last battle, but until then Antiochos had scored major successes. Yet too many of these had been due to the defection of mercenary commanders from the Ptolemaic side. Within Phoenicia and Palestine the cities had generally been loyal to Ptolemy IV. Some had negotiated surrender when Antiochos' army had confronted them, but others had resisted to the end, and had still been under Ptolemaic control when Raphia was fought. In this new campaign Antiochos could not rely on mercenary defections, but he might be able to convince the cities to change sides.

This change was made possible, of course, because of the change of affairs in Alexandria. The reign of Ptolemy IV had been negligent and rapacious, and the oppression had stimulated banditry and rebellion within Egypt. This regime had been continued under the regents for Ptolemy V, and the

rapaciousness had been aggravated by the regime's new instability. Provincial loyalty in such circumstances was less than staunch; the promise of better treatment, which might be expected under a Seleukid government, would perhaps have a useful effect. The autonomy of Seleukid cities was considerably greater than in the Ptolemaic kingdom, and the cities of Koile Syria might be expected to benefit. Arados, for example, had had to surrender control over its *peraia*, but the units of that *peraia* had then emerged as autonomous cities, while Arados had used its autonomy to mint coins on the Ptolemaic standard, presumably with a view to increasing its trade in the Ptolemaic territories.¹ The message was no doubt understood in the Phoenician cities in the Ptolemaic sphere, Arados' southern neighbours.

The Ptolemaic response to the threat of war had been, as noted in the last chapter, in part diplomatic, but also military, in that a mercenary army was in the process of being recruited, and rather earlier in the process than in the previous war. The Aitolian Skopas was given the task.² This was exactly what Sosibios had eventually organized during the last war, and this time the recruiting was taking place before the fighting began. To that extent the Ptolemaic regency seemed to be better prepared than before and again it was using its great financial resources to defend itself. This was the Ptolemaic equivalent of Antiochos' own preparations, but unlike his, it was undertaken almost at the last minute.

Antiochos, therefore, despite apparently delaying his attack on Ptolemaic Syria for eighteen months, still had the advantage, since Skopas' recruitment of mercenaries will have taken a considerable time to become effective. Until then the Ptolemaic army as it existed at the beginning of 202 would have to suffice. The size of this force is not altogether clear. Taking the army as fielded at Raphia fifteen years before as a benchmark – 70,000 men – at least 20,000 were now unavailable, since it was no longer possible to rely on a mass mobilization of Egyptians; the mercenary contingent at Raphia cannot be assumed to be present any longer, though clearly Skopas' assignment was to build it up again to the same level. We must therefore assume that the 'regular' Ptolemaic army was about the same size as that of Antiochos – perhaps 35,000 men – which could be supplemented by men liable to be called up in an emergency, and by the mercenaries. But at the beginning of the war, the army would be considerably less than what was really required. A further reduction can be assumed because part of the forces were needed to face the rebel pharaonic regime at Thebes, and more to maintain internal order. This may not have been a particularly large force, since the fighting arena was mainly confined to the Nile Valley, but several thousands of men at least were surely needed there.

When Antiochos began his attack, therefore, he had the advantage of a more secure governmental regime, of a well-prepared diplomatic position, of the command of his forces, and a larger disposable force. But, of course, it was not all about numbers. Both kingdoms had invested large sums in

defensive fortifications. The Seleukid system centred on the four great cities of Syria, in particular, when facing the possibility of a Ptolemaic invasion, on Laodikeia, which blocked the difficult coastal route, and Apameia, which was the kingdom's main military base, and which blocked the main inland route northwards. South of these two cities there were fortified towns – Larisa, Arethusa, Laodikeia-ad-Libanum – spread along the Orontes, and the towns of the Aradian *Peraia* on the coast. On the Ptolemaic side the three possible invasion routes were blocked by the Phoenician cities on the coast road, by the twin forts of Gerrha and Brochoi in the Bekaa, and by the fortified city of Damascus to the east. Antiochos had tried and failed to invade by the Bekaa route in the last war, and succeeded in 218 only with help from the defecting mercenary commanders and the manoeuvre of crossing the Lebanon Mountains with his light forces to gain access to the coast road – but even then Sidon had remained under Ptolemaic control all through the war.

This time the coast route and the Bekaa remained as difficult as before, but Antiochos had a new plan, which was to use an even more difficult route. East of the Antilebanon Mountains was a track along the foot of those mountains, a desert route which connected the Orontes Valley at Apameia with Damascus. If Antiochos could bring an army as far as Damascus, he would have outflanked all the Ptolemaic fortifications on the coast and in the Bekaa. And from Damascus viable routes led into the Jordan Valley and on into Palestine.

The problem for Antiochos' forces was that the road he aimed to travel was long and dry, and the city he aimed to capture was well fortified and well garrisoned. The Ptolemaic government had posted a strong force in the city, commanded by an officer called Dinon. The distance from Antiochos' military base at Apameia and the difficulty of the route meant that Antiochos' attacking forces had to be mobile, hence cavalry only. The road was too difficult for the slow-moving infantry, even the light forces, whose approach would be detected well before they reached Damascus. But cavalry alone was not suitable for a siege, though once at Damascus they would find water and supplies in plenty. Antiochos therefore could not afford a siege, but had to take the fortified city swiftly. The whole campaign required speed and surprise, even if a certain complacency could be expected of the garrison. Indeed without surprise he would face a disaster.

The opportunity came with a local festival, in which Dinon and his garrison took part. While the Ptolemaic forces were thus distracted, possibly drunk and/or sleeping it off, Antiochos equipped his cavalymen with 'four days' provision of raw flour', marched swiftly along the desert route east of Antilebanon, and arrived while the festival was on and in advance of the news of his march. 'By a vigorous attack [he] surprised, and took' the city.³

Damascus, with its difficult connections to other places, is a natural fortress.⁴ With control of the city, Antiochos had access to a major source of supplies in the Ghuta, the Damascus oasis, which could feed his whole army. Communications from the city led into Palestine, but also into the Bekaa by

the Barada gorge. This is a narrow and difficult route, easily blocked, so any Ptolemaic counterattack from the Bekaa would be easily stopped. Antiochos' vulnerable infantry marched south along the Bekaa and thence into the Ghuta; in fact, it is quite likely that the infantry began the march first in order to fix the attention of the Ptolemaic forces in the Bekaa and coastal routes, and so conceal the movement of the cavalry on the eastern route – though there is no evidence for this. Once the Ghuta and the Barada gorge were occupied, the Ptolemaic forces at the Gerrha-Brochoi lines could be taken in the rear, and were thereby not strong enough to mount an attack on the stronger Seleukid forces who were marching south through the Bekaa. Once the fighting had moved on into Palestine, the Bekaa forces would be difficult to reinforce. Once again Antiochos had evaded and outflanked the Ptolemaic defensive system.

The campaign which followed is much less well recorded than the campaigns in Palestine during the previous war, for Polybios' account has been reduced to a few fragments. The capture of Damascus took place in 202, at the very beginning of the war, and this may have been all that was achieved in the first campaign; the next year Antiochos was, it seems, able to march more or less unhindered through Palestine, either because he captured all the towns and cities as he approached them, or because he ignored and bypassed those which showed resistance. The first part of the campaign eventually centred on Gaza, which was, as ever, the key to controlling Palestine. The Ptolemaic garrison, perhaps the only one south of the Bekaa of any strength, fought back. Antiochos had to take the city if he was going to be able to hold his Palestinian conquests. In Egyptian hands Gaza was an open door for Ptolemaic forces to invade Palestine; in Antiochos' control, Ptolemy's entry into Palestine was blocked. The siege took some time, which Polybios attributes to the valour of the citizens, though the city was obviously well garrisoned as well. The current regent in Alexandria, Tlepolemos, had been governor of Pelusion, Gaza's counterpart on the Egyptian side, and he no doubt fully understood Gaza's importance. The city fell to Antiochos during the campaigning season of 201, allowing him to block Ptolemaic attacks out of Egypt while getting on with clearing out the last Ptolemaic holdouts in the rest of Koile Syria.⁵

This was evidently a different strategy than Antiochos' first invasion in the 221–217 war. Then he had painstakingly conquered Palestine from the north to the east and then to the south. Now he appears to have marched directly to Gaza, probably ignoring the towns and cities on the way, in order to seize that city first. (His army at the siege could have been supplied by sea, using his navy, though there is again no evidence for this.) He will then have mopped up those cities between Damascus and Gaza which were still held by Ptolemy's forces. It seems likely – none of this appears in any of the surviving evidence – that many of them capitulated without much resistance, though some – Sidon, the Gerrha-Brochoi lines, Joppa – certainly held out. The result

was that the major part of the Palestinian part of Koile Syria fell without trouble into Antiochos' control.

The main reason for the rapid collapse of the Ptolemaic position in Palestine was that the trouble in southern Egypt had drawn some of the embodied Ptolemaic forces in that direction, therefore thinning out the defences in Palestine; however, it must be said that the Ptolemaic government had plenty of warning of Antiochos' attack. The rapid seizure of Damascus was surely a surprise, and may well have caught the Ptolemaic forces off-balance. The swift move for the attack on Gaza rather than the systematic conquest of Palestine was perhaps another surprise, but by the time Gaza fell the war had been on for well over a year; again, the Ptolemaic response seems very tardy. It may be that a deliberate decision had been taken to concentrate the defence at certain well fortified places, such as Gaza, the Bekaa, and the Phoenician coast and then to counter-attack once the mercenary army had been collected and organized.

Just as decisive was surely the defection to Antiochos of the governor of Koile Syria, Ptolemaios son of Thraseas, which took place during the Palestine campaign. He could do this in the full knowledge that Antiochos welcomed such defectors, as had happened in 219 with Theodotos and Panaitolos (and their successor Nikolaos, who is noted as one of Antiochos' commanders in the east, as is Lagoras the Cretan, one of Ptolemy's commanders at the Porphyryion fight).⁶ This time, however, it is not clear that the defection was co-ordinated in advance.

Ptolemaios' defection was a much more serious matter even than that of Theodotos and Panaitolos. Theodotos, after all, was only a mercenary, even if a general, but Ptolemaios came from a family, originally from Aspendos in Pamphylia, which had been prominent in the Ptolemaic service for four generations. The first known family member, Apollonios, came to Egypt from Aspendos as a soldier or a clerk or perhaps a cleruch settler; his son Aitos was governor of the Ptolemaic positions in Kilikia for a time and was instrumental in founding the new city of Arsinoe, near Nagidos in Rough Kilikia; Aitos' son, Thraseas, was governor of Kilikia also and for a time governor of Cyprus.⁷ This is an impressive family career, built on long and well-rewarded service to the dynasty over a period of well over half a century. Thraseas' son Ptolemaios had fought at Raphia in command of part of the phalanx;⁸ by 202 he was governor of at least part of the Ptolemaic lands in Syria.⁹ His defection, which seems to have taken place in 202 or perhaps 201, was a serious matter. If a man of such a lineage and prominence defected many others must be just as strongly alienated. By timing his move when he did, he no doubt assisted in the transfer of all Palestine into Antiochos' hands – the lesson of Theodotos once again. It may well have been as a result of Ptolemaios' work that Antiochos was able to march all the way to Gaza in the campaign of 201. Disillusionment with the Ptolemaic government probably went much deeper than a single disappointed governor: at least one group, the

Jews in Jerusalem, were in receipt of a letter from Antiochos acknowledging their help, through Ptolemaios, in the campaign.¹⁰

The conquest of Gaza ended the campaign of 201. Antiochos, no doubt leaving garrisons in the main centres in the conquered country, sent his army into winter quarters. Meanwhile Antiochos' new friend Philip V had had a much more difficult task in securing his 'share' of the spoils. He campaigned in 202 along the Straits, capturing or gaining control of Lysimacheia, Khalkedon, Kios, and Perinthos.¹¹ This was not a bad bag of conquests, for collectively these cities gave him potential control of the great seaway, but when he extended Macedonian power in this region he alerted and alarmed all those cities whose commerce went through the Straits. Rhodes protested. Aitolia, recently Rome's ally in the war with Philip, was also worried and appealed to Rome again. Philip then took Thasos city and island on his way home.¹² He had gained some territory and partial control over a major strategic position, but at the cost of rousing a lot of influential enemies to full and quivering attention. What he had not done was attack any of the Ptolemaic possessions. The two kings may well have agreed to divide the Ptolemaic empire between them, but they were now fighting two completely separate wars. It may also be noted that Lysimacheia at least was one of those places to which Antiochos had an inherited claim, while other places in Thrace, such as Perinthos, were on Antiochos' acquisition list. It may be that Philip's purpose was less to capture Ptolemaic territories than to gain a strategic position from which he could later face and defy Antiochos when the Ptolemaic war ended.¹³

In the spring of 201, while Antiochos was invading Palestine and heading for Gaza, Philip mounted a naval expedition which was clearly designed to gain control over the Aegean. A cruise through the Kyklades, which had gravitated into the Rhodian sphere earlier, brought submissions from several islands.¹⁴ He occupied the Ptolemaic naval base at Samos, 'borrowed' some of the ships he found there, and went on to attempt to recover his family's former possessions in Karia.¹⁵ A Rhodian fleet tried to block his way but was defeated. Philip gained control of Miletos, which at least had been Ptolemaic until then.¹⁶ Once again his successes – and his brutal methods – were even more successful at rousing opposition than in achieving conquests. Attalos of Pergamon, Chios, Byzantion, and others, now joined Rhodes in moving to stop him, and in a naval battle against the combined Attalid and Rhodian fleets he lost half of his fleet and thousands of his men.¹⁷ He was able to push on into Karia, where he campaigned with some success, capturing the cities Antiochos had left for him earlier, including Euromos and Kildara; he took Stratonikeia from Rhodes, reasonably enough since the city was fighting him, but as it was originally a Seleukid foundation this may not have been altogether welcome to Antiochos.¹⁸ Philip was then blockaded in the small town of Bargylia during the winter of 201/200.¹⁹ He fed his men by extorting supplies from the nearby cities and by plundering the countryside. Here, as he

had once before in the campaign, he also received supplies sent by Zeuxis, on behalf of Antiochos.²⁰ That Zeuxis helped him on these occasions is the full extent of the co-operation of Philip and Antiochos during Philip's campaign, and Zeuxis' contribution was just about as minimal and reluctant as everyone else's. But then Antiochos was busy in Syria. Zeuxis did his duty, but Philip's campaign had hardly remained within the terms of the 'secret agreement'.

This assistance from Zeuxis was, so far as Philip was concerned, the only practical result of his agreement with Antiochos. The agreement had been to divide up Ptolemy's possessions, and Philip had largely failed to make any moves against those which he had claimed, except those in Karia, and some of the places he had taken were those which Antiochos himself could also lay claim to. Antiochos had no obligation to assist Philip in conquering territories from Ptolemy; Zeuxis' supplies could be construed as bribing Philip to go away, or submitting to extortion, or protection for the local Seleukid cities against Philip's requisitions – all these in fact were the same reactions as almost everybody else in the area.

While Philip was trapped in Bargylia the news of the agreement to partition the Ptolemaic lands was beginning to become known. Since it was secret, and the terms were only vaguely known, if at all, exaggeration and invention were widespread. Rhodes and Attalos both now appealed to Rome for help and protection, adding their voices to that of the Aitolians earlier; and another appeal had come from the government in Alexandria, where Tlepolemos was still in charge.²¹

Rome's original involvement in Greece had been the result of the Hannibalic War, which ended in a peace treaty during 201. That had included a war with Philip, which had ended in 205, but which left the Roman Senate with sore feelings. This was clearly known to the Greek cities, hence the appeals for Roman help against Philip in his new war. Rhodes' information about the agreement between the two kings was even slanted to suggest a threat to Rome. The appeal from Egypt also implied that Antiochos was really aiming to challenge Rome. For the first time the Seleukid kingdom crossed Rome's visible horizon.

The Roman Senate decided to take the opportunity to intervene to gain revenge on Philip. Twice he was warned to cease harassing Rome's friends, in particular Athens and Attalos of Pergamon. He ignored these messages, which were in fact ultimatata, though he appears not to have appreciated it. The Senate then sent an embassy to all those involved. This was later claimed to be a Roman arbitration move, but it was actually an investigation of conditions in the eastern Mediterranean. No doubt the reason the embassy was sent out at this moment was actually because of the several messages received from the region, which were partial and contradictory as well as self-serving. So, despite later claims, the embassy was mainly a means of gaining firsthand knowledge of the events in the east. The one concrete mission they were given was to inform Philip that he had brought a Roman declaration of war on

him.²²

The agreement between Antiochos and Philip cannot be characterized as an actual alliance, in which the two undertook to assist each other in the war, unless Philip is to be convicted of instant faithlessness (which his Greek neighbours would certainly believe of him). The agreement, in the exaggerated and distorted version propagated by Rhodes and Attalos, did have its effect on Rome, but when the Republic eventually declared war on Philip, it was for reasons of its own which had little or nothing to do with his agreement with Antiochos and his recent conquests. From Rome's point of view, this was mainly revenge for Philip's conduct during the war with Carthage; the Roman war aim was essentially to ensure the threat of Macedonian hostility was removed. Informed of the Roman declaration of war delivered by M. Aemilius Lepidus (one of the Senate's envoys) during Philip's siege of Abydos he decided it had no relevance to the actions he was currently undertaking, so he ignored it. Then, at last, he began a campaign against those Ptolemaic possessions within his reach.²³

So during 202 Antiochos had conquered Damascus, and Philip campaigned along the Straits; in 201 Antiochos conquered much of Koile Syria as far as Gaza, but not Phoenicia, and there may well have been parts of Palestine still under Ptolemaic control; Philip meanwhile had collected a few Ptolemaic possessions around the Aegean, but neither he nor the Ptolemaic government seem to have regarded themselves at war with each other. Philip had in fact been careful to avoid serious hostility against Ptolemy's territories, and could, like Antiochos, make a good claim to be merely recovering ancestral lands. The intervention of Rome against Macedon came in the next year for very different reasons, and the absence of a military alliance between Philip and Antiochos meant that Antiochos could ignore events in Greece, and even ignore for the present Philip's encroachment on his own preserves. He was still deeply involved in Koile Syria. His capture of Gaza had made it more difficult for the Ptolemaic forces to attack him, but the patchy nature of his control of Koile Syria as a whole made it certain that fighting would continue next year, and that there would be a Ptolemaic counter-attack.

Philip escaped from Bargylia in the early part of 200, and soon began to attack the Ptolemaic possessions at last, though he first antagonized Athens even further. In the summer he marched east and captured several of the Ptolemaic towns along the Straits: Ainos, Maroneia, Sestos, Abydos, and others, but at Abydos he was interrupted by M. Aemilius Lepidus, one of the Roman envoys, and was informed in a less than straightforward way that he and Rome were then at war. It took him some time to understand what had been said.²⁴ In Egypt, meanwhile, the conquest of Syria and the siege of Gaza in 201 had produced another coup: Tlepolemos, accused, as usual, of debauchery, was removed (his personal fate is unknown) and a former associate of Agathokles called Aristomenes, emerged as regent.²⁵

The unpreparedness of the Ptolemaic government had been shown by the

loss of Koile Syria. This was all the more reprehensible since all the successive ministers had clearly understood the threat posed by Antiochos ever since the death of Ptolemy IV. The defection of Ptolemaios son of Thraseas had exacerbated the situation but did not cause it, though no doubt much of the blame was heaped on him. Agathokles and then Tleopolemos had reacted in the same way as Sosibios had in 219, by financing the recruitment of reinforcements for the army. Skopas' recruiting adventure in Greece was particularly successful in recruiting his fellow Aitolians, and this produced an army of mercenaries in Egypt by the winter of 201.²⁶ Skopas was given command of this force with the task of the reconquest of Palestine, and as a surprise move he undertook a winter campaign, while Antiochos' forces were in winter quarters. The Ptolemaic army had not been involved in a major campaign in the previous year, except at Gaza, and did not need the break to rest and refit. Also, the sooner the mercenaries were employed and (presumably) victorious, the sooner they could be discharged and the financial drain of their pay would cease.

Another traditional measure by the Ptolemaic government in the face of invasion was to bring to Egypt many of the soldiers in garrison in the scattered posts of the empire; this may be one reason Philip was able next year to overrun the posts in Thrace and along the Straits, in which case we can say that the agreement between Philip and Antiochos was at last proving successful in facilitating Philip's conquests. The Ptolemaic government was thus faced by war in Thrace and the Aegean, in Koile Syria and in southern Egypt; partly by using its seapower, it was possible to transfer troops from Greece (Skopas' recruits) and the Straits to Egypt; within Egypt the Nile performed the same function.

The Ptolemaic return to Koile Syria early in 200 was perhaps assisted by the death at Thebes of the rebel Pharaoh Herwennefer. He was succeeded during 201/200 (the precise date is not known) by another Egyptian, Ankhwennefer, who may or may not have been related to him.²⁷ The change of king would certainly adversely affect any campaigning they might undertake, and so reduce pressure on the Alexandrian government. The Theban government was also affected by the intrusion of the Meroitic power from the south. The kingdom based at Meroe on the Upper Nile had long been at odds with the Ptolemies, and its king now took advantage of the general confusion to extend his power northwards along the river, particularly along the stretch called Dodekaschoenos, south of the First Cataract at Syene and Elephantine. This pressure on the rebel regime allowed Ptolemaic troops to make some progress in the next year or two – but it also meant that these Ptolemaic troops could not take part in the fighting in Syria which was going on at the same time, so it is unlikely that the change of pharaoh at Thebes allowed Ptolemaic forces to be withdrawn, though at least they would perhaps not have to be reinforced.²⁸

The rebelliousness of the Egyptians, however, was spreading. There had

been rebel activity in the Delta for some time; this is referred to rather obliquely in the inscription on the Rosetta Stone as 'Lykopolis in the Busirite nome having been seized ... by impious means'. The inscription of the stone is dated 196, so the siege of the town was recent, and dated probably to 197, but was only one of a series of rebellions in the region. It was only the end of this phase of the fighting which is recorded on the stone, and this revolt clearly continued for several years.²⁹ The connection between this and the southern rebellion is not documented, but presumably it did exist. It could only have been yet another distraction for the regency government in Alexandria.

Skopas' winter attack reconquered Palestine, which fell as quickly to him as it had to Antiochos; no doubt the Palestinians kept their heads down in the crisis. Antiochos' army had been largely withdrawn, perhaps because the fighting and confusion within Egypt persuaded the king that any early Ptolemaic return was out of the question. But it also seems likely that, since he had not yet taken control of the Ptolemaic Lebanese fortresses, he was not willing to leave his army separated from his home territories by untaken cities. It might also be that Antiochos did not wish to fight a major battle close to Egypt. The memory of Raphia was obviously present, and he will have been aware of the general intentions of the Ptolemaic government – a counter-attack could clearly be expected once the mercenary army had been collected. It would be more convenient to fight the Ptolemaic army somewhere north of Gaza, so that his army would have the less distance to march, and he would have time to prepare for the fight.

The troops who did remain in Palestine were not numerous enough to resist Skopas' reconquest, and he was therefore able to campaign as far as northern Palestine before Antiochos and his army emerged to renew the contest. It is probable that at least some of the Seleukid army had wintered at Damascus, if only to prevent an attack from the Ptolemaic garrisons in the Bekaa aiming at recovering the city.

Little is known of Skopas' campaign, but a note in Josephos quoted from Polybios indicates that he had to reconquer Jerusalem.³⁰ That is to say, the Jews of the Judaeian Hills were content to stay with Antiochos, and from Josephos' words it seems that they resisted the Ptolemaic return. No doubt there was a Seleukid governor and perhaps a garrison in the city as well. Other communities may have followed the same path. Antiochos will certainly have left a garrison in Gaza, and if that was large, Skopas will have found that his communications back to Egypt were in constant danger of interruption. It may be, of course, that he did not mind, but Antiochos, in much the same situation with the Phoenician cities still under Ptolemaic control, did make sure he maintained contact with his base. So Skopas had to spend much of the first half of the year re-establishing Ptolemaic control throughout the Palestinian region. He will have had at least a month, probably two, to do this while Antiochos recalled his forces and then marched south.

Skopas had a large and well-equipped army; Antiochos came south with an army larger in numbers than Skopas', though it is impossible to produce estimates for the size of either army.³¹ Skopas had recruited many more mercenaries from Greece quite recently, and there was a substantial Ptolemaic force busy still in Egypt. Antiochos, on the other hand, was able to call up the full levy of his kingdom, which probably meant mainly men from Syria and the nearby regions. This also implies that the time spent by Skopas in marching from Egypt and in reoccupying Palestine was used by Antiochos not merely to march his army south (again by way of Damascus, for the battle took place on the road leading southeast from that city), but also to have called up his reserve forces.

The battle of Panion is nowhere precisely dated, but it seems to have happened in the second half of 200. Skopas had begun his campaign in the winter (that is, between November and March), and had spent some time recovering control in Palestine (as at Jerusalem), and reimposing Ptolemaic control. We must assume, despite the lack of any figures, that the Seleukid army numbered up to 60,000 men, while the Ptolemaic army was perhaps 10,000 men fewer. Any larger discrepancy would have discouraged Skopas from fighting a battle at all. On the other hand, by not fighting Skopas would certainly lose the war; no doubt he had been told to fight or die. The Ptolemaic government, now under Aristomenes as regent, who only had been in power for a few months, had no choice but to see that he fought a full-scale battle.³²

Skopas did his best. He intercepted Antiochos' army in the far north of Palestine, just south of Mount Hermon, and so in the mountainous country through which the Seleukid army had marched from Damascus. Rough country was not good for phalanx warfare, which required a fairly level plain to allow the phalanx to deploy and operate. The two armies did in fact find a more or less suitable plain to deploy in, near the site of the later city of Panias, from which, and from a nearby shrine to the god Pan, the battle is called Panion.

The field of battle was divided by a stream, and two prominent hills overlooked it. Antiochos, coming from the direction of Damascus, placed the main part of his phalanx in the northern part of the lower land, flanked by his cavalry unit of cataphracts, mailed horsemen, heavily armed and armoured, who occupied the hill to the north. (This was a new unit, recruited it seems during Antiochos' eastern campaign, one of several innovations of Antiochos as a result of his varied experiences of warfare.) The king himself was in overall command, and his son, Antiochos the Younger, commanded the cataphracts, or at least was present with them.³³ The smaller section of the phalanx was stationed south of the stream, with another unit of cavalry flanking it on the other hill even further south. Facing the main force of phalangites was the Ptolemaic phalanx – that is, the troops under the direct authority of the Ptolemaic government, troops domiciled in Egypt – flanked by the Ptolemaic cavalry; south of the stream Skopas deployed the Aitolian

mercenaries he had himself recruited, and the Aitolian cavalry. He had fewer elephants than Antiochos, and placed them in front of the Ptolemaic phalanx, to face part of the Seleukid elephant corps – it was Africans against Indians again. The remainder of the Seleukid beasts were placed behind the smaller phalanx on the south. This deployment was superficially conventional, but actually was rather subtle on both sides, as the fighting would show.

On the northern part of the battlefield the Seleukid Indian elephants beat the Ptolemaic Africans once again, but the decisive move on that side was the charge of the Seleukid cataphracts, who drove off the Ptolemaic cavalry and then turned on the Ptolemaic phalanx, which was also engaged with the Seleukid phalanx in front; this turned into a major killing match, and the Ptolemaic phalanx was steadily worn down. On the south the Aitolians justified their fighting reputation: their cavalry was victorious over the Seleukid horse on that wing, and the Aitolian foot, who were lighter armed and more mobile than the hoplites of the phalanx, broke up the Seleukid force. But then both Aitolian groups came up against the solid wall of elephants, who were as usual interspersed with archers and other light forces. The Aitolians' horses, unused to facing elephants, were frightened off, and the foot could not penetrate the elephant wall, which was no doubt now reinforced by the surviving hoplites from the defeated phalanx.

This is where the layout of the battlefield was crucial, and the preliminary dispositions vital to the outcome. The southern part of the field, where the fight between the Aitolians and the smaller section of the Seleukid phalanx took place, was much less important than the northern. The Aitolians would eventually go home, victorious or not, those who survived. The Ptolemaic phalanx, on the other hand, was not merely the largest Ptolemaic unit on the battlefield, it was also the vital mainstay of the Ptolemaic government. Its destruction would make it impossible for the Ptolemaic government to continue the war in any effective way. Hence Antiochos' dispositions were evidently directed at procuring the destruction of that phalanx; the use of the elephants to block the Aitolians, whose victory on the south was the one hope Skopas had of winning once his main phalanx was surrounded, was the cleverest move of all, since their line prevented the Aitolians from intervening on the other part of the battlefield. Antiochos was able this time to control his cavalry much more effectively than at Raphia, but just as he had at the fighting in the east, at the Arios River.

On the north, therefore, the Seleukid attack was overwhelmingly successful and was in the process of destroying the Ptolemaic phalanx beyond recovery. On the south the Aitolians had been tactically successful at first, but were then held to a draw by the elephants, and prevented from intervening in the northern fight. Skopas, in command but not directly involved – just as King Antiochos this time kept himself out of the detailed fighting – saw that the only part of the army which was likely to survive was the Aitolians. He left the Ptolemaic phalanx to be destroyed and rode across to the Aitolians; there

he withdrew the whole unit, conducting a well-managed retreat away from the battle site. (That he rescued his own people is understandable, but it did nothing to endear him to the government in Alexandria, who found their own people had the heaviest casualties.) The Seleukid forces meanwhile were fully engaged in the fighting on the northern side, while those on the south were too damaged to pursue. Letting the Aitolians go allowed Antiochos to finish off the phalanx, and helped to sow doubts of Skopas' loyalty in Alexandrian minds. The destruction of the Ptolemaic phalanx would substantially reduce the power and authority of the Ptolemaic government, which would find it still more difficult to deal with the Egyptian insurgents.

Several overall conclusions about the battle can be reached, despite the extremely awkward source material. The Seleukid army was clearly a much more flexible and competent force than it had been at Raphia, and Antiochos had added the formidable cataphracts to his armoury. The deployment of the elephants was cleverly done, and the use of them as a cavalry-detering wall shows that Antiochos had studied his family's military history, for this was a new version of the similar use of the elephants by Seleukos I at Ipsos a century before. Antiochos showed careful political judgement in concentrating on the Ptolemaic phalanx, and, in effect, letting the Aitolians get away. (Less than a decade later he was to be allied to the Aitolian League, an alliance which would scarcely have been possible if he had massacred the mercenaries.) The two generals for once held themselves out of the fighting in order to direct the overall battle – neither had any need to prove their fighting skills to their troops by this time, and the complications of the deployment on both sides required a different kind of generalship than that at Raphia, where both kings were in the middle of things. The well-disciplined cataphracts were not carried away with their charge, but, under the apparent command of Antiochos the Younger, who was only 20-years-old, they rallied from the defeat of the Ptolemaic cavalry and were brought back to do their real job, which was to attack the enemy phalanx from the rear and flank. Skopas similarly was able to pull out his Aitolians because he had not been directly involved in the fighting. Both commanders could do this only because they were well known to have fought valiantly in the ranks in the past. But for generals to direct rather than participate was a distinct advance in methods of warfare, and portended more intelligent battle conduct in the future.

This was a truly decisive battle, far more so than Raphia, which simply restored most of Koile Syria to the Ptolemies. The destruction of the Ptolemaic phalanx rendered the Ptolemaic government powerless to go on contesting the possession of Koile Syria, which from now on was a Seleukid possession. The loss of soldiers also lengthened the life of the rebel Egyptian regime, and restricted the ability of the Ptolemaic regime in Alexandria to contest the conquest of their distant possessions by Philip and later by Antiochos.

Skopas brought the Aitolian contingent, 10,000 strong, in a careful retreat

to take refuge in Sidon. Antiochos cleared up the battlefield and moved south to reoccupy 'Samaria, Gadara, and Abila', which is the best evidence that Ptolemaic authority in northern Palestine had been restored in Skopas' earlier march,³⁴ and then took part of his army to besiege Sidon and the Aitolians.³⁵ Much of Antiochos' army – the militia element, for example – was probably dismissed after the battle, for he would not now need his whole available force to finish things off. Skopas' Aitolians were still therefore technically in the field but were not strong enough to fight an open conflict with Antiochos' army. Antiochos could retain his main professional force, and the reservists who were called up only for the great encounters like Raphia and this battle, were sent back to their homes, no doubt with the king's thanks, a reward, and rightly proud of what they had done.

At some point during this year's campaign, the Roman envoys reached Alexandria. They are said to have been charged by the Senate to arbitrate, but there is no sign that they ever attempted to do so. No doubt they were well aware that the possibility had vanished when Skopas returned to Palestine; neither side would forfeit a clear chance of victory. Nor is there any sign that they contacted Antiochos. Certainly they seem to have reached Alexandria, which gave rise to the nonsense story that Rome had been appointed Ptolemy V's guardian. It seems very likely, even though no record exists, that contact was actually made with Antiochos. This, of course, was one of the main objects of the mission – not to arbitrate, but to research. By this time the Roman invasion of Macedon had begun, and an investigation into Antiochos' attitude and his precise connection with Philip is to be expected of the Roman envoys. Two of the men, C. Claudius Nero and M. Sempronius Tuditanus, had long experience of command and office during Hannibal's War; they would understand the need to search out the possibilities in the diplomatic situation in the east. If they were still in the east after Antiochos' victory they would most certainly be interested in his next move. All involved would be fully aware that Antiochos' war with Ptolemy was not ended by the victory at Panion, and that there was plenty of Ptolemaic territory ripe for the plucking elsewhere.

The siege of Sidon was more a blockade than an active assault, and only part of Antiochos' army would be required. The rest of his force could then be used to establish Seleukid government in the conquered territory: we have a note that Jerusalem was recovered.³⁶ In all this Ptolemaios son of Thraseas was particularly useful. He was reappointed as governor of Koile Syria in the Seleukid interest, and no doubt he was able to get the Ptolemaic governing system operating again quickly.³⁷ It was presumably in this period that any unconquered Ptolemaic detachments were persuaded to give up the fight. This would include any in the Ptolemaic cities, such as Jerusalem and possibly Gaza, which had been retaken by Skopas, and, at last, the garrisons of Gerrha and Brochoi, and any of the Phoenician cities which still held out.

Sidon resisted through the winter of 200/199. The government in

Alexandria made serious attempts to relieve the siege, clearly feeling that not was all yet lost. Little is known of these attempts beyond the fact that they occurred, and the names of their commanders – Aeropos, Menekles, and Demoxenos.³⁸ There is no sign that any naval assistance was forthcoming, presumably because part of the Ptolemaic fleet was held up in the Aegean and probably also because the Seleukid fleet was able to impose a blockade on Sidon – since Antiochos now held such places as Byblos and Berytos, such a blockade was quite possible (though we have no evidence for it). These attempts at relief therefore had to come by land, and Antiochos will have had to be on his guard in southern Palestine to defeat the Ptolemaic relieving armies. It is difficult to believe that much hope was held out in these attempts, for the distance of the march would allow Antiochos plenty of time to mount his reply and intercept any relieving force.

The siege of Sidon lasted into the early summer of 199, but then Skopas was compelled to surrender. He was granted generous terms by which he and his soldiers could go back to Egypt – or to Aitolia.³⁹ Antiochos would know that they would probably mainly go home. Tyre and Ptolemais-Ake held out a little longer, into later 199, and perhaps Joppa did as well, but after the capitulation of Sidon there was little fight left in the Ptolemaic forces and government.⁴⁰ The relief of these garrisons could also have been one of the objects of the relieving forces which came up from Egypt; clearly they failed. But once Joppa was in Antiochos' hands, late in 199, all the lands he had been claiming for a quarter of a century, and his family for a century, were his at last; by early in 198 the Syrian campaign was over.⁴¹

Chapter Seven

The Fifth Syrian War: Asia Minor

The use of the word ‘Syrian’ for this war, and its predecessors and successors, is so normal by now that it is inescapable, but at the same time it is misleading. Certainly Syria was at the heart of the conflict between the Seleukid and Ptolemaic kings, but it was not the only land over which they were in dispute. The fighting between the two states had ranged from the borders of Egypt to the coast of Thrace, and had involved every other kingdom and many cities around the eastern Mediterranean. The use of the term ‘Syria’ therefore serves to hide the wide extent of these wars.¹

In the case of the Fifth War the Syrian section of the fighting was only the first part, from 202 to 199 or 198. The next part, in 197–195, took place in Asia Minor and Thrace, and by the end it was being overtaken by a growing crisis in the relations of Antiochos with Rome, and, classical historians being what they are, anything to do with Rome takes priority, so this aspect, certainly from the Roman point of view, has been studied at the expense of what Antiochos actually did. To Antiochos, however, this was not a major issue until well after the war with Ptolemy was over.

In 198 Antiochos stood victorious in Syria. He had gained control of the whole land as far as the borders of Egypt. He was then faced with a new choice. The Ptolemaic kingdom, though now deprived of Palestine and Phoenicia, still consisted of a large territory: Egypt and Cyrenaica, and numerous coastal places and islands in Anatolia and the Aegean. Some of the European places, of course, had now been taken by Philip, who had captured those he could reach in Thrace and the Chersonese; he was besieging Abydos on the Asian side of the Straits when Lepidus the Roman envoy caught up with him and delivered what was, in effect, a declaration of war. Earlier he had campaigned for a time in Karia, capturing cities from Ptolemy and from Rhodes. When he returned to Macedon, he found that the Roman declaration of war had arrived just as the Roman invasion forces were crossing the Adriatic.² From the point of view of both the Ptolemaic and Seleukid kingdoms, both Rome and Philip were now so fully preoccupied with each

other that they could be ignored.

Antiochos therefore had three options before him after his conquest of Koile Syria: he could go on to attack Egypt, or he could be content with what he had gained and make peace, or he could go back into Anatolia to pick up the remaining Ptolemaic possessions. He chose this last alternative. Probably he did not have to think long about it, but it is worth considering what reasons he might have. First, by the time he was free to leave Syria, sometime late in 198, the situation in the Aegean and Greece had clearly become critical. Philip had made a good fight against Rome in the first two campaigns, but he was beset by Greek as well as Roman enemies. It behoved a conscientious king, even a neutral, to be on hand at such a crisis point; and it might also, of course, be possible to extract gains from the situation, just as Philip had taken advantage of Ptolemy's war with Antiochos to seize Ptolemaic possessions. Second, and perhaps more important in a personal sense, Anatolia was a region into which Antiochos had repeatedly put a lot of effort in the past: Akhaïos had conquered it in Antiochos' name in 222, Antiochos himself had operated there in 216 to 212, and he had campaigned there again in 204 to 202, and yet there were still problems he had to solve in the area. A further visit to collect the Ptolemaic bits and pieces along the coasts might allow him to finish the work. Removing them would also remove possible bases from which Ptolemy might revive his local power. There were still other areas to which Antiochos, as heir to the earlier Seleukid kings, could make a plausible claim. Finally, the elimination of the numerous Ptolemaic outposts would obviously increase Seleukid power and wealth in the region for the future. There were plenty of factors attracting him yet again into Anatolia.

Egypt was still in a bad condition. The defeat in Syria will have put the government into shock; the rebellions in the south and in the Delta had not been seriously tackled yet; the regency government in Alexandria was clearly unstable. It had a legitimate king in the child Ptolemy V, who was now 12-years-old, but still too young to assume any real power. We do not know if Antiochos ever harboured a wish to reconstitute the empire of Alexander; if he did Egypt would be a prime target, but he never showed any wish to invade it, still less to conquer it, even in 198 when he had the best opportunity. The rumoured division of the Ptolemaic territories between Antiochos and Philip V had always excluded Egypt as a prize; by avoiding an invasion Antiochos would therefore be carrying out that agreement. At the same time, he would know that such an invasion would be a very difficult enterprise; Egypt was both difficult to invade and to conquer.

There was another, and personal, point here as well. As has been argued here and elsewhere, the most convincing interpretation of Antiochos' career is that he was intent on restoring his family's kingdom to its widest extent. This necessarily entailed a recognition of the continued existence of the rival kingdoms in Macedon and Egypt whose dynasties were of the same vintage as his own. This political system could only continue if all three of the major

powers accepted each other; stripping the Ptolemies of their extra-Egyptian territories would not eliminate the kingdom; instead it would replace the predominance of the Ptolemies with that of the Seleukids; Antiochos would surely believe that could only be right.

In view of future developments, of course, it may have been a pity that Antiochos did not seize the opportunity which seemed to exist in 198 to march on Egypt and unite it with his own lands. A combined Seleukid-and-Ptolemaic kingdom would have been able to face the Roman assault which came in the next decade much more successfully than the separate states could.

It may also have been clear that the deposition of Ptolemy V from his kingdom would be thoroughly unpopular, certainly among the Greeks of Egypt, and even outside that country. Polybios gave voice to this when he argued that it was wrong for the kings to steal Ptolemy's provinces, especially as he was only a child, and this may well have been a more widespread sentiment.³ Several of the Greek cities and leagues – Rhodes, Athens, Aitolia, Sparta, Achaia – had had friendly relations with Egypt, and these were the guardians of 'public opinion', insofar as such a thing can be understood at the time. Antiochos was usually very conscious of his reputation; it was at his insistence that his army had respected the sanctuaries at Amyzon and Labraunda and Sinuri in Karia; he would not wish to be seen as brutal and blasphemous, as Philip was, for example, after his sack of Thermos.

There were plenty of good reasons, therefore, to avoid an Egyptian campaign, but possibly the most telling was its difficulty. Most of the earlier attempts at invasion of the country from Syria had failed. Antiochos knew from first-hand experience the conditions in the Sinai Desert, and he knew from family history that even the great Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes had failed to reach Egypt by that route. The stubborn fight of the Ptolemaic phalanx at Panion, as well as his own defeat at Raphia, the popular support for the Ptolemaic garrison in Gaza and the resistance of Sidon and Joppa, were all clear evidence that the Ptolemies held the loyalty of the surviving Greeks in Egypt, despite the despair and corruption among the higher officers and in the court.

Further, by the time Antiochos had to make a decision on his next move, early in 198, the Egyptian government had had time to organize its defences. Most of Skopas' force of Aitolians was back in Egypt from Sidon, and he had recruited 6,500 more Aitolians to reinforce them.⁴ One suggestion is that he had also been appointed to command the defences of the eastern Delta, but in any case he was in command of the strongest military force in Egypt for the time being.⁵ There was therefore a substantial army still available to defend Egypt, both local Greeks who could be embodied, and the Aitolian mercenaries, all under a skilful general who could scarcely be removed by a coup in Alexandria while he was surrounded by an army composed of his own people. Despite the destruction of the Egyptian phalanx at Panion, therefore,

there were still troops enough for the regency government in Alexandria. No easy conquest could result.

But then, suppose Antiochos did invade and conquer Egypt, he would have the child Ptolemy on his hands – shades of the son of Alexander the Great – and he would have to solve the problem of governing Egypt. The native Egyptian rebellions were still active, and they would only be encouraged by the defeats of the Ptolemaic regime. The surviving Greeks and Macedonians were unlikely to become reconciled to losing their king, the source of favours and the object of their loyalty, and they might even join one of the rebel pharaohs in fighting against a Seleukid regime. The subsequent war would last a long time. It was a prospect sufficiently unpleasant to daunt even Antiochos the Great.

In fact, it seems probable that, even if such considerations were discussed at his court, as they surely were, it was another factor entirely which stopped him. There really was no need to invade Egypt, for at some point Antiochos and Ptolemy would make peace, and in that agreement Ptolemy would be left in control of Egypt, a kingdom much reduced in power. The Seleukid king would be the dominating power from Asia Minor to India, and Ptolemy would be reduced to the status of Euthydemos of Baktria, a satellite of Antiochos' kingdom. It would be almost a repeat of the achievement of Seleukos I in the brief period of triumph between the victory of Koroupedion and his murder.

At the same time all those involved were trapped inside their political system, which had existed for the past century, in which the lands around the eastern Mediterranean were divided among a group of major kingdoms, with lesser kingdoms grouped around and under them. This applied also on Antiochos' eastern flank, where his eastern campaign had resulted in stabilization, but where none of the kings had been removed. (Armenia had been incorporated only when its dynasty failed.) There could be no question of extinguishing the Ptolemaic kingdom, only of reducing it to vassalage. None of the political participants of the period could contemplate the removal of any single state – Rome had left the Syracusan king in power until 212, and the Carthaginian Republic was still in existence, even after the Second Punic War.

These were all considerations which will have been discussed, either formally or informally, by Antiochos and his council, and the trend of the argument was surely away from either invasion or annexation, but in the end it may have been still another issue which prevented him from invading Egypt. The continued efficacy of the political system required a system of diplomatic practice which was acceptable to all the kings and cities and leagues. In the case of the kingdoms, the kings relied on each other keeping to the letter, if not necessarily to the whole spirit, of their agreements. It seems quite possible that the real deterrent for Antiochos in a personal sense was that he had agreed with Philip that neither of them would attack Egypt itself, and he had to keep his word.

The city of Sidon probably fell to Antiochos' forces in the late spring or early summer of 199; but it took another year for Antiochos to remove all the vestiges of Ptolemaic rule from the conquered region.⁶ By that time the regime in Egypt had recovered its balance somewhat, and had rearmed, in part by importing the second tranche of Aitolians recruited by Skopas. A note in Livy, probably based originally on Polybios, indicates that it was not until the summer of 198 that Antiochos could be satisfied with the situation in Palestine. There had been plenty to do, even if he did have the assistance of the old Ptolemaic governor, now the Seleukid governor, Ptolemaios son of Thraseas. The administration would need to be staffed – even if more of the Ptolemaic officials stayed in place – each community would need to be checked for its rights and duties, and a level of taxation imposed. A considerable garrison would need to be stationed in the region, not only to defend it against any Ptolemaic attack, but in order to ensure that no rising took place in Ptolemy's favour. And every item would need to be decided by the king. Antiochos then returned to Antioch, where he spent the winter of 198/197.⁷ Preparations for the next campaign were then made.

The contact made with Rome by the visit of the three envoys in 200 had been a clear sign of the emergence of that new great power onto the Eastern Mediterranean scene. The elimination of Carthaginian power had affected Egypt, which had had long if intermittent relations with it. In addition Carthage was a daughter city of Tyre, and had kept up commercial and religious relations with it – and Antiochos now included Tyre in his kingdom.

Further than that, the Romans now had no obvious competition in the west, and had at once turned to finish their earlier dispute with Macedon. By the spring of 197, when Antiochos was about to set out on his new Asia Minor expedition, the Roman forces were about to launch the decisive attack on Macedon from the south. Philip had become desperate, and searched for allies. It is significant, given the earlier agreement between them, that he made no attempt (at least so far as we know) to enlist Antiochos on his side, but had to make do with Nabis of Sparta, who proved to be a liability.⁸

It is curious that Philip apparently ignored the possibility of an appeal to Antiochos. Quite apart from the agreement they had made to partition Ptolemy's territories, they had earlier made a successful agreement over Karia. And again, the two dynasties had repeatedly intermarried; Philip's stepmother, his grandmother, and two of his great-grandparents, were Seleukids. In the face of Ptolemaic power they had more than once operated in concert if not usually in full alliance. In many ways it would have been natural for Philip to turn to Antiochos for assistance. But perhaps it was the very fact of the destruction of Ptolemaic power which now separated them, plus the fact that Philip's enemy was now Rome, with which Antiochos had been at pains to establish friendship.

Antiochos' preparations for his next campaign had included sending a force in advance into Asia Minor. There it would reinforce Zeuxis and would be

available if needed. It was this army which in 198 brought about the next contact with Rome in a largely accidental but certainly unfortunate way. King Attalos I, already a subordinate of Antiochos after the alliance they had made against Akhaïos in 216, complained that a Seleukid force had encroached on his territory. But his complaint was not directed to Antiochos, which would have been the correct diplomatic response, nor apparently to Zeuxis, who was the Seleukid official in command in Asia Minor, nor to the commanders of the Seleukid force, whose men were presumably responsible for the encroachment. Instead Attalos complained to Rome.⁹

It may be assumed that the encroachment did take place, though it is not beyond imagination that Attalos invented it, or simply lied to the Romans about it. His turn to Rome was due to the fact that he was already involved in the Romano-Macedonian war on the Roman side – he and Philip had long quarrelled – though he had not been particularly active. (He died next year; maybe his energies were failing.) But he was also, as were all participants, playing his own game. One aim he had was no doubt to escape from the Seleukid subordination and alliance; an alliance with distant Rome would be more comfortable, and leave him freer to pursue his own designs in Asia Minor. The (probably unintended) Seleukid military encroachment on his territory – we do not know how the boundaries were marked, or even if they were – was an ideal opportunity to bring Roman power on to his side against Antiochos. But he can hardly have expected any direct Roman help, which might have brought them into a war with Antiochos while they were still at war with Philip. Maybe Attalos was mainly interested in withdrawing from the fighting in Europe, which is what he asked for. He had to have been worried by the build-up of Antiochos' military strength in western Asia Minor – rightly as it turned out.

In Livy's account of the Senate meeting with Attalos' envoys, he remarks that Antiochos was regarded by the Senate as 'a friend and ally of the Roman people'.¹⁰ This is a new item whose origin is not known. If it is not a Livian mistake or invention (or one by the Senate being used to deflect Attalos) it was a result of the meeting of Antiochos with the three envoys, Nero, Tuditanus, and Lepidus, two years before. It may merely have been an assumption by the Senate because a friendly meeting had taken place, or it may have been a deliberate assertion to put Antiochos on the same footing with regard to Rome as Ptolemy already was, so as to deal with them equally. It does not in fact seem to have had any real effect on either Rome or Antiochos – even if Antiochos knew of his status in Roman eyes. The Senate, clearly seeing through Attalos' ploy, refused to send him help, but did give him leave to withdraw his forces back to Asia, and then decided to send another set of envoys to discuss matters with Antiochos, though we do not know who they were, nor when they saw Antiochos. He sent envoys of his own to Rome, probably in reply to this senatorial embassy, who returned to report to him in mid-197.

Antiochos, meanwhile, had laid out his plans for the next campaign against Ptolemy's territories. The advance party of the army was to be followed up by the main field army, while he had also gathered a fleet which was to operate along the coast, where the Ptolemaic posts were. This was clearly the easiest means of conquest, since much of the land by the coast was difficult of access and roadless.

In the spring of 197, the army crossed the Taurus Mountains in the spring, once the passes were open, and marched west along the Royal Road, along which he had himself campaigned against Akhaïos. The commanders were Mithradates and Ardys, said by Livy to be sons of Antiochos, but Livy is probably wrong. This Mithradates is presumably the erstwhile candidate for the Armenian kingship, now adult; Ardys is unlikely to be another nephew, but is probably the man who commanded a unit in the war against Molon twenty years before.¹¹ This combination of a member of the royal family, perhaps at first in nominal command, with an experienced general to do the real work, is hardly unknown.¹²

At the same time, the Seleukid fleet, with plenty of soldiers on board, and commanded by Antiochos in person, sailed along the south coast of Asia Minor, to capture the Ptolemaic posts on the way. It consisted of 100 warships accompanied by 200 other vessels, transports and supply ships.¹³ Here, it may be noted, was another area where Antiochos had been building his strength. At the start of his reign the Seleukid navy was negligible. After all, he had only one major Syrian port under his direct control when he became king (Laodikeia-ad-Mare). It was scarcely possible to build up a fleet on such a narrow basis, though he also had the use, though maybe only after negotiation, of the Aradian fleet. But in 219 a substantial section of the Ptolemaic fleet was captured at Ptolemais-Ake, and perhaps others in the Phoenician ports, and next year he had a large enough fleet to deter the remainder of the Ptolemaic navy from attacking in the fight at Porphyryon; in 200/199 similarly no Ptolemaic fleet interfered with his blockade of Sidon, though enough ships eventually arrived, it may be assumed, to evacuate the surrendered troops.¹⁴ The decayed condition of the ships taken over by Philip at Samos is perhaps a good indication that the Ptolemaic fleet was no longer an active force; perhaps the sailors were drafted into the army – for sure, one would expect the marines to be fighting on land.¹⁵ Now in 197 Antiochos set off for the Aegean in command of a war fleet of 300 ships. This is not a fleet of the great size built up by Ptolemy II, or anywhere near that of the Romans, but it was larger than anything east of Italy, now that the Ptolemaic fleet was in decay. As with other kings who believe they are, or should be, great powers, Antiochos clearly believed he should be strong both by land and sea.

A preliminary operation probably took place in Smooth Kilikia, during which several places fell to him: Mallos in the plain of Smooth Kilikia, across the bay of Iskenderun from Seleukeia-in-Pieria, Soloi and Anemurion, Arsinoe next to Nagidos, and, round the corner, Selinos and Arsinoe in

Pamphylia.¹⁶ Two inscriptions from the region probably record details. One is from Aigai, and was a dedication to Antiochos and his family by Themison, ‘nephew of the king’, dating between 199 and 193, so 197 is likely.¹⁷ (This is another claimed royal relationship which is otherwise undocumented – possibly it was an honorary rank, or possibly a more distant relationship than we would understand by the term ‘nephew’.) From Soloi is another dedication to the king, this time by Ptolemaios son of Thraseas, who had become the governor of the former Ptolemaic Syria. His family originally came from Aspendos in Pamphylia, and he had connections with Nagidos in Rough Kilikia. The activity of both of these important men in Kilikia seems best to be accounted for by their participation in the early stages of the campaign of 197.¹⁸

A comment is needed at this point on the sources for this maritime expedition. There are two sources, Hieronymos and Livy, but in each case they do little more than provide a list of the places which Antiochos captured.¹⁹ But the two lists give the names in a different order, which in turn provides the clue to Antiochos’ progress and to his method. He appears to have moved along the coast to seize the main strategic posts, and bypassing lesser places. These were then taken at leisure. But in addition there are significant omissions in both lists, places of importance which were evidently ignored.

The first post to be seized was Cape Zephyrion, in Rough Kilikia, after which towns on the coast to the east, between there and Smooth Kilikia, were mopped up – Mallos, and Soloi, and so on. The next point to be seized was the great rock of Korakesion, fortified a century before by Ptolemy I and so a major centre of Ptolemaic power in the area ever since. Korakesion was the first place to resist; it held out for a month before capitulating. No doubt it was the first place reached which had a substantial Ptolemaic garrison, and probably the last. It was also, and still is, a hugely difficult obstacle, a steep rock with a solid fortification on the summit.²⁰

Korakesion was besieged, and the places in between it and Zephyrion were taken in the meantime – Nagidos, Arsinoe, Selinos. The next stage was to reach Korykos, a minor port on the east coast of Lykia south of Phaselis. Antiochos thus had to cross the Pamphylian Sea, and by doing so he left a whole series of places alone, including all the Pamphylian cities, but then he clashed with the locally dominant naval power in the area, Rhodes.

At Korakesion Antiochos had received a delegation from Rhodes suggesting that he should not go any further than the Chelidonian Cape, which is the western end of the Pamphylian Sea, just south of Korykos.²¹ Antiochos was, by his moving west by sea, coming within range both of Rhodian territories and that city’s maritime interests, and of the conflict between Rome and Macedon. Rhodes was an ally of Rome in the Macedonian war, while the year before Antiochos and Attalos of Pergamon, another Roman ally, had clashed. So Antiochos was already at odds in a minor way with two of

Rome's allies. He seems to have calmed Attalos, whose complaint was not repeated or followed up, and had sent his main field army into Asia Minor as far as Sardis with no further reaction. Now, with Rhodes, he ignored the implied challenge delivered at Korakesion. His fleet was quite large enough to call Rhodes' bluff, and he moved decisively enough to do so by successfully seizing the naval base at Korykos, very close to the Chelidonian Cape.

The bypassed cities of Pamphylia had formed themselves into an alliance, originally stimulated by the intrusion of Akhaïos into Pisidia and Pamphylia in 221/220, but it had continued in existence ever since. Aspendos (the original home of Ptolemaios' family), Perge, Sillyon, Phaselis, and probably Termessos and Magydos, were joined into a political league which was defensive in intention; the evidence for it is largely numismatic, for the cities produced a joint coinage which was clearly dated by the years since the alliance had been formed.²²

For Antiochos this group of cities acting together could have been very awkward. He had only one friend among the Pamphylians, the city of Side, Korakesion's western neighbour, but from there to the Chelidonian Cape the Pamphylian city-alliance was dominant. At the same time there is no sign that the league was in any way hostile to him; indeed its origins were as a defence against Akhaïos. Nor was Pamphylia Ptolemaic territory, though Phaselis in the past had been a Ptolemaic port, and there had been Ptolemaic influence in the area. The cities were evidently determined to be neutral, so Antiochos could ignore them. No doubt Rhodes chose the Chelidonian Cape as its *ne plus ultra* challenge on the assumption that this place, in combination with the city-alliance in Pamphylia, would in fact keep Antiochos even further back, at Side and Korakesion. However, by sailing his fleet directly across the Pamphylian Sea and seizing the base at Korykos, between Phaselis and the Cape, he outflanked the Pamphylians, and arrived in effect on Rhodes's doorstep; at Korykos he was also dividing the potential allies. Korykos was clearly an unexpected choice as a base, but from there he could easily sail past the Cape and then directly along the coast of Lykia. He thus arrived close to Rhodes in full naval strength much more quickly than the Rhodians had expected.

The Rhodians, faced by this sudden move, agreed to talks, and Antiochos sent an envoy to the city, while remaining east of the Cape, in a threatening position, but not mounting an active threat. Rhodes had been claiming to be operating on behalf of Rome, but Antiochos produced an envoy of his own who had just reached him from Rome, so Rhodes' pretence failed.²³ The negotiations then were easy, since Rhodes could be reassured that Antiochos intended no hostility towards the city – so long as his progress was not blocked – and that he did not aim to interfere in Rhodes' control of its mainland *Peraia*. Rhodes also stipulated that Samos be left to Ptolemy, and laid claim to several of Ptolemy's cities. This Antiochos was quite prepared to agree to, and he arranged for the return of Stratonikeia to Rhodian control – it

had been seized by Philip, whose defeat by Rome, which had taken place by this time, had effectively eliminated his power in Karia. These mutual concessions indicate that a process of negotiation between the two kings and the city had taken place, and this alone should have reassured the Rhodians that they were in no danger.²⁴

Antiochos then continued his voyage. On the way he systematically mopped up more Ptolemaic posts, both on the Lykian coast and inland. He had presumably made it clear to the Rhodians that he intended to do this, and that his eventual destination was Ephesos. He seized the Ptolemaic posts at Limyra and Andriake, and the great harbour at Patara, together with the city of Xanthos, a little inland. Close by was Telmessos, ruled by Ptolemaios, a descendant of Arsinoe II and Lysimachos, whose ancestor had been originally placed there by Ptolemy II; he was not disturbed, which means he submitted readily, but a colony of Kardakes soldiers was planted on the city, no doubt to ensure its and his continued loyalty to Antiochos; this was a real compromise, added to which Ptolemaios' daughter Berenike was appointed a priestess of Queen Laodike when her cult was organized in 193.²⁵

There was little hope of help from Egypt for any of these places after the destruction of troops at Panion, and measures such as those at Telmessos were intended to fasten the Seleukid grip on the region in place of the Ptolemaic – or the Rhodian. Patara had a large and useful harbour only 80km from the harbour of the city of Rhodes; it now became a Seleukid fleet base, and so if it was not a direct threat to Rhodes, then it was a latent one. The Seleukid fleet sailed on past Rhodes, and past Philip's last garrison in Karia at Bargylia as far as Ephesos, which was captured. This now became Antiochos' maritime base facing onto the Aegean.²⁶

The army which Antiochos had sent into Asia Minor complemented this maritime campaign. As before, the commander-in-chief was Zeuxis, no doubt assisted by Ardys and Mithradates. The army arrived at Sardis about May or early June, when Antiochos was at Korakesion and negotiating with Rhodes. It is probable that a detachment was then sent south into Lykia. Antiochos might well have required it close by in case his confrontation with Rhodes turned violent. There is a record of the city of Arykanda in Lykia being taken by Mithradates.²⁷ Since the author, Agatharchides, wrote before the conquering career of Mithradates VI of Pontos, who is the only other possible candidate of that name who ever operated in the area, it is generally assumed that the man he referred to was the man appointed by Antiochos. This would mean that Antiochos had summoned a force south from Sardis, Mithradates' original destination, to assist him. He was certainly held up long enough by Korakesion and Rhodes for such a force to have time to arrive. Arykanda is also a good way inland, 30km or more from the coast, which is perhaps more distance than the ship-borne army cared to march. And, of course, with a land force paralleling the progress of the ships, Antiochos could exert still more pressure on Rhodes.

This is not the only action of the land army. Zeuxis himself returned with a force to Karia. So, while Antiochos advanced from the east by sea, collecting the coastal Lykian cities, and Mithradates operated in the Lykian interior, Zeuxis was operating in Karia. His activity is recorded in inscriptions, as before. Kildara was promised assistance in recovering from earlier damage;²⁸ Iasos received a letter from Queen Laodike promising similar help, and the city acknowledged this by instituting a ritual of libations and prayers for the royal family;²⁹ Euromos made an alliance with Antiochos;³⁰ Herakleia under Latmos, either at this time or a little later, recorded its submission to the king by copying on to inscription his and Zeuxis' letters to it.³¹

The same sort of progress was marked in Antiochos' movements. Livy and Hieronymos recorded the several places submitting to him; some were on the coast, and some a little way inland, which might suggest that Mithradates' forces were still present. Some cities not mentioned were also probably included: the port of Myra, Andiake, was taken, and this would suggest that Myra itself fell also. Xanthos records that the king consecrated the city to its triple deities, Leto, Apollo, and Artemis, instancing as his excuse his and the city's joint Apolline ancestry.³²

Several of the places taken by Zeuxis had earlier fallen to Philip, and it was his operations which had apparently caused the damage at Kildara and Iasos which Zeuxis and Laodike promised by their letters to repair. The dating of these grants seems to be in the late summer of 197 or in 196; that is, Zeuxis was in Karia after the defeat of Philip in Europe, when it is apparent that it had become open season on his conquests. Stratonikeia was another of these Macedonian conquests, and had probably been one of the subjects discussed with Antiochos in the negotiations at Rhodes. (The news of Philip's defeat at Kynoskephalai had arrived at Rhodes during the negotiations.) Antiochos, or perhaps Zeuxis, took over the city and then handed it on to the Rhodians.³³

The Rhodians had meanwhile 'liberated' three of Ptolemy's towns, Myndos, Halikarnassos, and Kaunos, so extending their *Peraia*. The old friendship of the city towards Ptolemy did not, it seems, extend to restraint when there was the possibility of the acquisition of such places. Bargylia was still held by a Macedonian garrison which neither Rhodes nor Antiochos wished to tackle. Other than that the whole region was now partitioned between Rhodes and Antiochos. Antiochos, on his way north, will have taken over Miletos, if he did not already hold it, and if Zeuxis had not already acquired it during his Karian campaign.³⁴

By the time Antiochos reached Ephesos there were no Ptolemaic outposts left along the coast of southern Asia Minor. His voyage took several months – he began in the spring of 197 and was negotiating with Rhodes when the news of the battle of Kynoskephalai in June arrived.³⁵ Perhaps another month, even two, was taken up with the voyage on to Ephesos – it is not clear how long it took to mop up the last Lykian and Karian cities. At some point along the way, perhaps once he had reached Ephesos, peace negotiations began with the

regency in Alexandria, though Antiochos was in no hurry to finish off his war while there were still a few Ptolemaic posts to capture.

The continued loss of the Ptolemaic overseas territories had gradually undermined the position of the regent Aristomenes. He had made progress in dealing with the various rebellions, and had largely suppressed the problems in the Delta, at least for a time, by the conquest of the rebel stronghold at Lykopolis.³⁶ But repeated defeats in the external war, and the regime's dependence on Aitolian soldiery, were sources of unpopularity. During 197, while the Asia Minor campaign was on, the governor of Cyprus, Polykrates of Argos, returned to Alexandria, bringing with him a large sum of money he had saved out of the administration of the island, which he presented to the king, though one wonders why he had not acted to interfere with Antiochos' campaign just to the north of Cyprus.³⁷

Polykrates was a political ally of Aristomenes and together they dealt with a political threat from Skopas, who had amassed much treasure and was apparently planning a coup, presumably using his Aitolians. He was possibly only a suspect rather than a planner, but his defence was incoherent, and he had become too powerful to be tolerated.³⁸ He was imprisoned and murdered on Aristomenes' orders. Polykrates then organized the *anakleteria*, the coming-of-age ceremony for the king. In March 196 Ptolemy V was formally crowned pharaoh at Memphis, an action which was a clear threat to the rebel pharaoh Ankhwennefer, but also to Aristomenes, who had not taken, or perhaps had deliberately delayed, such a step.³⁹ And so Polykrates gradually supplanted Aristomenes as the king's principal minister and became the man who negotiated the end of the Seleukid war.

Antiochos had been in contact with Rome all through this campaign, though it is only by the odd remark in Livy that we can discover this. The key is the comment, during Antiochos' negotiations with Rhodes, that his envoys had recently arrived from Rome. These had been a return embassy after the visit of the Roman envoys who had been sent to discuss the problem that had arisen with Attalos the year before. That problem having been smoothed over, the exchanges of embassies were largely matters of courtesy while both the king and Rome were in the midst of their campaigns. Once Philip had been beaten and Antiochos had reached Ephesos, the air cleared and serious negotiations could be conducted.

At Ephesos, Antiochos was just to the south of the Attalid kingdom. (The takeover of Teos and its neighbours along the Erythraian peninsula may have happened at this point, if not earlier in 203.) At Pergamon King Attalos had died in the spring, and had been succeeded by his eldest son, Eumenes II (the only succession from father to son in this dynasty). This meant that the old alliance between Antiochos and Attalos had expired; at the same time, Attalos' behaviour during the previous year in withdrawing from the Macedonian war had soured his relations with Rome. Eumenes thus had no protector, and was suddenly menaced by both Rome and Antiochos.

It is probable that another of the Seleukid expeditions despatched by Zeuxis from Sardis had gone to the north, though this is even more vague in detail and dating than other matters. Early in 196 Antiochos was able to order a force of his troops which was already at Abydos to attack Lampsakos, and later he could order another force in Abydos to cross the Hellespont to the Chersonese.⁴⁰ This suggests that the site of Abydos had been occupied late in 197, and by a substantial enough force to undertake those operations while also leaving a garrison in the town. Abydos had been captured by Philip in 201, when he had sardonically given the inhabitants permission to kill themselves, which they did; the site was perhaps wrecked when Antiochos' forces arrived, certainly it was under-populated, and this is probably why he seized it as a ready-made fortress.

The extent of the occupation which Antiochos' forces achieved in the northwest is not known. There are two undated inscriptions recording the violent captures of cities, but neither their names nor the dates are recorded, though one was in Hellespontine Phrygia.⁴¹ Thyateira in Attalid territory was taken at about this time, and this may be another of the captures of the expedition.⁴² Antiochos made an agreement of some sort with Ilion, but the date is not known.⁴³ It may therefore be assumed that Antiochos' forces were operating in the region, though when they actually arrived is not clear; they were in occupation of Abydos early in 197, but there may well have been Seleukid troops in the region earlier. Next year he sailed from Ephesos to the Hellespont and set about gathering up the remaining places to which, as the man at war with Ptolemy, he could lay claim.

He pressed Smyrna to accept his suzerainty, without success; also Lampsakos continued to resist him.⁴⁴ But Abydos was his, and he campaigned in the Thracian Chersonese, which had been abandoned by Ptolemy, by Philip, and by the Aitolians, and had then been overrun by a Thracian invasion. He had to lay siege to Madytos, which surrendered just as the final assault was about to go in; then 'Sestos and the other towns' also surrendered.⁴⁵ He drove the invaders out and set about reviving the city of Lysimacheia, which had been destroyed by the Thracians. This was another dynastic occasion, in that it was near that city that Seleukos I the founder had been murdered. The city had been wrecked and plundered by the Thracians and its inhabitants either driven out or enslaved. Antiochos set about bringing the refugees back, rebuilding, finding and ransoming the enslaved, and generally refounding the city.⁴⁶

This was in its way the culmination of the campaign and the validation of Antiochos' 'restoration' policy. There were still jobs to be done, but the recapture of Lysimacheia could have been the final task, and its re-peopling was a suitable moment at which to begin to move towards internal development and consolidation. The king was at this point still less than 50 years of age. He had the best of medical care, the best of food, and was still active and vigorous, as the constant activity of the past year had demonstrated.

He had not only campaigned and conquered, but had co-ordinated the movements of the fleet and army several hundred kilometres apart; he had negotiated with his Ptolemaic enemy, with Rhodes, and with Rome. It was an impressive programme of activity. And he could expect two more decades of life at least (and he did in fact live another ten years, before dying in battle, and so prematurely). It seems, however, that his success was a heady and stimulating emotion; he was determined to go on.

Chapter Eight

Thrace, Peace, and the Romans

The multiple activities of Antiochos III in 197 continued into 196, and for a time Lysimacheia became the effective capital city of the Seleukid Empire. In that time the city was refounded, rebuilt, and repopulated, and Antiochos based himself there while he conducted a series of campaigns into Thrace. It was also the scene of one of the decisive diplomatic conferences of the Hellenistic world.

In Greece the Roman proconsul T. Quinctius Flamininus, the victorious commander against Macedon, was in all probability in regular communication with Antiochos. The envoys sent by Rome in 198 (concerning Attalos' complaint) and those sent by Antiochos in reply, had passed through Greece, and it is overwhelmingly probable that they met Flamininus on their way. Apart from anything else, it would be normal diplomatic courtesy for the envoys to call on him. There is no direct evidence for this, but one cannot believe that the Roman proconsul in Greece was not kept fully informed by the Senate and its envoys of the relations with the only other great power left in the region, just across the Aegean Sea.

Flamininus was assisted by a group of ten peace commissioners sent out by the Senate to implement the peace terms in detail. The commissioners' remit was to make decisions on the details of the peace settlement within the parameters laid out by the Senate. They relied on Flamininus, as the local proconsul, to implement their decisions, but of course he also had a large input into those decisions. The Senate's instructions may have been fairly vague in the first place, and it was at this point that Flamininus' local knowledge became important.

The ten commissioners reached Greece in about March 196.¹ They spent several months discussing with Flamininus exactly what measures to take to implement the peace terms, and it was an open secret in Greece that they found it difficult to agree. A variety of cities appeared in lists, provoking Greek derisive comments. In particular the commissioners were arguing amongst themselves whether to evacuate the three 'Fetters' of Greece,

Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalkis in Euboea, and Corinth, which Roman forces had taken over from Philip's troops; their decision on this was not clear until the very end.² It was not until the Isthmia at Corinth in June that final decisions were reached and announced.

While the Romans were in discussions, and long before they had actually set about implementing their plans, Antiochos went on campaign. He left Ephesos probably in April, captured Madytos and then the rest of the Chersonese, and gave orders to revive Lysimacheia. While he was doing this he also sent two envoys, Hegesianax and Lysias, across to Greece, where they met Flamininus and the commissioners at the Isthmia at Corinth.³ The reports of the meetings say nothing of the message the king sent, and give a supposed reply by Flamininus which is a list of demands and prohibitions.⁴ Since Antiochos went ahead and ignored all these demands, it is best to assume that they are all inventions, either by Flamininus when he returned to Rome, or by the Roman historians later. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the king's message was a statement of his plans for the campaign on which he had already started. He would know that he would be approaching territory in which Rome was interested and would wish to reassure Flamininus and his commissioners as to his intentions. They will also have learnt of the king's plans for Lysimacheia, a clear indication that Antiochos could over-trump the vague Roman aim of 'freeing' the Greeks. Rebuilding a wrecked city was a much more positive act than anything the Romans were contemplating.

In fact Flamininus' actual return message was probably to the effect that Greece was now to be evacuated, including the 'Fetters', and that this had been announced, to great Greek applause, at the Isthmia. Hegesianax and Lysias may well have witnessed the joyful demonstration the announcement produced. The discussions between the two groups concluded with the suggestion, originating from whom we do not know, that a meeting of some of the commissioners with the king would be useful; it was arranged for Lysimacheia for the autumn.⁵

After the Isthmia, the Roman commissioners then set about implementing their decisions in detail, mainly seeing to the removal of Philip's garrisons from any places outside Macedon where they still existed. They divided the task between them. P. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus went to Karia to take the Macedonian garrison from Bargylia; he found, of course, that the other places taken by Philip in the area had already been liberated by Rhodes and Antiochos.⁶ In the northeastern Aegean the commissioners P. Villius Tappulus and L. Terentius Massaliota visited Thasos Island.⁷ These three were to attend the conference, so they had to wait for Antiochos to return from his campaign.

In the Propontis, Kios had been destroyed by Philip and then handed over to Prusias of Bithynia. The commissioners sent him a letter requiring him to abandon the place; Prusias ignored it, and nothing was done to enforce the commissioners' demand.⁸ It is evident that they were by no means as diligent

or thorough as might have been expected, and any ruler who ignored them was liable to succeed.

One commissioner, L. Stertinius, having been to Lemnos and Thasos, visited Ainos and Maroneia on the north Aegean coast, whence Philip's garrisons were removed, even though these cities were apparently not on their original list.⁹ Lysimacheia was similarly not in their list, since Antiochos had taken it, and his work there clearly removed their need to do anything. The Senate had obviously had no detailed information on the situation when the 'liberation' clause was drafted, but Flamininus could give the details. This clause was vague, and it was this which eventually brought Rome into collision with Antiochos. Two cities in particular were reacting to the pressure that Antiochos was exerting on them: Lampsakos and Smyrna. The pressure on Smyrna seems to have lessened when Antiochos went from Ephesos to the Hellespont, but Lampsakos remained under siege. One of its citizens, Hegesias, left the city to appeal for help to Massilia in Gaul, which, like Lampsakos, was a daughter colony of Phokaia. On the way he encountered the Roman naval praetor, L. Quintus Flamininus, Titus' brother, to whom he poured out his tale.¹⁰

Here was a Greek city which was already free – it does not seem that Philip had controlled it – and it was now threatened with being subjected to Antiochos. Either in emulation of Hegesias' action or independently, Smyrna also contacted the Romans. We have no details, but the city instituted a cult of Rome in 195, which was probably the city's expression of thanks for Roman support.¹¹ The commissioners were instructed by the Senate to include these two cities in their work. The issue went on to the Roman agenda for the meeting with Antiochos.

Antiochos' dynasty had a long connection with Thrace.¹² The founder Seleukos I was murdered in the Chersonese on his way to Lysimacheia; Antiochos I, Antiochos II, and the usurper Antiochos Hierax had all campaigned there.¹³ This was sufficient evidence for the Seleukid interest in the area, and their continuing claim to rule there. Sometime in May or June Antiochos set out to enforce that claim. Until Lysimacheia was defensible, he left half his army there, together with 'all the naval allies' – presumably naval contingents from the Greek cities of Asia Minor and from Phoenicia – as simultaneous garrison and builders' labourers; he took the other half into Thrace on a combined reprisal raid and preliminary campaign of conquest.¹⁴ He had spent several months in the Chersonese, partly securing his political control of the peninsula, and partly devoted to diplomacy with the Romans in Greece. He also devoted some time and energy to diplomacy in Thrace.

The reconstituted city of Lysimacheia was partly linked to Antiochos by a new treaty, though the date of the recorded treaty is disputed between the reigns of Antiochos I and III.¹⁵ Even if this is not to be attributed to Antiochos III, it is certain that a new treaty between the king and the city will have been agreed, for the situation was different: Antiochos III now stood in relation to

Lysimacheia as a founder, not just as an ally.

The other cities in the area will have also had arrangements made to regulate their relations with the king. Madytos and Sestos are both noted in Livy's brief account, and other Greek communities in the Chersonese had surrendered readily to his forces – Kallipolis, Alopokonnesos, Elaious, for example. Each made an agreement with the king separately, though in the case of these smaller cities the process was no doubt handed over by the king to his officials, while he got on with his new campaign in Thrace.

Antiochos' method of preparation for a campaign was first to identify the main enemy and then to recruit a local ally whose existence and activity could be used to distract or menace that enemy. The Thracians being the main enemy, the Greek cities of the Chersonese and the Propontis coast could perform the ally-function. However, their geographical positions and general weakness made them more suitable as beachheads than as sources of menace to the Thracians. A better Trojan Horse were the surviving Keltic inhabitants of Thrace.

The Galatian kingdom of Tyllis had been destroyed but there remained Kelts in the Balkan area even after Tyllis' destruction. Within the Balkan area archaeological discoveries locate the main centre of Keltic settlement well inland, astride the Danube, in the area of modern Belgrade, where there is a dense concentration of remains of Keltic type.¹⁶ These Kelts are the prime candidates to be Antiochos' allies in his Thracian campaigns. Appian emphasizes his connection with the Greek cities, and describes the king's alliance with the Galatians, acquired 'by gifts and fear', from whom he also recruited soldiers. Appian is clearly referring to Galatians in Thrace, not to the more familiar Galatians of Asia Minor.¹⁷ These could be the survivors of defunct Tyllis, or the predecessors of the Scordisci in the central Balkans, but either would be well placed to be Antiochos' ally against the intervening Thracians.

Antiochos already employed Galatian mercenaries: units fought in the battle against Molon, at Raphia, and at Magnesia in 190.¹⁸ The presumption must be that most of these soldiers were recruited from the Galatians of Asia Minor, though the remnants of the Tyllians would also provide a ready source of manpower. Such men would be useful sources of information about conditions in Thrace, even useful as envoys. The Greek cities could also supply information, but their opinions of both Kelts and Thracians might well have interfered with the accuracy of their information. In this connection note that the envoy of Lampsakos, Hegesias, carried messages from the Asian Tolistobogii to a related tribe of the same name in Gaul when he went to Massilia.¹⁹ If the Lampsakenes could do this, so could Antiochos.

Already Antiochos controlled the cities of the Chersonese, and he expanded his alliances to other cities. Appian notes Antiochos' alliance with the Byzantines, in words suggesting that their geographical position on the Straits was decisive, giving the king access to the Euxine.²⁰ Perinthos, halfway along

the coast of the Propontis between the Chersonese and Byzantion, became Antiochos' ally, as an inscription attests.²¹

Antiochos' fleet is not mentioned in this campaign after it was used to transport his army across the Hellespont. Some of the men were being used to help rebuild Lysimacheia, but the ships no doubt provided Antiochos with a means of communication with the coastal Greek cities to secure these alliances, and to transport units of the army to make landings in the enemy rear – Perinthos would be an ideal landing point, as would both Selymbria and Byzantion. Antiochos had used ships in all these roles in past campaigns: there is no reason to suppose he ignored the maritime possibilities at the Straits. The ships could also reach into the Euxine, and this is where the reference to the Straits in the treaty with Byzantion is relevant.

Byzantion was a notoriously independent city, and the achievement of an agreement by Antiochos is a tribute to his diplomatic skills – and perhaps to the Byzantines' perception of the locus of real power.²² One phrase in Appian suggests that it provided for an extension of Byzantion's city territory at the expense of the nearby Thracians.²³ Selymbria, another useful landing point for a beachhead, was within Byzantine territory.

Beyond the Bosphoros, Thracian raids threatened the Greek cities of the western Euxine coast, just as those cities of the Propontis suffered the same threat. Apollonia had an old Seleukid connection, and was also regarded, much later, as a neighbour of the Thracian tribe of the Astai; the cities of Mesambria, Odessos, Kallatis, Tomi, and Istros might also respond to Antiochos' overtures, particularly if elements of his fleet passed into the Euxine.²⁴ This would depend also on the extent of Antiochos' operations on land, in particular if he aimed to go north of the Haemos (Balkan) Mountains. Only then would it be worthwhile to ally with these cities; otherwise they might merely be extra problems.

To summarize: these indications, even if they are in all likelihood incomplete, show that Antiochos cast his diplomatic net wide: he was solidly based in Lysimacheia and the Chersonese, and was allied with Perinthos in the centre of the north coast, and with Byzantion at the other end of the Straits. The alliance here suggested with the inland Kelts meant that the Thracian tribes of the interior were surrounded.

This was all preparation, presumably mainly accomplished while Antiochos spent several months in the Chersonese. He set off on his land campaign in June (for he was still in Lysimacheia when he sent his envoys to Greece for the Isthmia meeting). He took, as noted, half of his army, his purpose being, according to Livy, to ravage the nearby part of Thrace, but this is an inadequate characterization.²⁵ His intention was scarcely to inflict a mere ravaging; his aim was to conquer and occupy all Thrace. Nothing less can be expected of the conqueror of Koile Syria and the restorer of the eastern empire of the Seleukids. Unfortunately we do not know where he went, or how far his conquests extended, but there are some indications.

One of the Roman envoys sent to interview Antiochos was L. Cornelius Lentulus, who arrived in the area whilst Antiochos was still on his first campaign in 196. He had been sent out directly by the Senate, whereas the other envoys were commissioners of the treaty. Unwilling to wait, perhaps intent on being the first on the scene, or maybe aiming to discover just what the king was up to, Lentulus went on to Selymbria alone, but he failed to contact Antiochos, eventually returning to Lysimacheia, though he clearly went to Selymbria because he believed the king to be nearby, no doubt on information from Seleukid officers at Lysimacheia.²⁶ Since he apparently made no effort to move inland from Selymbria, the king was clearly a long way away – and the intervening territory perhaps rather dangerous.

Antiochos in fact returned to Lysimacheia by land, that is, through Thrace, reaching the city about the same time as Lentulus on his return from Selymbria, clearly coming from a different direction than along the Propontis coast. Antiochos was thus so far inland that it was not worth Lentulus' while trying to reach him from Selymbria, so his campaigning was thus being conducted somewhere in central Thrace by then. The earlier part of the campaign had probably been somewhere to the north of Selymbria, if that was a reasonable place for Lentulus to approach him. This points to the territory of the Astai tribe, inland of Byzantion, the region where the defunct kingdom of Tyllis had been located. Byzantion was obviously more distant from the king on his campaign than was Selymbria, otherwise Lentulus would have gone there, and if the campaign was in central Thrace, Perinthos (or even Lysimacheia) would have been more suitable. The campaign had therefore reached the Hebros basin or towards the Istranca Mountains.

The Roman commissioner L. Stertinius freed the cities of Ainos and Maroneia from control by garrisons of King Philip during the summer, while Antiochos was on campaign. He had first visited Lemnos and Thasos, having started after the Isthmia.²⁷ He came into conflict with no Seleukid soldiers or administrators, so Antiochos therefore had stayed clear of those cities, and kept his people away as well. He was deliberately contacting the Greek cities in Thrace, so this omission was clearly deliberate. Presumably Antiochos knew full well that the Romans were involved there. Avoiding them was not lack of ambition to control those cities, for he seized and garrisoned them both later, but evidently a wish to avoid contact with, or a dispute with, the Romans.

Antiochos' range of activity in the summer of 196 was therefore from the Chersonese along the northern shore of the Propontis as far as Byzantion, and inland to the Hebros basin and the territory of the Astai, that is, most of eastern Thrace. The social situation within Thrace which he faced was a divided and impoverished set of Thracian tribes. The overlordship of Tyllis had extracted substantial wealth from the Thracians, as it had from the Greeks, and this wealth appears to have completely vanished. The incipient urbanization of Thrace in the early third century – at Seuthopolis, Kabyle, and

Kypsela, for example – had been either destroyed or stunted.²⁸ The periodic centralization of local power into a substantial kingdom based on the Odrysai of the Hebros basin had also been aborted once more.²⁹

Antiochos' campaign affected four tribes: the Astai, whose territory extended west and north of Byzantion to Kabyle and the hinterland of Apollonia on the Gulf of Burgas on the Euxine coast, probably the geographical successor of the Tyliš kingdom; the Kaeni, situated to the north of the Thracian Chersonese, presumably the perpetrators of the sack of Lysimacheia; the Koreles or Korpiles north of Ainos and Maroneia, including the city of Kypsela; and the Maudatenes, by process of elimination perhaps located in the middle Hebros Valley, the old centre of Odrysian power. These tribes had not been dominant earlier, but had emerged as local overlords after the overthrow of the Tylians. Of these tribes the Kaeni and the Astai were Antiochos' early targets, since his main political objectives were both to extend his kingdom and to cement his alliance with the Greek cities which were threatened by the Thracian tribes.³⁰ He had spent three to four months in Thrace, a full summer's campaign. It was only partly successful, for he had to campaign there for two more summers at least.

Antiochos returned to Lysimacheia in September 196, when the conference with the Roman commissioners took place, at the end of his campaigning season.³¹ The conference took place at Antiochos' convenience, perhaps at his instigation, not that of the Romans. The Roman delegates gradually converged on Lysimacheia. P. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus, having freed Bargylia of its Macedonian garrison, sailed north; Villius and Terentius sailed to Lysimacheia from Thasos; L. Cornelius Lentulus, having failed to meet Antiochos at Selymbria, returned from there to Lysimacheia. Although the others may have known of the existence of this senatorial envoy, this seems to have been the first time they had all met since they left Corinth. L. Lentulus had instructions directly from the Senate whereas the others were there by arrangement with Flamininus as proconsul, so he took precedence.

The Romans gathered at Lysimacheia before Antiochos arrived, and so they were able to confer, to sort out their pecking order, and to make their own arrangements, briefing each other on recent events and on the attitude of the Senate. They had also made other preparations, as it transpired later. Antiochos arrived, according to Livy, 'a few days' after the Romans.³² No more than 'a few days' more seems to be necessary for the actual conference, but at the end of that time, the Romans were able to introduce envoys from Lampsakos and Smyrna, the cities which had already appealed to Rome against Antiochos' aggression.³³

The envoys from Lampsakos might have arrived during the period of the conference since their city was close by, but the envoys of Smyrna had to come from a considerable distance, and their arrival must have been arranged some time before the conference began, well before Antiochos had arrived at Lysimacheia. Their joint appearance just at that time, and their introduction to

the meeting by L. Lentulus, shows that they had been brought to Lysimacheia at Roman instigation, and had been coached by them. This arrangement had thus been made while the king was still on campaign. There was plenty of time for it, and there were plenty of Roman commissioners available to do the job of recruitment and coaching. It was thus a tactic prepared by the commissioners, and not by the senatorial envoy L. Lentulus, since he did not have time to arrange it. Unless another, unnamed commissioner was involved, P. Lentulus is the most likely man to have collected the Smyrnaean envoy, Koiranos, on his way from Bargylia to Lysimacheia, while Villius and Terentius, from their base in Thasos, would have had time to contact Lampsakos and arrange for that city's envoys, Parmenion and Pythodoros, to attend. If this is so, it means that this tactic had been decided by the commissioners before they left Corinth, and so that Flamininus was probably involved. In fact it is likely that the initiative came from Rome, since the envoys of both cities had been there and had been referred on to Flamininus.

When Antiochos arrived at Lysimacheia, therefore, he was entering into a negotiation for which much preparation had been made by the Romans. However, he himself was not wholly unprepared. He had the reports of Hegesianax and Lysias, his envoys to Flamininus at Corinth. They were thus fully aware of the pressures on Flamininus, and of the work of the commissioners in interpreting and implementing the peace terms, and no doubt of the appeals of Lampsakos and Smyrna to Rome. It has been assumed from Polybios' placing of the sentence reporting their presence at Lysimacheia, that they arrived there at the same time as the Roman envoys, and from that it has been supposed that they went on a diplomatic tour of Greece.³⁴ But Polybios' sentence can be read that Hegesianax and Lysias arrived at Lysimacheia with the king, that is, from the Thracian interior; in other words, they reported to the king right after leaving Flamininus. After Corinth, they would obviously need to reach the king at once, and this is in fact what Polybios says in that context.³⁵ They had therefore returned to Lysimacheia and travelled to the king's camp in Thrace, to brief him on the talks with the Romans. All this is, of course, what one would expect them to do; they then returned to Lysimacheia with the king in time for the conference.

The idea that Antiochos' envoys made diplomatic contacts in Greece separate from those at the Isthmia is based on the notion of the inevitability of war between Rome and Antiochos. With that in mind, it becomes reasonable to assume that both sides were planning for the war and that Antiochos would aim to recruit allies for the future. Yet, except for the reports of the speech made by Flamininus at Corinth to Hegesianax and Lysias which included demands and threats, there is no evidence for any hostility between the two powers at this point. Disputes and disagreements, suspicions and apprehensions all existed, no doubt, for these are the two great powers of their time. But the prospect of a war must not be assumed; it was not inevitable,

and neither side planned it.

The explanation for this absence of warmongering, if one is necessary, is straightforward. Antiochos was already at war with Ptolemy V, and had just mounted a substantial campaign into Thrace. He could see the difficulties the Romans were having in Greece, difficulties which in some ways mirrored his own in Asia. The Roman forces in Greece had their hands full in simply keeping control there in the face of the hostility of the Aitolians, the restlessness of Nabis of Sparta, and their uneasy relationship with Philip. They would not wish to take on another enemy, and certainly not one which was the greatest kingdom in the known world, controlling an empire several times larger than their own, while they were still so deeply involved in these troubles in Greece. For the Romans, they could see that Antiochos had not yet finished his work in Asia, and had just embarked on a campaign in Thrace; they were clearly in no danger from him. For either state to be actively considering war would be remarkably reckless in the circumstances, and neither was that. The Romans had been fighting Hellenistic states for eighty years and Antiochos had been king for thirty; both had enough experience of defeats and difficulties to make them cautious.

Antiochos therefore had been able to discuss the forthcoming conference with his main advisers. He received, about this time, news of the negotiations which an envoy of his – perhaps the man called Eukles of Rhodes who is known to have been involved later – was conducting with the Ptolemaic government.³⁶ The removal of Skopas and the ceremony of the King Ptolemy V's coming-of-age, the *anakleteria*, in November, had unblocked the paralysis in Alexandria and allowed the talks to proceed.³⁷ The declaration of the king's majority permitted the negotiators to act with rather greater authority; it also put the king himself on the scales: his marriage was one of the elements available for negotiation in the treaty.

It is evident from Antiochos' comment at the Lysimacheia conference that the Egyptian negotiations were by that time almost concluded. The Romans had no idea that they had reached this stage. Both the Seleukid and Ptolemaic kingdoms could keep such negotiations very quiet. Moreover, the full attention of the Roman Senate had been on Greece, when they were not watching the situation in Cisalpine Gaul, or Spain, or Italy, while the Romans in Greece had manifold problems to cope with, as well as having to watch Antiochos' own movements. The negotiations with the Ptolemaic government were no doubt slow; regular reports will have gone to Antiochos, who would need to authorize any concessions. One of those reports had presumably reached Antiochos when he returned to Lysimacheia in September 196; the conference with the Romans was important enough for him to have given instructions for this in advance, and it seems safe to assume it. And yet even if a conclusion was in sight, it had not yet been reached; he was still at war with Ptolemy.

The conference with the Romans is reported by Polybios, who is the main

source of Livy's slightly different version, and for the shorter versions of Diodoros and Appian.³⁸ All have details unique to themselves, and it is usual that Polybios' account is taken as the basic datum, and extras from the others are added – but this will not work, because Polybios' version is suspect in itself. Rhetorical flourishes and historians' editorial comments have to be ignored. A common element in all versions is that the Romans are said to have uttered threats to Antiochos, which were ignored; but which also seem unnecessary. It has to be borne in mind that the accounts were written in the knowledge that this conference was followed by a war, but this did not happen until four years later, and the conference was not a direct cause of it.³⁹

Polybios' is nevertheless the basic source, as well as the earliest. It was written within two or three decades of the conference, but this does not mean that he is a primary source, though he did have opportunities to learn what went on from older contemporaries. There is, however, little sign that he did so, for he quotes no source. His main account consists of two speeches, one by L. Lentulus, one by the king, in reported speech. These speeches bear little or no resemblance to what was actually said, for, not only do they have no relation to each other, they have no relation to what happened during or after the conference. It is clear from Polybios' preliminary remarks that the two speeches are a wholly inadequate account of what went on at a conference which lasted several days.

To sort out what actually happened it is necessary to consider the form of the meeting. When all the parties had reached Lysimacheia, 'a few days' were spent in informal meetings and discussions held in private. We have no information on this, but these meetings are clearly important.⁴⁰ It was there that the two sides explored each other's positions. This did not necessarily bear too much relation to the open and official meeting held later. Polybios reports that these private meetings were held in a friendly spirit, which suggests a sensible and civilized atmosphere in which any disagreements and differences could be aired frankly. The topics on which both sides were agreed were identified; these could then be set aside and did not arise in the public discussions.

There were many topics one would expect to arise in these talks which are not mentioned in any of the accounts. It would not be surprising if the commissioners – Villius, Terentius, and P. Lentulus – reported on their work towards the pacification of Greece. P. Lentulus could report on the situation in Karia, and on his (presumed) success in removing the Macedonian garrison from Bargylia; Villius and Terentius could point out that the same had been done at Ainos and Maroneia by Stertinius; the implication – and it may well have been stated aloud – was that these places were now under Roman protection, and the Romans will surely have wanted that to be made quite clear. Some airing of Roman worries about Nabis of Sparta, and over the Aitolians are likely.

On Antiochos' side an explanation of his policy towards Philip and

Eumenes, both of whom were Rome's allies and his neighbours, would be likely. These were problems which should have arisen in the negotiation, but which are not reported to have been mentioned in the public meeting. It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that these were aired in the private meetings, and that they were topics on which broad agreement or understanding was reached; that is, each side reassured the other that the policies being pursued in these matters did not arouse misgivings. Antiochos could assure the Romans that he had no objections to the suppression of Nabis, and could allay any suspicions which the Romans entertained that he had any intention of suppressing Eumenes; the Romans could show that they understood his work in Thrace and that they had no objections to it. These matters were, of course, probably those which had already been aired at Corinth.

The informal discussions were followed by an official meeting. The difference is presumably that an official record was produced and presumably published so that Polybios, and maybe Livy, could consult it. For the Romans this will have been a report to the Senate by L. Lentulus, with a copy to Flamininus in Greece. For Antiochos the record would be kept in his archives. It is presumably these records which are the basis of Polybios' account of what were said. But we do not have a transcript of the meeting, only the clearly doctored and much distorted versions produced later as justifications for each side's earlier policies. It was in the Senate's interest to seem to be belligerent in the defence of the Greek states; it was in Antiochos' interest to seem to be the victim of Roman aggression; the accounts of the official meeting must be treated with considerable scepticism, even disbelief.

In the person of L. Lentulus, for the Senate, the Roman side is said to have made a series of complaints: that Antiochos was profiting from their exertions in the war with Philip by snapping up places he had held; that Antiochos should give up the lands he had taken from Ptolemy; that he should not threaten the remaining autonomous cities; and finally Lentulus wondered what Antiochos was doing campaigning in Europe, which, he implied, was the Romans' sphere of interest.⁴¹

This collection of complaints makes little sense as it stands. The Roman Senate had no standing in the war between Antiochos and Ptolemy, and had long accepted that; issuing a demand that Antiochos withdraw from his captures could only provoke derision. Those captures did not consist only of a few cities on the coast of Asia Minor and Thrace, the main prize Antiochos had won was Koile Syria, which he and his predecessors had been trying to gain for more than a century. Lentulus (and the Senate) cannot have been ignorant of this. No Roman senator in 196 could possibly have demanded that Antiochos give up this conquest. To have done so would be to provoke the instant disruption of the talks; one must conclude no such demand was made.

The demand that Antiochos withdraw from places which he had captured or which had joined him, but which had been occupied by Philip beforehand, was similarly nonsensical. In every case Philip's troops had been removed or

had removed themselves before Antiochos and his forces arrived. When Antiochos made agreements with Iasos and Euromos those cities were free agents, and Antiochos had shown that, while he might exert pressure on certain places, he was rarely prepared to resort to naked force to bring them into his system.⁴² Only one Greek city in Philip's hands had been captured by force by Antiochos – Stratonikeia – but this had been taken for the benefit of Rhodes, a Roman ally, which had participated in the capture after its previous attempt had failed. None of the cities of the Hellespont had Macedonian forces in them when Antiochos arrived; only Madytos had even been threatened with attack, and even there the city had given in before real fighting began.

Then there was the form in which the demand was made, that Antiochos was profiting from Roman efforts. This must have been extremely offensive to Antiochos and his entourage. If the demand was made in that way, it would have justified the king immediately breaking off relations. Questioning Antiochos' motives in invading 'Europe' was equally offensive, since Antiochos must have explained his purposes already, both in the informal meeting and earlier to Flaminius and the commissioners at Corinth.⁴³

These Roman demands, or terms, are so illogical, offensive, and irrelevant that strong doubts must arise as to whether they were ever made. A set of such demands stated in such a way was an excellent means of provoking a war. Apart from this passage and that attributed to Flaminius at Corinth, there is no evidence of such a desire on the part of any Roman. The conclusion must be that L. Lentulus' demands were not actually made, but were invented afterwards as a supposed justification for the later Roman declaration of war on Antiochos. The apparent victory of Antiochos in the argument can thus be taken as an added insult to Roman forthrightness, foiled by casuistical argumentativeness.

Polybios and Livy follow these nonsensical demands with a reported speech by Antiochos which sets out, rather well, the justification of his actions.⁴⁴ He is said to make a distinction between Asia (meaning Asia Minor, probably), which was his, and Italy, which was Rome's. Thrace had been his family's in the past, and he was merely reclaiming it; by implication he left Greece to Rome, who had it anyway. In Livy's version he explains that he was rebuilding Lysimacheia as a royal seat for Seleukos, his second son, who was to be set up in a kingdom of his own. As for the war with Ptolemy, he was negotiating with Ptolemy for a treaty of friendship and a marriage alliance. He did not say that this had been decided, only that this was what he wished to bring about. The king's reply is so well argued – if the argument of hereditary possession is accepted as valid – that the suspicion arises that the preceding Roman demands, so rudely and offensively stated, were only listed in order that the king's reply should seem, by contrast, to be logical, sensible, and civilized. In other words, the possibility exists that Polybios' source for the conference was a Seleukid propaganda document produced later, after the

war had begun. The reports of the conference cannot be seriously relied on as evidence for what took place.

There is, however, one item which fits the surrounding events. Lentulus is said to have asked that Antiochos not lay hands on the autonomous cities.⁴⁵ None of these are specified but, since Greece was already under Roman control in large part, and Asia mainly under Antiochos' control, it was not necessary to do so; the reference must be understood to apply to the cities Rome had just freed – Bargylia, Ainos and Maroneia – and those which recently had placed themselves under the protection of Rome – Lampsakos and Smyrna. Antiochos' reply, as relayed by both historians, did not deal with this matter. Polybios, the only source to mention the issue, then has Lentulus introduce the envoys from Lampsakos and Smyrna. Antiochos is made to refuse to listen to their 'harangue'. Then he announced that he would accept Rhodian mediation, not Roman, over the issue of the two cities.⁴⁶

This is an incident which must have taken place, since it was a public event witnessed by others than the two sides, and it is the one item in the meeting which has the air of a real diplomatic dispute. It was the nub of the argument between Rome and Antiochos, the one major item which they failed to resolve in the private meetings and which L. Lentulus tried to sort out by this new diplomatic move.

It is also the one item in the whole account which shows a truly diplomatic solution being arrived at. On the surface Antiochos is brusque and dismissive, but his argument is only a face-saving gesture. Rhodes was Rome's ally, and was also a power notoriously sensitive to the autonomy of cities in the Hellespont region – she had gone to war with Philip on this very issue – and at the same time was only technically a friend of Antiochos. By now it will have sunk in at Rhodes that the scope of the city for expansion on the Asian mainland had ended. The result of Rhodian mediation in a dispute between Antiochos and the two cities claiming autonomy could safely be predicted to favour the cities.⁴⁷

This issue was in fact the only one which was a source of dispute between Rome and Antiochos. Rome really had no quarrel over Antiochos' actions in Thrace, and accepted them without concern in 196 and then for several years' more. The war between Antiochos and Ptolemy was not over, and negotiations for peace were continuing, and this was also the situation for the Romans in Greece; neither side was interested in adding enemies and problems to those it already had. The conference at Lysimacheia had cleared the air and all that was left to settle was the status of Lampsakos and Smyrna. Antiochos had not in so many words accepted Roman suzerainty over them, but his actions implied that he would, once the formality of the Rhodian mediation was gone through. Both cities could probably have been taken by his army with ease, but neither was ever seriously attacked. No record of the Rhodian arbitration exists, and it probably never took place – it would take a request from all the places involved to begin the process and Rome never took

kindly to such arbitrations; probably Antiochos was not keen either. Nevertheless Antiochos had tacitly accepted Rome's position.

Thus the conference at Lysimacheia must be regarded as a minor diplomatic success for the Romans, with Antiochos gracefully giving up his claims to the two cities. Their future did not figure in any of the later talks until the war between Rome and Antiochos actually broke out, at which point it was Antiochos who raised the issue again; the absence of the Rhodian arbitration meant the issue was still unsettled. (And the fact that Antiochos raised the issue should mean he would accept arbitration again.) The Romans implicitly accepted that Rome had no objection to Antiochos' conquest of Thrace. This issue was again later revived, by Rome, but since Antiochos conducted a series of campaigns for several more years without any Roman reaction, it must be accepted that an agreement, informally reached in the preliminary discussions, had been made. The conference had thus had the beneficial effect of settling some issues. At the same time it had highlighted those matters which could not be immediately settled. It was thus the first attempt to reach an agreement over a division of the world. It is not surprising that there was no formal agreement, but both sides could be encouraged to believe that this remained possible.

The meeting with the Romans at Lysimacheia was interrupted – though there seems little that was still left to do – by a rumour that Ptolemy V had died.⁴⁸ Antiochos sailed back to Seleukeia-in-Pieria, though in fact, despite Livy's mocking account, he showed no real hurry to get back; he first made arrangements for Seleukos to act as viceroy in Thrace, and then stopped at both Ephesos and Patara on the voyage; at Patara he learned that the rumour was false. Between Cyprus and Kilikia his fleet was badly damaged in a storm.⁴⁹ It is claimed in one source that he was attempting to invade Cyprus at the time, but the site of the wreck was at the mouth of the Saros River, some distance beyond where he would have turned off to get to the island.⁵⁰

If the rumour of Ptolemy's death had been true, this was as big a crisis as the Mediterranean world could imagine, and it would fully have justified Antiochos' haste. If Ptolemy was dead, there was no heir of his family to take over the kingdom. Any agreement Antiochos had made with him was void, though if the betrothal to Kleopatra had been formalized, Antiochos might have had a claim on Ptolemy's territories on her behalf. It was politically necessary for him to be in Syria rather than at Lysimacheia at such a time. Any number of possibilities could be imagined, from civil war in Egypt to conquest by Ankhwennefer to a military coup in Alexandria, even a new invasion of Palestine.

Whatever the source of the rumour, it will have encouraged both parties to push on with the peace negotiations. The Ptolemaic government surely aimed for an early peace before yet more of its territory was seized – and Cyprus was clearly vulnerable to Antiochos' attack if the war went on; the possibility that Ptolemy would die will also have encouraged Antiochos to move quickly

to a ratified peace, and to see that the marriage of his daughter took place. The winter of 196/195 thereupon saw the final conclusion of the peace treaty between the kings,⁵¹ and in 194/193 the marriage took place, symbolically at Raphia on the borders of the two states, close to where the battle had taken place over twenty years before.⁵²

The terms of the peace treaty are nowhere set out, and have to be elicited from presumptions and later conditions. Clearly the most important were the territorial clauses, which are obvious: Ptolemy recognized the conquests of Antiochos, and so accepted their official transfer to Antiochos' rule. The betrothal of Ptolemy V and Kleopatra was another clause. Perhaps there were more, and one in particular has brought considerable discussion. Kleopatra will have brought a dowry with her, and since she was the daughter of a king and was marrying a king it will have been substantial. (That of Berenike, the Ptolemaic wife of Antiochos II, was notoriously large and rich.)

The dowry is never specified, though it will have been detailed in the treaty. Later it was said to be either the lands of Koile Syria or the revenues therefrom.⁵³ This only emerged later, during the crisis which led to the next war. It is, of course, merely an invention. It is simply not believable that Antiochos, having fought two long and difficult wars for Koile Syria and finally succeeded in conquering it, would give up any part of it, land or revenues. But the fact that the claim was made and taken seriously, in Egypt and elsewhere, is evidence that the Ptolemaic regime was not reconciled to the loss of its Syrian lands (any more than the Seleukids had ever been reconciled to not possessing it). The vindication of the Seleukid claim was therefore the beginning of Ptolemaic revanchist claims. The Seleukid conquest was only the next stage in the contest, not its termination. But Antiochos would surely assume that he would not have to fight for it again, and, as he had discovered, it was a land which was extremely difficult to conquer; any Ptolemaic attempt at recovering it would first of all require a much stronger Ptolemaic state than existed in 195, and the rebellion in the south was still continuing.

The Fifth Syrian War was decisive for the Ptolemaic foreign empire outside Egypt, for the kings then retained only Cyrenaica and Cyprus, plus three naval posts in the Aegean, at Itanos in Crete, the island of Thera, and Methana in the Argolid; the Aegean was a region which was in Rhodes' or Rome's sphere after 196. The end of the war was also decisive for the future of the dynasty within Egypt. Much of the rebellion in the Delta had been suppressed, and now it became possible for the government to concentrate its military attention fully on the rebellion in the south. The peace between the kings was effectively a guarantee of no further hostilities until one of them died. Ankhwennefer had retaken Thebes during 196 after a brief Ptolemaic reconquest, but he was also under pressure from the king of Meroe further south, who had gained control of the Nile Valley as far north as Syene. The coronation of Ptolemy V in 196 was a public statement of intent, and the peace with Antiochos released troops and energies which could now be

applied in the south, though Ankhwennefer was not easily beaten. There are indications of considerable fighting in the Nile Valley to the north of Thebes in the next years.⁵⁴ Ptolemy's government controlled the richest part of Egypt, and his wealth could be used to recruit more soldiers, so it would be only a matter of time before the rebellion in the south was crushed.⁵⁵

Antiochos, having secured peace with Egypt, and in the knowledge that the Ptolemaic regime was fully concerned in the fighting in the Nile Valley, returned to Thrace next year, with a force large enough, so Livy claims, to have frightened the experienced consular L. Villius Tappulus. Villius had been sent by Flamininus in Greece to Antiochos in response to a visit by envoys from Antiochos who had arrived at Corinth just as the Roman forces were coming out of their winter quarters, and so in the spring of 195.⁵⁶ Antiochos' envoys had clearly been sent very early in the year, well before Antiochos' own campaign had begun, and so while he was still in Syria. Villius was away from Greece for most of the campaigning season, and was able to report to Flamininus on Antiochos' progress.⁵⁷ The two commanders were therefore keeping each other informed, obviously intent on avoiding any clashes which might escalate into real trouble. Both were no doubt conscious that the conference the year before had ended with several issues unresolved.

Antiochos had left much of the army behind to winter at Lysimacheia under Seleukos when he sailed off to Syria. Villius reported to Flamininus that a larger contingent returned with him from Syria in the spring of 195.⁵⁸ Allowing for casualties, we may assume that an army of between 30,000 and 35,000 was in Thrace again in that year; some of them would be in garrisons, as at Lysimacheia and Perinthos and other cities, but most of them were available for the new campaign. This army was the equivalent of a Roman army of three legions with Latin auxiliaries, rather larger than that which was campaigning under Flamininus' command in Greece at the same time.⁵⁹

These Thracian campaigns, involving a large army and the conquest of a strategically important land, are thus major political and military events. Yet neither the Romans in Greece nor Philip V in Macedon showed any apprehensions about them (which is probably why we know so little about them). Antiochos was at pains to keep Flamininus informed as to his intentions and his progress through his envoys. Their early arrival was followed by the return visit of Villius to the king, with whom he stayed for some time, rejoining Flamininus well into the summer; he could tell Antiochos what Flamininus was concerned about in Greece. Philip was also probably being kept in the picture; this martial activity close to his northern and eastern borders may explain Philip's reluctance to send military help to his new Roman ally in the fight against Nabis of Sparta. Nor did the arrival of Hannibal at Ephesos during 195 have any noticeable effect, either on Antiochos' conduct of affairs or on the Romans.

The fact that Antiochos did campaign in Thrace in 195 is all we know. It is widely assumed that Antiochos returned for a third campaign in 194, and

indeed some authors place the events recorded by Appian in that year, without justification.⁶⁰ The only apparent evidence specific to 194 is a comment by P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, who is reported by Livy to have demanded Macedonia for his consular command for that year on the grounds that a war was threatening with Antiochos, 'who had already and without provocation crossed into Europe'.⁶¹ This may be an anticipation of Scipio's participation in the later war against Antiochos, or it may be only a general reference to the previous Thracian campaigns. This is somewhat strengthened by his reference to a possible war, the threat of which scarcely existed yet. Certainly the Senate was unconvinced, if the speech really was made.

This is not very strong evidence for a new campaign by Antiochos in Thrace in 194, but if he was not in Thrace we do not know where he was, and it is best to assume his presence there in default of positive indications about anywhere else. The events of the campaign are, once again, utterly unknown, nor can conjecture do more than produce guesses. The reconstruction of Lysimacheia was surely more or less complete by then, and Seleukos was installed as viceroy; Antiochos' intention will have been to complete his conquest. But it is worth pointing out that, while this presumed third campaign in 'Europe' was going on, Flamininus withdrew the Roman forces from Greece. Even if the king himself was not in Thrace, his army and his son were, and so therefore was his power. It follows that the Romans, including Flamininus and the Senate as a whole, entertained no apprehensions about the Seleukid conquest – unless Scipio's scaremongering speech was really spoken.

The Thracian conquest was clearly completed by this third campaign of 194, except for one detail. In 190, when the Roman army marched along the Thracian coastal road to attack Antiochos, it was discovered that Seleukid garrisons held the two old Greek towns of Ainos and Maroneia.⁶² These garrisons had not been in place in 194, for the towns had been freed of Macedonian rule in 196 by the Romans, and cannot have been taken over by Antiochos before Flamininus left Greece. They were therefore occupied later, no doubt in 192 or 191 when it became clear that war had broken out between Rome and Antiochos. This would seem to be his final Thracian conquest.⁶³

Antiochos' envoys at Rome in 193 asserted that Antiochos had the right, by inheritance and by conquest, to rule in Thrace, which was defined as 'the cities of Thrace and Chersonesus'.⁶⁴ Once again, the provenance of that speech, reported by Livy as being made to a secret senatorial committee, is such that its authenticity is highly questionable, but it would seem to imply clearly enough that Antiochos' conquests were both extensive and completed. It also indicates that the long continuing if distant negotiations between Antiochos and the Senate were not making any progress; the assertion was in reply to the Roman accusation of Antiochos' interference in 'Europe'.

A further visit by the king to Thrace, in 192, has been postulated.⁶⁵ It was a busy summer for Antiochos, with his sieges of Alexandreia Troas, Smyrna,

and Lampsakos, and with diplomatic contacts with Rome and in Greece. Any expedition to Thrace was on a smaller scale than before (for part of his army was involved in the sieges) and briefer. The king could not afford to be far from the scenes of diplomatic action in Greece and Rome at such a time. The death of his eldest son the previous year, and the consequent promotion of his next son Seleukos to the position of heir and principal royal lieutenant may have been the pretext for the visit, since Seleukos had been ruling from Lysimacheia as viceroy for several years and now had to be replaced. No doubt other problems were dealt with at the same time. This visit was perhaps more administrative than military; the Romans had no reason to claim fright, other than the need to find a justification for the war which both sides now felt was coming.

The extent of Antiochos' Thracian dominions cannot be stated, but the geographical indications may be set out. Along the coasts he either controlled or was allied with every Greek city from the tip of the Chersonese to Byzantium; the western coast of the Euxine was also probably his, at least as far as Apollonia Pontike and the Gulf of Burgas. This implies a conquered area comprising essentially the basin of the Hebros, as far as the Haemos Mountains, but perhaps not as far as the abandoned Macedonian colony of Philippopolis. Had he gone so far the threat to Macedon might have become too strong for Philip to ignore. Ainos and Maroneia and Abdera and their territories lay as an unclaimed space between his new province and Macedon along the coast, and he may well have done the same inland, where the tribe of the Bessi in the upper Hebros Valley could have been left as an inland buffer state. The bounds were thus, in all probability, and very approximately, the Haemos mountain range in the north, the sea to the east and south, and a line north from Maroneia to the Haemos range on the west, an area of over 35,000 square kilometres,

The conquest was thoroughly done. When the Roman forces marched through in 190, on their way to fight Antiochos at Magnesia, the Thracians did not interfere. The Romans ignored the garrisons of Ainos and Maroneia, and there were surely other garrisons in the inland areas, for the land had only been conquered three years before, and could hardly be left uncontrolled. Antiochos was not about to abandon any conquest so hardly won. The Romans ignored them also. But by holding on to Thrace, Antiochos was paradoxically easing the approach of the Romans, who were not impeded in their march by any enemy, Seleukid or Thracian. This is good evidence, in other words, for Antiochos' success in his conquest.

The garrison and the restored citizens of Lysimacheia, however, were withdrawn as the Romans approached, in a masterly manoeuvre conducted in secret.⁶⁶ However, this was the only example of such a move. Antiochos showed no inclination to give up his new conquest, and the Ainos and Maroneia garrisons survived until after the peace treaty was signed.⁶⁷ However, after the Seleukid garrisons were withdrawn, the Roman forces

marched back the way they had come under the lax command of Cn. Manlius Vulso, and were ambushed by a Thracian attack, in which all four of the tribes participated.⁶⁸ The removal of Seleukid garrisons from the interior had released the Thracians to fight for their land again, and, in this case, for the booty of Asia and Galatia as well.

Antiochos' conquest of Thrace had thus been successful, and he held onto it until after the Roman victory. But it overlapped from the beginning of his war with Ptolemy and with his collision with Rome. The distraction of a constant diplomatic dialogue with Rome cannot have assisted the work in Thrace, and his success there clearly came to be seen at Rome as a threat to them. It thus not only overlapped with his growing dispute with Rome, but it was also one of the main elements in that dispute.

Chapter Nine

The Roman War: Greece

While Antiochos was intermittently attending to the problem of Thrace, and no doubt revelling in the victory he had achieved over Ptolemaic Egypt, the problem of his relations with the Roman Republic recurred. The issue they disagreed over was, on the surface, the control of a few cities on the coast of Asia Minor, notably Lampsakos and Smyrna. In fact, of course, it was over which of them should be the dominating power in the Hellenistic world. Both had emerged in the last years of the third century BC to a new level of power, having eliminated three of the other states which could pretend to Great Power status – Ptolemaic Egypt, Macedon, and Carthage. Now both of them, in the insecurity of their new superpower status, had developed suspicions of the other.

The marriage of Ptolemy V with Kleopatra had been accompanied by another royal marriage, that of Antiochos the young king with his sister Laodike.¹ These marriages in fact took place more or less at the same time, though precision is not available, and both of them were in pursuit of dynastic objectives. As it turned out Kleopatra – called ‘Syra’ by the Egyptians – was the most effective queen before the last Kleopatra, whose ambition outran her kingdom’s resources. For the next twenty years Kleopatra Syra was a major political force in Egypt.

The marriage of Antiochos and Laodike, however, was unique to that point in Seleukid history. Two brother-sister marriages had taken place in the Ptolemaic family – Ptolemy V was the product of one of them – and Seleukid daughters had been married to uncles or other near relations in the past. Sibling marriage was never liked by the Greeks, though by the 190s the practice had become more or less accepted as one of the royal eccentricities. But Seleukid daughters had usually been sent off to marry neighbouring kings, presumably as a means of establishing a friendly political relationship – though none had resulted in active political alliances. Antiochos’ own wife was the daughter of one of those marriages. So the sibling marriage in 196/195 needs to be explained.

In the Ptolemaic family daughters were normally reserved for the pharaoh because, in Egyptian dynastic practice, they carried with them a claim to the throne – that is, the daughter of a king gave a claim to the kingship to her husband. Hence it was to keep the succession in the family that the royal daughter was married to the eldest son of the preceding king. He was to be the next king, both because of his parentage and his marriage. Surplus daughters, if any survived the ruthless culling process which was also practised in that family, remained unmarried. This was perhaps one of the sources of the new Seleukid practice, though it can only have been a minor aspect, given earlier Seleukid marriage practices, and it did not extend to culling surplus children.

The more likely explanation is related to this, however: that the success of Antiochos III in his political and military policies had so elevated his dynastic self-esteem that the marriage of his eldest daughter was something he felt would only demean the dynasty if she went to another king. There may well have been a further element, one which was more directly political. Antiochos the young king had been joint-king with his father since 209. Treaties made in the years since then had presumably been made in the names of both kings. The elevation of the son to the kingship at a time when the elder was heading into dangerous territory in the east is usually seen as a routine precaution to ensure the succession in the event of Antiochos III's death. But by making treaties in both their names Antiochos III may have been attempting to get over the diplomatic constraint whereby a treaty died with the death of one of the participants. He may have hoped that when he died the treaties made in his son's name would continue in effect into the new reign.

During the four years following the Lysimacheia conference, Antiochos spent at least three summers campaigning in Thrace. Diplomatic exchanges with Rome continued. And there remained the continuing problem of Asia Minor. There were parts of the great peninsula still out of his control. The usual methods were applied. The new king at Pergamon, Eumenes II, was offered a Seleukid daughter as wife, but refused her.² This refusal definitively severed the subordinate alliance which had existed under his father. Seleukid daughters did go to the kings of Pontos and Kappadokia.³ The Galatians, thus surrounded, may well have been brought into alliance – certainly their young men were recruited into Antiochos' forces, which was the most effective way of sapping their military potential. In 193 he campaigned in Pisidia, whose hillmen were traditionally hostile to anyone in the plains; their young men were also recruited into Antiochos' army.⁴

Apart from the small Attalid kingdom, and the Bithynian kingdom in the northwest corner, therefore, Antiochos by 193 had secured effective control or domination of every part of Asia Minor. The structure of his empire was diverse, consisting partly of directly ruled provinces, partly of subordinate kingdoms, partly of allied cities, and partly of royal marriage alliances, but he was clearly the man to whom the rest had to relate in everything they did. He received their envoys, passed judgement on them, and regulated their

relationships.

Antiochos also began to reach out to the west. He had gained control of Thrace by conquest, and of the Greek cities of Thrace by alliances. He also expanded on earlier relationships in Greece itself. The entry point was always religion. His dynastic connection was with Apollo, the god the Seleukid family claimed as its ancestor, and he had used this at Xanthos, for example. Apollo was the god of Delos and of Delphi, both of which received gifts from several members of the Seleukid family. The cities of Athens and Antioch had old connections, since some of the original Antiochene colonists were Athenians, and this connection was revived.⁵ Delphi was under Aitolian control, and Antiochos had plenty of Aitolians in his employ. As it happened also, Aitolia was the one Greek state which was at odds with Rome.

This, of course, has a bearing on Antiochos' diplomacy towards Rome. He and Flamininus exchanged envoys several times between the end of the Lysimacheia conference and Flamininus' departure from Greece in 194, but these were largely exchanges of information, or so it seems, rather than negotiations.⁶ Flamininus, of course, took the Roman forces away with him, so in a sense the chance of a collision of Roman and Seleukid forces was well removed. Of course, this was never the real danger, as the dispute over the cities had indicated. The two armies were both well enough controlled to avoid a direct collision. The problem was political and diplomatic, and the control of territory, so by removing his forces from Greece, Flamininus seemed to be indicating that Rome was no longer aiming to control that land.

Antiochos will have been regarding Greece through his own experience. He had controlled his empire by physical occupation and written treaties. The Romans did not do this, but relied on the influence, and perhaps on their concept of political friendship (*amicitia*) and patronage. Whether the Greeks ever understood this is not clear, but if so they did not like it, as the several wars in the next half-century showed.⁷ We can be fairly certain that Antiochos did not understand the Roman system – if such a definitive term can be attached to it. So, just when he had finally established a degree of control over all Asia Minor and Thrace and was reaching out to influence events in Greece, the Roman presence seemed to vanish, leaving the usual political anarchy behind it.

Antiochos sent two envoys to Rome in 194, after Flamininus' withdrawal. His main contact until then had been with and through Flamininus, a most slippery diplomat. They had exchanged information, but Flamininus did not speak for the Senate; indeed, it soon became clear that he was not in the least popular among the senators. So Antiochos' friendly contacts with him had no influence, but it is likely that the king did not realize this for some time. One of the new envoys was Hegesianax, who had visited Flamininus before, and this may well be the reason he was chosen again; the other was Menippos, a royal Friend. The origins of these men are perhaps also relevant: Menippos was a Macedonian, possibly a former officer of Philip; Hegesianax was from

Alexandria Troas, which was another Asian city which was resisting Antiochos.⁸

When they arrived in Rome, the envoys discovered quickly that the friendly atmosphere fostered by Flamininus while in Greece had not extended to the city. Their purpose was to pursue a suggestion by Antiochos that he and Rome become allies, which Flamininus had said, quite correctly, was something which had to be addressed to the Senate.⁹ When they met the senators they were referred to a committee consisting of the ten commissioners and Flamininus.¹⁰ It was evident from the start that the atmosphere at Rome was more hostile than they had expected.

The reasons must lie in the events of the past year. A year before Scipio Africanus had been refused Macedon and a war with Antiochos as his consular province; this implies at the very least that the Senate was not then apprehensive of a war.¹¹ Since then, however, Antiochos had advanced in Thrace, while Rome had retreated from Greece, or so it could be interpreted. Antiochos had made peace with Ptolemy, and so now he was no longer concerned about his left flank; he had campaigned twice more in Thrace, finishing that task, and so his right flank was now safe. He was active here and there in Greece. He had polished off most of Asia Minor. To anyone who had followed his career of 'restoration' and conquest, it must have been of some interest to wonder where the king – the Great King – would go next. And during 195 there had arrived at Tyre in Phoenicia the refugee Hannibal; he soon arrived at Ephesos, Antiochos' base.¹²

Hannibal had been pushed out of Carthage by Roman diplomatic pressure, and had taken refuge with the one ruler in the Mediterranean who was powerful enough to protect him; and Antiochos had accepted him into his councils, though there is no sign that he accepted his advice. To Roman senators who had only just emerged from Hannibal's great attack on Roman Italy, and the long series of destructive campaigns there, the combination of Antiochos the Great King and Hannibal the great enemy was ominous, to put it no worse.

In the committee one of the Romans, P. Sulpicius Galba, suggested that Europe was the Roman sphere, and Asia Antiochos', a possibly deliberate adaptation of the older formula of Antiochos, that Italy was Rome's, and Asia was Antiochos'; another suggestion was that Antiochos should keep Thrace, but that Rome should extend its 'liberation' of Greek cities to the coast of Asia Minor. Flamininus emphasized his liberation of Greece, surely as a means of alerting the envoys to the Roman interests there; Menippos emphasized the restoration work done by Antiochos at Lysimacheia, also as a means of reminding the Romans of Antiochos' whole policy.¹³

That is, the two sides were digging in, holding on to their positions, and refusing to consider surrendering anything. When Galba demanded that the envoys make a clear answer to the propositions put forward by Flamininus, Menippos replied that he did not have the power to alienate any of Antiochos'

lands, a position which must have been obvious all along – after all, the committee could not alienate any of Rome's lands without senatorial approval. No more than a tentative agreement was therefore possible; at least the area of disagreement was much the same as before, though somewhat widened by including Thrace and expanding from Lampsakos and Smyrna to 'the cities of Aiolis and Ionia', as Flamininus put it at one point.

Menippos and Hegesianax, promising to report to the king, took their leave. The Senate appointed two envoys of its own to follow them: P. Sulpicius Galba and P. Villius Tappulus.¹⁴ They reached Asia during 193, probably fairly early in the year, landing at Elaia, the port developed by the Attalid kings. Galba became ill and remained at Pergamon; Villius went to see Antiochos, whom he had already met several times.¹⁵ He found him campaigning against the Pisidians.¹⁶ Their meeting was interrupted by the news from Syria of the death of Antiochos the young king, an episode described in transparently false terms by Livy, though, given the importance invested in the dead man, the king's distress is very believable.¹⁷ Antiochos had to attend to this, but he arranged for the Romans to have discussions with Minnio, his first minister. These talks had no result other than to confirm both sides, once more, in their positions.

The death of his son compelled Antiochos to make new arrangements for the succession and to rearrange his governing system. The second son, Seleukos, was taken from Lysimacheia and made the new joint-king, and was soon married to his widowed sister, Laodike.¹⁸ (This was one advantage of having several surviving children, something the murderous Ptolemies should have learnt.) The two Antiochoi had really been operating a joint kingship: while one was in Asia Minor, the other was in Syria.

It is very probable that Antiochos' wife Laodike also died about this time. There is no evidence of her demise, but then there is also little evidence of her life, apart from references to her in some inscriptions. In the spring of 193 Antiochos instituted a kingdom-wide cult for her, probably expanding on the local cults that had been founded at Sardis and Teos earlier. The evidence is in three inscriptions, one from Laodikeia-in-Media (Nihavand), one from Kermanshah, also in Iran, and one from Eriza in Phrygia.¹⁹ Laodike is referred to in the present tense in all of these, so she was presumably still alive in that year. There is another inscription, from Susa, which is said to demonstrate that she was still alive in 177/176, but this is so extensively restored that it is difficult to accept that interpretation.²⁰ If Laodike was alive in the spring of 193, there is no reason to assume she lived for much longer without clear proof, and the fact that her husband married again eighteen months later is a good indication that she had died in the meantime.

Antiochos the young king died at Antioch. Rumour, recorded by Livy, suggested poison – just as it did with the death of Xerxes of Armenia.²¹ But poison could be easily confused with disease, especially some of the quick-killing fevers, such as some types of malaria. Antioch was later, under the

Roman Empire, a notorious post for killing off governors. Where Laodike was during the spring of 193 we do not know, but if she was at Antioch she could well have succumbed to a local epidemic along with her son. This would help explain the deep mourning that Livy mentions. This is a guess, of course, but until there is good evidence for Laodike's survival beyond 193, the king's remarriage must be a good sign that she was dead by the end of 192.²²

The cult he was establishing in spring 193 was for Laodike, but the records also indicate that a cult for the male members of the royal house was already established. This is referred to casually in the letters sent out to provincial governors with the instructions to organize Laodike's cult. In Media, for example, the king's daughter Laodike (who had been married to Antiochos the young king and was now married to Seleukos) was the chief priestess of her mother's cult; in Phrygia it was Berenike, the daughter of the Ptolemaic ruler of Telmessos, taken by Antiochos in 197. These cults, for the king and for Laodike, were designed as one more attempt to bind the empire into a single whole. This was perhaps a result of the great eastern expedition, where isolated local royal cults were noticed, as at Antioch-in-Persis.²³ Linking them together is the sort of action Antiochos III might well take: first the occasional civic cults, then the provincial version (as with the appointment of Nikanor in Asia Minor), then the imperial cult.

It would not matter if Laodike died; she would continue to be honoured, just as the dead kings were included in the royal cult at Antioch-in-Persis; indeed the arrangement of the names on the much restored inscription from Susa might indicate that Laodike the daughter was being honoured first – she was still alive in the year of the inscription – and the cult of the dead queens followed on.

The wider disaster for the king with the death of his eldest son may well have been the failure of his plans to ensure that the treaties made in the names of the two kings had made continued in operation after his own death. He might have been able to remake the treaties in the names of himself and Seleukos, but this would take time and meanwhile the problem of Rome began to loom ever greater. By evacuating Greece, the Romans had permitted the old local enmities to revive; in particular the Achaian League was apprehensive of the ambitions of Nabis of Sparta, and the Aitolian League, the strongest Greek state by the 190s, was not in the least reconciled to the situation the Romans had left behind. In 192 they attempted three coups simultaneously, at Demetrias in Thessaly and Chalkis in Euboea – two of the former Fetters – and in Sparta.

Contact had already been made between the Aitolians and Antiochos, apart from his gifts to Delphi. On his way from Rome Hegesianax had stopped there and had been honoured as *proxenos*.²⁴ *Proxenois* had a political role, and it is probable that Hegesianax had talks with the Aitolian leaders while he was there. Menippos is not mentioned; no doubt he went on to report to Antiochos on the Roman discussions as soon as possible. It may well have been as a

result of the meeting with Hegesianax that the Aitolians began to look for allies: they sent envoys to Philip, to Nabis of Sparta, and to Antiochos, choosing men who were among the most prominent politicians of the league.²⁵ The Aitolians were now quite serious about upsetting the Roman settlement. The coincidence of their new resolve and the visit of Hegesianax are telling.

Philip refused to be involved.²⁶ Nabis, given the slightest hint, at once began operations, which was clearly not what the Aitolians intended.²⁷ Antiochos was busy in Pisidia – the meeting with the Aitolian envoy Dikaiarchos probably took place before that with Villius, and before the death of the young king – and would not give a definite answer; on the other hand, he did not refuse to join the Aitolians sometime in the future.²⁸ This was all good sensible diplomacy of the ‘wait-and-see’ variety by the king.

The Roman response to this active diplomacy was begun by Galba and Villius, the new envoys. By landing at Elaia they had indicated Roman favour for Eumenes. They went up to Pergamon where conversations with the king will have lasted for several weeks, while Galba was ill, and while Villius went 200km up-country to see Antiochos.²⁹ (Suspicion that Galba’s illness was a diplomatic one must be strong to the point of certainty.) For Eumenes, of course, having rejected a marriage with Antiochos’ daughter, an alliance with Rome was the only way to future security. The only way he could survive or escape was if Rome first extended its protection over him and then defeated Antiochos; Eumenes was therefore in favour of such a war, and presumably urged that the Romans undertake one.

Antiochos made it clear to the Roman envoys that he was not going to surrender his gains, but he had also made it obvious to the Aitolians that he was not interested in a Roman war. Yet he had not entirely closed the door on an Aitolian alliance. When the Roman envoys returned to Rome they reported that they had seen no preparations for war.³⁰ Villius had been a long way up-country and had seen no such preparation, other than those for the Pisidian campaign. Galba, whose host Eumenes was no doubt reasonably well-informed about his neighbour, and who had been at the great seaport and naval base of Ephesos, could report the same. The result of this diplomatic event was therefore new contacts – Rome with Eumenes, Antiochos with the Aitolians – but neither of the two Great Powers showed any interest in a war. Yet within a few months war had come about. It was, of course, the two minor allies who were the incendiaries.

It may have been this manifest lack of interest by the Great Powers in fighting each other that moved the Aitolians to the next step. They could not hope to fight Rome alone, so the only way to succeed in upsetting the Roman settlement was to get Antiochos to do the main fighting for them. Both the Great Powers’ friends were thus keen for them to fight, while the Powers themselves were clearly unwilling, or at least reluctant. The disputes between Antiochos and Rome were minor affairs; no doubt both would have liked to

solve them, and no doubt both were quite prepared to keep the arguments going until they could gain some advantage which would help resolve the issues in their favour, but as occasions for war the allegiances of a couple of cities were not sufficient for either side. Both were concerned at the time with other issues – Antiochos with the Pisidians and the royal succession, Rome with war in Spain and problems in Cisalpine Gaul.

The Aitolians probably did not need much encouragement. They were a belligerent people, vilified by Polybios as pirates and bandits, but then he was an Achaian, Aitolia's enemy and rival, so his evidence, such as it is, is clearly tainted. The Achaian League was the other Greek state of some power at the time, and was just as keen as the Aitolians or Nabis to upset the Roman settlement, but the Achaians understood that this could only be done with Roman agreement and co-operation, whereas the Aitolians (and Nabis) were happy to defy Rome, probably taking the Roman evacuation as a sign of a lack of interest in what happened next.

So when the Aitolians contacted Nabis he set off like a firecracker, with the result that Roman preparations were made in the winter of 193/192 to suppress him. A praetor, A. Atilius Serranus, was to gather a fleet of thirty quinqueremes for the purpose.³¹ This was a carefully calculated force which would hardly be seen as a threat by anyone except Nabis; and after the elections for 192 a set of envoys was appointed to go to Greece to sort out any issues. Since this delegation included T. Quinctius Flamininus, it was clearly intended to reinforce, and enforce, the original Roman settlement rather than adjust it.³²

The Aitolians send another envoy to Antiochos, Thoas, who had been the league *strategos* in the previous year. He managed to persuade the king to send him back to Greece with his own envoy, Menippos, who had been in Rome.³³ Flamininus had been moving through Greece returning to power those pro-Romans who had been excluded, and strengthening those still in office. He had failed with Nabis, but the Achaians had seized the opportunity to mount an attack to suppress him, and Serranus was due with his ships.³⁴ It is significant that Flamininus' journey then consisted of visits to the three Fetters, Corinth, Chalkis and Demetrias. Corinth was part of the Achaian League and so was safe, though the league was acting rather too independently in attacking Nabis for Roman tastes; at Chalkis the wobbly pro-Roman government was bolstered, and some Roman forces were in the area; at Demetrias, Flamininus had to carry out a coup to eject an anti-Roman, Eurylochos, who had come to power. Eurylochos escaped and went to Aitolia, where he described his treatment to the March Assembly in the usual hurt and anti-Roman terms.³⁵

This was where Menippos also arrived, with Thoas. He was, however, as cautious as Antiochos had been the year before when talking with Dikaiarchos. It was known, either through Menippos or from Thoas, that Antiochos had gathered an army, but he used it in a new campaign in Thrace.

Eumenes of Pergamon hastened to report this to Rome. Menippos perhaps explained to the Aitolians what Antiochos was doing, thereby making it plain that he was busy, and would not be available for a war, at least, not yet. But he did point out that the Aitolians really could not rely on someone else to do their fighting. If they wanted the disposition in Greece to change, they would have to do something to change it.³⁶

The Aitolian Assembly adopted two resolutions. The first was an invitation to Antiochos to 'liberate' Greece; the second was an invitation to him to arbitrate the differences between the Aitolians and Rome.³⁷ Both of these were obviously directed against Rome – Livy calls them 'insolent' – but they still relied on Antiochos responding, and this he could not do while fully occupied in Thrace. The Aitolians were perhaps given some pause by an Athenian delegation which was present, which pointed out that there were plenty of Greeks who were quite satisfied with the Roman arrangements, and suggested that it would be best to hear what the Romans had to say.³⁸ The assembly rejected this advice, but after it dispersed the Council agreed to invite Flamininus to visit and put his case. After some hesitation Flamininus arrived, but there was nothing he could say which would satisfy the Aitolians, other than give a warning of the costs of a war.³⁹

Thus stimulated, the Aitolians' plan was to upstage Flamininus. Three cities were targeted to be seized: two of the Fetters – Demetrias and Chalkis – and Sparta. Eurylochos was quickly restored at Demetrias by a swift cavalry expedition which seized the city gate and let Eurylochos return, thus reversing Flamininus' earlier coup. He then spoilt it all by killing as many of his opponents in the city as he could reach, though this was, of course, normal Greek political behaviour.⁴⁰ At Chalkis, however, those in power realized that an attack was approaching; the approach and the plan were complicated, and included exiles, always notoriously leaky, and the forces had to march some distance. The small Aitolian force which was to assist the group of returning exiles failed to reach the city, and, surprise having been lost, went home. The expeditions had alerted Flamininus and King Eumenes, who both arrived at the city soon after; Eumenes left a detachment of 500 troops to protect the city and its pro-Roman government.⁴¹

At Sparta the fighting between the Achaians and Nabis had produced a stalemate. Flamininus had attempted to negotiate a truce, since he was more concerned that they should balance each other than that either should be victorious. The Aitolians however saw that Nabis was an obstacle to their aims, and hoped that the Achaians would join them in the anti-Roman camp if he could be removed. A small Aitolian force arrived at Sparta, was welcomed by Nabis, and then murdered him. The consequences were the very reverse of the Aitolian expectations. The infuriated Spartans killed any Aitolians they could catch; those who escaped were captured by Sparta's neighbours and either killed or sold into slavery. And the Achaians took advantage of Spartan shock and induced the leading men to agree that the city should be admitted

into the Achaian league.⁴²

The news of these events arrived at intervals at Rome through the spring and summer of 192. The union of Sparta and Achaia was probably the final straw, indicating clearly that the former Roman settlement in Greece had broken down at the hands of one of Rome's friends. The Roman response had been at first to send Flamininus, who had only partly succeeded in holding the line. Now the Senate reacted as the Roman Senate normally reacted to an apparent challenge: by sending an army. The praetor M. Baebius Tamphilus was given two legions, plus the usual added Italian infantry – a total of about 25,000 men. He was sent to Brundisium in the heel of Italy, and then across to the Roman posts in Illyria. Just in case of further trouble, another army of about the same size was concentrated in southern Italy, a region whose loyalty to Rome was uncertain. The elections for the coming year were held early, and the provinces to be attached to the consuls were left open. More troops were to be embodied, and a new fleet of fifty quinqueremes organized.⁴³

This was all essentially precautionary. Any further Roman actions were dependent in part on what the Aitolians did, but above all on what Antiochos decided to do. The king spent that summer in Thrace. Whether he heard about what was happening in Greece we do not know, but it is surely likely than he did, receiving the news in fragments and batches, and probably confusingly, like the Romans. On his return from Thrace in the late summer, he resumed his pressure on the three Asian cities which still refused him, but this pressure can hardly have been intense, if the cities were refusing those terms after five years.⁴⁴ It was, however, fairly clear that the situation in Greece was becoming so bad that a Roman intervention was now highly likely, and in that case he could expect that the dispute over the Asian cities would revive and intensify. If he could gain control of them before the Romans were ready, the problem might well solve itself.

Such pressure as he exerted in late 192 was not sufficient, but by then the conditions in Greece were very disturbing. By September the Roman settlement had been wobbling for six months, and yet the Romans had done very little about it: the tours of Flamininus were hardly decisive action, and had produced defiance from both Aitolians and Achaians. There was also the Aitolians' invitation to the king to 'liberate' Greece. This was, of course, in a way what Antiochos felt he had been doing already in Asia and the Hellespont, and in Thrace. He came to a decision to intervene about the end of September, and transported a small army across the Aegean, only 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry and 6 elephants.⁴⁵ The smallness of the force implied that he was going to rely on Aitolian manpower, that he did not expect to do much fighting, and that he was not challenging Rome. It was the Seleukid equivalent of the carefully calculated force brought by the praetor Serranus. Antiochos could not know that Baebius was transporting an army more than twice that size across the Adriatic at much the same time.

Antiochos sailed from the Hellespont, and he did so very soon after he had

emerged from Thrace. The Hellespont was where Lysimacheia was a major imperial base, and where two of the recalcitrant cities were. The fleet staged across the Aegean by way of Imbros and Skiathos, and was met at the mouth of the Gulf of Demetrias (now the Gulf of Volos) by Eurylochos. The forces landed near the city, but camped outside it. Clearly Eurylochos had been alerted in advance, and so also probably had others. The Aitolian Council was meeting at Lamia, not far along the coast from Demetrias, and Antiochos went to meet them there within a week. He addressed the Council and was given the title of *strategos autokrator* (which Livy translated as *imperator*).⁴⁶ Almost at once he was off to Chalkis to complete the Aitolians' earlier failed attempt to seize the city.

This time there were no exiles with them to threaten a purge of the city's government; this time the Aitolians, surely at Antiochos' instigation, offered the city an alliance. The Chalkidians stalled for time, and the leading politicians in the city went off to see Flamininus and the Achaians to ask for help.⁴⁷

Antiochos' arrival in Greece had had its effect elsewhere, for what remained of the original Roman system creaked and groaned under the pressure of his presence. He sent an envoy to the Achaians to suggest a similar alliance to that he had with the Aitolians. Flamininus' presence at the meeting prevented that, and it was resolved to send Achaian assistance to Chalkis, together with a force to Athens where the possibility of anti-Romans gaining power was apprehended.⁴⁸ The Achaians were quick enough to get forces of 500 men into each city before Antiochos could prevent them; however, a Roman force of 500 men was blocked from crossing into Chalkis. Antiochos sent 3,000 of his soldiers to do this, and to threaten an assault. They were commanded by Menippos, and part of the fleet under Polyxenidas sailed from Demetrias to isolate Chalkis from the mainland. Menippos' force caught the Romans unawares at Delion, and destroyed it.⁴⁹ Antiochos brought up the rest of his forces and their and his presence persuaded the Chalkidians to surrender; the rest of Euboia also succumbed.⁵⁰

The capture at Chalkis gave Antiochos control of Euboia, and this allowed him to persuade a reluctant Boiotian League to side with him as well.⁵¹ He was able to secure the alliance of Elis, to whom he sent 1,000 soldiers. Elis lay to the west of Achaia, and to the south Messenia was probably friendly – both of these were reacting against Achaia, which had shown itself to be expansionist and had taken the Roman side; the coup which had brought Sparta into the Achaian League was seen by the league's other neighbours as an obvious threat to them.⁵² This all happened at the time of the Chalkis crisis and soon after. Within a few weeks Antiochos and the Aitolians had therefore gained control of all central Greece and a large part of the Peloponnese. They had demonstrated in concrete terms what most Greeks had understood from the start, that the Roman system was not viable in the absence of Roman forces permanently present.

The parts of Greece he did not control were relatively powerless. To the south was Attika, which was divided internally over the Roman alliance, especially now that Antiochos was next door, but was held to the Roman alliance by an Achaian, and perhaps a Roman, force. Achaia was never a powerful state in a military sense, and was to a degree neutralized by the hostility of Elis and Messenia. To the west of Aitolia was Akarnania, small but awkward and a long-standing enemy of the Aitolians, and Epeiros, which was a neighbour of the Roman part of Illyria where Baebius' two legions were. To the north was Thessaly, another region with few military possibilities, but which contained a considerable number of fortified cities; again Aitolia might be seen as an enemy, but the most usual political emotion was dislike of Macedon, which had ruled it for a century and a half. Beyond Thessaly was Macedon, where King Philip was now technically a Roman ally; it must have been hoped, in Aitolia and with Antiochos, that he could find an excuse to break that connection, though Antiochos, whose power was in part based on fidelity to treaties, must have been at least sympathetic to his dilemma. Absolutely no evidence exists for any contacts between the two kings, but it is surely likely that Antiochos will have made enquiries; the Aitolians had done so earlier, of course. But it is difficult to see what Antiochos could offer Philip that the Romans could not. And Philip will have known, before anyone else in Greece, except the Epeirotes, of the arrival of Baebius' army. The best Antiochos could hope for from Philip was neutrality, and even that, he must have realized, was unlikely.

Strategically, therefore, Antiochos' position was not yet strong enough to provide security. The news of the Roman army's arrival reached him at the latest with the visit of the Epeirote politician Charops, who arrived not long after the fall of Chalkis, and who discussed matters with Antiochos but carefully avoided committing his country to either side.⁵³ On his return home he no doubt reported on Antiochos' strength to the Romans, so confirming a neutrality which was not at all pleasing to Roman ears. What Antiochos needed to do, therefore, was to secure sufficient territory to deny the Romans any chance of invading Greece, as politically these required alliances with as many Greek states as possible. It was a forlorn hope, of course, given the attitudes of Philip, Charops, and the Achaians, but he now had to make the attempt. After all, if he held all Greece except those three lands, he would be in a strong position, if not actually overwhelming, and might be able to bargain with the Romans.

Thessaly and Akarnania were therefore now the crucial areas. If the allies could gain control of Thessaly they had a chance of being able to defend their area against an attack from the north. If they could gain control of Akarnania and of the Ionian Islands (of which the allies already held Zakynthos and Kephallenia) they could prevent much activity by the Roman fleet, by denying it ports at which the ships could put in. Between Epeiros and Sparta the ships could only use ports on the southern coast of the Corinthian Gulf – and if

Antiochos could gain control of Epeiros the fleet's exclusion would be complete. So late in 192 two offensives were launched, one by the Aitolians and some Seleukid forces into Thessaly, the other an intrigue into Akarnania.

Neither wholly succeeded. A Roman force detached from Baebius' army came through Macedon with Philip's permission and appeared in northern Thessaly before the allied offensive, which had secured most of the south and centre of Thessaly, could reach that area; the northern passes could therefore be held open for more of the Roman troops – and Philip had now made clear his choice.⁵⁴ In Akarnania the league was as divided internally as was every other Greek state. An intrigue was got up to gain control of the league, but was only partly successful.⁵⁵

Antiochos kept his forces in the field well into January, but then had to send them into winter quarters. This was not just a time of rest and recreation, but a necessary break in operations in which men could repair and replace equipment, reorganize and be reinforced. Antiochos was based at Chalkis at this time and it was in this time of winter quarters that he was married for the second time.

It is, of course, not known whether his first wife, Laodike, was alive or dead at this point, but it is probable that she had died. His new wife was a girl of Chalkis whom he renamed Euboia in a transparent appeal to Greek sentiment; she was the daughter of a prominent man of the city. Altogether the easiest explanation for this is that Laodike had died, and that the king required a female companion, either for ceremonial or sexual purposes, or, of course both; she produced a daughter next year.⁵⁶

The Romans interpreted this as a debauch, a view of the event which owed more to their anti-regal prejudices than to the reality, for the king was constantly busy all through the winter. In the early spring he sent part of his army through into Akarnania, while he himself with more of his troops went by way of Delphi to the Aitolian Assembly at Naupaktos.⁵⁷ Then he went on to Akarnania and persuaded most of the league cities to join him; only Thyrreion held out. Meanwhile a scratch Roman naval force gained control of the island of Leukas, off the Akarnanian coast.⁵⁸ Given time Antiochos could certainly have taken Thyrreion and probably could have crossed to seize Leukas – the strait is very narrow – but he did not have time.

A consular commander had been appointed in Rome, M. Acilius Glabrio, and he finally crossed from Italy to Illyria in March – as early as it was safe, and about the same time Antiochos was visiting Delphi – bringing with him a further force of 10,000 men to reinforce Baebius' army.⁵⁹ One of his legates, M. Porcius Cato, went on a tour to Achaia and Athens to encourage Rome's fearful allies.⁶⁰ Glabrio moved his army through Macedon into northern Thessaly. Baebius had already begun the campaign there, and Philip had joined him, having been promised possession of any places in Thessaly his forces captured.⁶¹ Their arrival in Thessaly was even more convincing of Roman intentions than Cato seeing the sights in Corinth and Athens.

The approach of the Roman army from the north immediately punctured Antiochos' strategy. Any remaining neutrals, such as Epeiros, instantly enlisted with the Romans. Antiochos' attempt at Thyrraeion was instantly outflanked, and the Aitolians at once became fearful for their homeland. Much of Thessaly had fallen easily into allied control in the winter campaign, and now it all fell equally easily into Roman control, with Philip assisting – though his presence tended to stiffen resistance. Baebius and Acilius could see soon enough that to hand over much of Thessaly to Macedon would only encourage unrest. However, on reaching Aitolian territory the Romans found they had to fight for every town, beginning with the stiff resistance of the minor town of Thaumakoi.⁶² Antiochos brought back most of his troops from the west, gathered up his detached forces, and ordered a muster of the Aitolians and his own forces at Lamia, in front of the Thermopylai Pass and just inside Aitolian territory.

The Aitolians would only supply 4,000 men to add to Antiochos' 10,500 (several detachments remained outside the league's territory, in Elis, and at Demetrias, which had a garrison of 3,000, and probably other places). The Aitolians had to guard other entrances to their lands, and the eastern section was one of the least important. Antiochos withdrew to a defensible position inside the Thermopylai Pass, leaving the Aitolians to install garrisons in the cities of Hypata and Herakleia. Glabrio attempted to provoke all these forces to come out by ravaging the fields of Hypata, but they stayed put.⁶³ Antiochos' army rebuilt the defensive wall across the route through the pass, at the 'eastern gate'; this gave him a strong position, and a force of 10,000 men was quite adequate for blocking the pass. When his tactics failed, Glabrio ignored the Aitolian garrisons in the cities, and came into the pass to take on Antiochos' army, camping at the 'middle gate'.

Of course, this was Thermopylai: and both sides knew of the problem here: that the pass was easily blocked by a relatively small force, and that it was also just as easily outflanked through the hills to the west. Antiochos persuaded the Aitolians to detach half of their local force – 2,000 men – to hold the heights; the other 2,000 were kept in garrison at Herakleia. (Probably Hypata was now without much of a garrison, but it was too far off to be relevant with the main forces of either side in the pass.) The result was that the Herakleian garrison was too small to be able to intervene seriously in the coming battle, but the force in the hills should be enough to block any outflanking attempt.⁶⁴

Glabrio had seemed to be the aggressive one, but he had ended up exactly where Antiochos had intended, where his superior numbers were of no importance. Once he was engaged in the pass, the Aitolians, if they were at all alert, should be able to close the exit from the pass and box in the Roman force; but if this was to happen, the Aitolians must arrive quickly, and Antiochos' army must meanwhile mount a successful defence. Antiochos drew up his forces with this in mind: the heavy infantry of the phalanx was at

the wall, with the missile batteries behind them, intended to bombard the attackers to make them lose their formation. His light troops and archers were placed on the lower slopes of the hills, positioned so as to enfilade the attackers; the elephants were on the lower ground, more or less linking the phalangites and the lights.

Glabrio's first attack was successfully blocked, partly by the missiles from the machines and from the light troops, and then by the phalanx, placed initially in front of the wall. When he broke off the attack, the Seleukid heavy infantry drew back behind the wall. The Roman camp was attacked in the rear by Aitolians, probably those from Herakleia, or by others which had just arrived. Glabrio's haste and overconfidence had produced a Roman defeat, and the Roman force was now blocked into the pass.

It was time for the flanking move to be attempted. Glabrio had detached 4,000 men for this operation, half commanded by L. Valerius Flaccus and half by Cato (who had somehow reached Glabrio from Athens). The path was blocked by three forts, all of them occupied by Aitolian detachments. The Roman attack went in at night (and so after the failed daylight attack on the lower ground). Flaccus attacked two of the forts, which were close enough together to provide mutual support, and failed. Cato tackled the third fort. There are several stories about this – Cato claims to have lost his way in the dark, and one tale claims that the Aitolians in the fort were asleep – but the facts are really simple enough: the Aitolians, correctly, had an advanced picquet out to delay, and give warning of, any attack, for they were obviously expecting one. This picquet was charged by the Romans and scattered; the main force in the fort itself, probably less than 500 men, was then attacked and overwhelmed. Cato held his men in hand and led them along the path to attack the Seleukid army in rear of the light forces, and in flank of the phalanx. It was now daylight, and Glabrio had launched a new attack, probably aware of the situation in the hills. The attack from the flank was decisive. The Seleukid army broke out of its positions and fled.⁶⁵

The defeat was serious enough to persuade Antiochos that his adventure into Greece had failed. He returned to Chalkis where the survivors of the battle collected – Glabrio's pursuit was steady and relentless, but slow.⁶⁶ Antiochos might have held on to the two Greek Fetters he controlled, at Chalkis and Demetrias, but this was not feasible. He had ships enough to evacuate the forces, but not enough to contest the seas with the Roman fleet. About the time of the Thermopylai battle the Roman squadron commanded by Atilius Serranus came out from the Peireios and intercepted a Seleukid supply convoy off Andros. A number of the transports were captured or sunk.⁶⁷ This was a clear warning that to stay in Europe would be to be besieged by land and sea. The populations of neither Chalkis nor Demetrias were not reliable supporters, and elsewhere in Greece the defeat will have emboldened other states to join, or switch to, the Roman side.

The Aitolians fought on, and the cities Antiochos had persuaded to join him

dropped away as the Romans arrived: Boiotia at once, and presently Akarnania, then Elis later. Antiochos cut his losses, packed up at Chalkis, and sailed to Asia. He left a governor in the city, who opened the city gates for the Romans on their approach, a courtesy which at least avoided an assault and a sack; the pro-Seleukid politicians left with the king, his army and his ships, and his Chalkidian wife (and presumably the king's new father-in-law); a group of exiles from Euboia was settled in Antioch later.⁶⁸ When the Roman forces arrived the city's population was solidly on their side. The troops and ships at Demetrias were persuaded to leave by Philip, who took over the city.⁶⁹

Glabrio turned to deal with the Aitolians. His consular province was Greece, and so he could not follow Antiochos into Asia. He turned back to attack Herakleia, while the Aitolian Council met at Hypata; Philip came south and laid siege to Lamia.⁷⁰ The Council appealed to Antiochos for troops and money, pointing out that the longer the Aitolians fought, the longer the respite for Antiochos, a reminder Antiochos hardly needed.⁷¹ Once Herakleia had fallen (and Lamia surrendered to the Romans, not to Philip), Glabrio's earlier suggestion of peace talks produced a ten-day truce.⁷² The Council was divided, and for a time the decision was in the balance, but near the end of the truce the answer came from Antiochos, promising help.⁷³ The Aitolians decided to call an Assembly meeting to discuss the question of fighting on. The Assembly decided to continue the war, but meanwhile, Glabrio had advanced into the heart of the league territory.⁷⁴

Antiochos' intervention in Greece had failed, and he had been driven out of the country in a humiliating fashion. His original move had clearly been based on poor intelligence, for the small force he had taken across the Aegean had been wholly inadequate to contest the Roman forces which had come to enforce the Roman settlement. Of course, although he expected to have Aitolian assistance which would bring his overall force to about equality with the Romans, it is likely that he did not expect to have to fight the Romans, for had he expected to face a Roman army he would certainly have brought more than 10,000 men. The conclusion must be that he did not expect to do so.

Antiochos' aim was therefore to achieve a new Greek settlement under his own auspices, a more stable arrangement than the Romans had achieved. It would be a version of the methods he was using in Asia: a series of individual treaties linking each state to him as his ally. This would be a firmer organization than the Romans' system, which relied on influence, *amicitia*, and the distant menace of the Roman legions, together with senatorial negligence and nearcontempt for the Greeks. There is no way of knowing, but it is quite possible that Antiochos' system would have worked better than the Roman – after all, the Roman system scarcely worked at all well if it was intended to secure peace and security in Greece. Antiochos could hardly have done worse.

The smallness of the army he brought to Greece was therefore a political

statement in itself, the message being that he came to Greece as a conciliator, to bring peace where Rome had brought discord and unpleasantness, a true liberation which, instead of a scheme open to Roman abuse, would be an orderly assembly of the king's allies. One would not have been surprised if it had ended in a new pan-Hellenic league.

Antiochos miscalculated the Roman response. He should have known that his intervention would annoy the Senate, which believed it had gone to a lot of trouble to try to accommodate Greek wishes. Antiochos got, therefore, what he deserved, a drubbing; and one cannot help feeling that even if he had brought his whole field army of 35,000 men to Greece, he would still have been beaten in battle, but then he might have been stranded in Greece. As it was, when the final defeat came, he was able to survive it.

Chapter Ten

The Roman War: Asia

Antiochos took his army back to Asia, landing at Ephesos.¹ He had been defeated and had lost part of his forces, though it does not seem that his battle casualties were very numerous. (Glabrio admitted to 200 Roman deaths; Livy's claims that Antiochos had only 500 men with him at Chalkis are ludicrous.²) He had three concerns once he was home: the effect of his defeat on his kingdom, the intentions of the Romans, and instituting peace talks.

Livy suggests that he did not expect a Roman attack, but that he was disabused of this notion by Hannibal.³ Hannibal has already popped up occasionally in his account, being interviewed by Villius, offering advice to Antiochos. The interview may well be authentic, though the contents, as reported, are not to be believed; the advice he gave, as reported, was usually nonsense, and was probably invented by the Romans later. But in advising Antiochos as to the Roman intentions he may have been worth listening to, for he had long experience of their political system from the same enemy perspective as Antiochos. And it was that system which was operating now to force Antiochos to fight on, and which blocked his several attempts to make peace.

Antiochos undoubtedly hoped that by evacuating Greece, he would be able to negotiate peace, on the assumption that the basic quarrel was over control of Greece – after all, the Romans had not reacted until he had moved his forces there. But he was now trapped into the relentless process of the Roman senatorial war machine. The war, from the Roman point of view, had now developed into two parts: M. Acilius Glabrio's army in Greece was to continue the fight against the Aitolians, who were clearly destined for heavy punishment. The war against Antiochos was therefore now available for one of the consuls in the coming year.

It is not clear if Antiochos made an early attempt to make peace, though it seems likely enough. After all, he had not intended to fight Rome in the first place. It soon became clear, however, that those entrusted by the Senate with command intended to continue. Glabrio was necessarily confined to Greece

by his province, and he had plenty to do there; the naval commanders, however, could range freely. Serranus had attacked one of Antiochos' convoys, and now his replacement, C. Livius Salinator, arrived with fifty Roman quinqueremes, six Carthaginian ships, and others collected from the ports of southern Italy. This fleet joined that of Serranus at Peiraios, giving Livius eighty-one big ships and plenty of smaller ones.⁴

Antiochos' one piece of good news was that his own kingdom was quiet. That, at least, is what we may conclude, but the truth is that there is no source which discusses its internal situation at this time. This is possibly significant, since it would be expected that the sources, which are generally hostile to Antiochos, would be happy to report unrest. So probably Antiochos faced no internal problems. The one item which might indicate such a problem is the size of the army Antiochos gathered in the next year, which was rather smaller than might be expected, but there is another explanation for that.

The menace of Livius' fleet was the first matter to be dealt with. Antiochos ordered his own ships to be refitted, and those which had been laid up to be launched. With those immediately available he set off to the Chersonese and Lysimacheia. This was a crucial point at which he could defend his kingdom, by intercepting any Roman land expedition. Such an expedition had to cross into Asia at the Hellespont; it was also a major naval base from which to dominate the Aegean. His small craft were dispatched into the Aegean and its islands to locate the Roman forces.⁵

Livius crossed first to Delos. His aim was presumably (no statement survives explaining his intentions) to secure domination of the Aegean Sea, so that, if the Senate so decided, it would be possible for the army to invade Asia. His arrival in Delos was reported back to Polyxenidas at Ephesos, where he was supervising the refitting of Antiochos' ships; when Antiochos was informed he returned to Ephesos for a conference.⁶ The problem was that the intentions of other naval powers was unknown, just as Livius' ultimate destination was unclear. Two of these naval powers, King Eumenes and Rhodes, were presumed to be Roman allies; Eumenes had gone to join Livius with three ships; the Rhodians had not yet moved, but Antiochos had clashed with the Island League at Tenos on his retreat from Greece, and so Rhodes, which was the suzerain of the league, could be assumed to be hostile.⁷ The advantage to the Roman side of these two was different: Eumenes could provide accommodation on land in Asia, Rhodes had ships and naval expertise.

From the viewpoint of Ephesos the options were awkward, but it was decided to take the Seleukid fleet out and position it to intercept the Romans. Polyxenidas first positioned his fleet at Phokaia, where he was between the approaching Roman fleet and that of Eumenes, still in harbour at Elaia. Then he changed his mind, perhaps because of news of the approach of a Rhodian squadron from the south.⁸ He retired southwards and took up a position near the end of the Erythraian peninsula so as to be in a position to intercept any of

the three, hoping to do so before they united. Antiochos put the command into Polyxenidas' hands, and attended to the muster of the army ordered for Magnesia-by-Sipylos.⁹

Livius sailed from Delos to Chios and then round to Eumenes' territory; Eumenes managed to bring his own ships out and joined him, but the Seleukid fleet was between the Roman-Attalid fleet (now 105 warships) and the Rhodians. The allied ships sailed south through the Chios Channel and met the Seleukid fleet off Kissos. Numbers and weight told: the Seleukid fleet was made up of generally smaller vessels than the Roman and there were only seventy of them; it suffered a defeat, losing a third of its ships. Polyxenidas brought the survivors back to Ephesos. Livius and Eumenes were now joined by the Rhodian contingent, and the joint fleet blockaded Ephesos.¹⁰

However, a strict blockade was not within the capabilities of ships of the time, which needed frequent returns to their home port for supplies and to rest the crews. The dates of all this sailing and fighting are not known, but it is probable that the Kissos battle took place fairly late in the sailing season, and after demonstrating off Ephesos, the Rhodian and the Attalid ships returned to their bases; Livius took his Roman ships back to the north and made a winter camp near Elaia.¹¹

The Roman war machine ground on. Glabrio pounded the Aitolians, who attempted to negotiate for terms, both with him and with the Senate, to no avail. At Rome in the elections for the next year the consuls were to be C. Laelius and L. Cornelius Scipio, the friend and the brother of Scipio Africanus; their provinces were to be Italy and Greece respectively – but Scipio only secured Greece when Africanus said he would go along as his brother's legate. The fleet was to be commanded by L. Aemilius Regillus in succession to Livius.¹²

All this meant that it was impossible for Antiochos to negotiate peace. New Roman consuls were always keen to secure a victory, and hence a triumph, plus quantities of loot. But it soon became worse. Scipio was to take over Glabrio's army, and take with him substantial reinforcements. Glabrio's army was at least 30,000 strong, probably more, and the reinforcements would bring it to about 40,000. And Scipio was authorized, 'if the public interest seemed to demand it', to invade Asia – and since his own and the public interest inevitably coincided, it was certain that this would happen.¹³ It only remained to neutralize the Aitolians, so that the whole army could be used against Antiochos.

The winter was therefore spent by the Romans in recruiting these reinforcements and in preparations for the new expedition. The Aitolians prepared for a new assault. Antiochos was perhaps busiest of all. He brought up an army under his son Seleukos to menace the Roman naval camp and the Attalid kingdom. The allies broke out to raid the region around Thyateira, but Seleukos stayed where he was and the raiders returned to their camps.¹⁴ But it was the naval war which was the most urgent. Whether or not Antiochos had

definite news from Italy, the lack of response to his peace feelers showed that he could be attacked next year – and the victory of the allied fleet in battle at Kissos can only have encouraged his enemies. So he built up his fleet as a first line of defence.

It was clearly a priority to regain control of the Aegean, since Roman naval power would otherwise permit the Roman army to across into Asia, however it chose to move. Polyxenidas set to work at Ephesos to construct more warships to replace those lost in the battle. Antiochos also controlled the shipbuilding expertise of Phoenicia, and he sent Hannibal there to build and collect a supplementary naval force – Hannibal, as a Carthaginian, might be more acceptable to the Phoenicians than a Macedonian officer. In both cases these new ships were usually larger than those which had been lost, quadriremes and quinqueremes, and several of even larger size were included.¹⁵

During the winter also much diplomacy was conducted by both sides. Seleukos and his army in Aiolis exerted pressure on the city of Phokaia, which had switched to supporting Rome when Livius' fleet arrived in its neighbourhood, and had carried several of its neighbours with it. Seleukos did not directly attack the city, but his army's pressure was wearing down support for Rome in the city and the region. Antiochos also contacted three of his neighbours. The Galatians of the centre of Asia Minor allowed him to recruit among their young men, and he gathered a total of 3,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry that way. Their neighbour and Antiochos' son-in-law, Ariarathes of Kappadokia, was persuaded to provide 2,000 infantry. Antiochos also contacted Prusias of Bithynia, whose cities along the southern and eastern shores of the Propontis were potential Roman landing places. But Prusias was married to the sister of Philip of Macedon, and seems to have always inclined that way. Antiochos' attempts to secure his alliance failed, but Prusias played little part in the ensuing fighting.¹⁶

On the Roman side, Ptolemy V sent envoys to Rome to offer his congratulations on the Roman victories in 191, but neither then nor later did Rome show any interest in accepting Ptolemy's help.¹⁷ More crucially, the new consul proved to be as cunning as anyone else. Whereas Glabrio had used his military strength to beat down the Aitolians, Scipio Africanus, operating on behalf of his brother, could see that what was sustaining them above all was the hope of Antiochos' victory. Whether Antiochos had ever followed through with his offers of help made to the league after he left Greece is not known, but the Aitolians could see plainly that if Antiochos won his own war this would surely rescue them. When the new consul arrived, therefore, he was able to persuade Glabrio that a negotiated truce with the Aitolians would best serve Roman interests. The Roman army in Greece was boxed into a siege of the Aitolians at Naupaktos, but Scipio required that army for his campaign in Asia. The truce rescued the Aitolians for the moment, and allowed Scipio to unite his reinforcements with Glabrio's toughened army and

use both against Antiochos. Faced with their league being conquered city by city, the Aitolians agreed a six-month truce, during which negotiations for peace would be conducted.¹⁸ Scipio gathered up his forces and marched eastwards, assisted by Philip, heading for the Hellespont.

So in the spring of 190 forces were converging on the Hellespont and western Asia Minor from several directions. Scipio's army crossed from Italy to Illyria and marched to join Glabrio's force in and near Aitolia, and then began a slow march east. Hannibal had collected and built a new fleet of warships in Phoenicia, and was commencing a voyage westwards from Syria towards the Aegean. Antiochos was gathering his main field army, originally at Magnesia-by-Sipylos; Seleukos' army was in Aiolis and during the campaign season it moved north into Attalid territory; both of these commanders were watching the approach of the Roman forces carefully. At sea Regillus was coming to take over from Livius; Rhodes sent a fleet north to establish a new base on Samos, whence a watch could be kept on Polyxenidas at Ephesos; he, like Hannibal, had spent the winter months building up his naval strength.

Livius actually remained in command of the Roman fleet for some time, for Regillus had to travel some distance to reach him. In March (probably) Livius took thirty of his Roman ships and seven of Eumenes' from his winter camp to the Hellespont, aiming to seize control of the Strait so that Scipio's army would be able to get across when it arrived. He gained control of several of the towns on both sides of the Strait, but the royal garrison at Abydos resisted, and Livius made the mistake of attempting a siege, which halted any momentum he had developed.¹⁹ Also, he had divided his naval force, so that each section had become vulnerable.

Polyxenidas brought out his fleet from Ephesos and ambushed the Rhodians at Samos, capturing or sinking all but seven of their thirty-six ships – twenty of these were added to his own fleet.²⁰ Livius was quickly told of this disaster and rapidly abandoned the Hellespont to return to reunite his fleet with that of Eumenes. He also had collected contingents, perhaps only single ships, from several places in the area, including Kos, Erythrai, and Mitylene – the product of more diplomacy during the winter.²¹ But while he was away Seleukos had finally taken Phokaia and this success had been followed by the capitulation of several other cities in the near neighbourhood.²²

Polyxenidas had used a fleet of seventy ships against the Rhodians at Samos, so he had built enough during the winter to return his numbers to what he had started with the year before. Hannibal's fleet, which was approaching from Syria, consisted of thirty-seven ships, and included some extra-large vessels. If these two fleets could unite (along with the twenty Rhodian ships Polyxenidas had captured), the Seleukid fleet would have the numerical predominance. So the crucial allied aim now was to prevent that junction, either by Livius defeating Polyxenidas before Hannibal's ships arrived, or by the Rhodians preventing Hannibal's arrival.

The Rhodians sent a new squadron of twenty ships north to replace that destroyed by Polyxenidas. Meanwhile Livius with his and Eumenes' ships sailed south once more through the Chian Channel. It took some manoeuvring and a blockade of Ephesos, but in the end all three allied fleets were united at Samos into a joint fleet of 120 ships.²³ Once again the Seleukid fleet was outnumbered. And this time it was this fleet which was divided. There were some ships at the Hellespont, and Antiochos had hired a private squadron commanded by Nikandros and sent him to raid the Roman supply and communication lines across the Aegean.²⁴ And Hannibal's fleet was approaching. The union of the fleets of Polyxenidas and Hannibal was now the Seleukid priority.

Regillus had tangled with one of Antiochos' allies on his way from Italy. At Kephallenia a Spartan, Hybristas, had established himself with several ships and several hundred men and was operating against Roman lines of naval communication. Regillus had started off with twenty Roman ships, and left eighteen of them to deal with Hybristas, and perhaps patrol the coast of the Ionian Sea; when he arrived in the Aegean therefore he only had two ships left. In the Aegean Livius had also been compelled to detach ships to cope with Nikandros' raiders (whom the Romans referred to as 'pirates'), and more had to go to escort Regillus across the Aegean.²⁵ Livius had mainly concentrated, however, on trying to prise Polyxenidas out of Ephesos. He sent a raiding party on shore, which was defeated by the city's garrison, and a second raid was even less successful. He thought to sink blockships in the harbour entrance, but was interrupted by the arrival of Regillus.²⁶

After a conference of the allies, Livius went off to Karia to see about blocking the approach of the fleet under Hannibal; he failed to capture Patara, the local Seleukid naval base, and Telmessos, which was alerted to his approach by the attack on Patara. Regillus then brought the whole fleet south to attempt to take Iasos, but was deterred when the exiles with him complained that his planned assault would ruin the city.²⁷ The story of all this also records that most of the other cities along the coast, from Miletos southwards, were on the Roman or Rhodian side, but this ploy failed to deprive Antiochos' fleet of its staging posts in the area. The result was that the way was still open for Hannibal's fleet to get through, and even for him to invade Rhodes as he passed had he wished. Regillus returned to Samos and Livius now headed back to Italy, reporting to Scipio in Thessaly on the way.

While Eumenes was away, his kingdom came under attack. Seleukos attacked the Attalid port of Elaia and then marched up the Kaikos Valley to blockade Pergamon; he was joined there by Antiochos with the main Seleukid field army.²⁸ The purpose of this was no doubt to distract and weaken Eumenes, in advance of a possible Seleukid defence of the Hellespont crossing. If Antiochos chose to fight at the Hellespont Eumenes would be in his rear and clearly dangerous, especially if he could get Roman reinforcements from the fleet. The attack on Attalid territory was also a way

of demonstrating its vulnerability, just as the failure to take Patara by Livius had demonstrated the threat to Rhodes. While waiting for the Roman army, therefore, Antiochos was attempting to detach Rome's allies. He then came to the coast and invited Regillus to talks. (In Greece about this time Scipio had concluded the truce with Aitolia; the possibility of the Roman invasion of Asia had now become a probability.) But Regillus, whose remit scarcely extended to the making peace and so depriving the consul of his anticipated glory, rejected the suggestion.²⁹

Antiochos continued to ravage Attalid territory. This was now May or June and his destructiveness eliminated the current harvest so that supplies for his enemies were made more difficult to obtain. He found, however, that he was prevented from taking any of the seaward cities by the presence of Regillus' fleet, while Seleukos at Phokaia had to fight off a serious seaborne raid aimed at retaking that city.³⁰

The march of the Roman army through Thessaly and Macedon and into Thrace was slow. The commanders could not know if or where they would meet Seleukid resistance. They must have hoped that Antiochos would come forward to meet them in Thrace. Antiochos' forces had occupied Ainos and Maroneia, probably as soon as the war began in 192; they were presumably detached from the Seleukid garrison in Thrace.³¹ As it happened these two places could easily be ignored by the Romans, but at the end of the road there was the major fortress of Lysimacheia. This also could be bypassed if absolutely necessary, but to cross the Straits anywhere but at the Hellespont was to face a much longer sea crossing or a much longer march – or both – together with greater danger from Seleukid ships. If Antiochos did not fight in Thrace, a crossing by way of the Hellespont was really the only acceptable way forward.

This required that the Roman warships must gain control of both shores of the Hellespont in advance. Livius had already tried to do this in the spring of 190, without success. He had failed in part because of the local resistance at Abydos, and he had not even attempted to take Lysimacheia, a much more difficult task; but his real failure had come about because the Seleukid fleet had attacked his ships elsewhere. That is, it became clear that to gain control of the Hellespont it was necessary first to secure control of the Aegean, and so the Roman priority was to defeat and/or destroy the Seleukid fleet.

Regillus and the Roman and Attalid ships maintained a blockade of Ephesos from Samos, but the Rhodians were now detached to defend their home island against Hannibal's fleet approaching from Syria. This meant gathering up the scattered Rhodian ships, the numbers of which had recovered since the defeat at Samos. Eudamos, the commander of the thirteen Rhodian ships at Samos, took those ships south, collected other vessels on the way, and at Rhodes, then sailed east to join yet more ships which had been stationed east of Patara. The joint force was then thirty-eight vessels, and Eudamos took the whole fleet forward to Phaselis to lie in wait for Hannibal's fleet.³²

Hannibal was reported to be approaching Side, at the eastern end of the Pamphylian Sea, and he learned of the Rhodian fleet awaiting him at Phaselis. Eudamos moved forward to lie off the Eurymedon River, then moved on again to fight Hannibal as far forward as possible, and the two fleets met in battle not far from Side. Hannibal had a larger number of vessels, and these included some extra large ships; the Rhodians had mainly quadriremes, but they were much handier than the clumsy Seleukid ships. They were also manned by more skilful rowers, and indeed were commanded by more experienced admirals. The resulting fight was more or less even, but more of the Seleukid ships suffered damage than the Rhodians', and at length the two fleets drew apart. It was then seen that at least half of Hannibal's ships were so damaged as to require repair before moving on.³³

On the other hand, ten of the Rhodian ships also needed repair, and the Seleukid fleet had more or less survived. Given time it would be able to mount a new westward voyage. The Rhodians pulled back to Phaselis and then all the way back to Rhodes, and Hannibal was able to follow up this retreat; but he would not be able to get past Rhodes, since in the narrow waters there and close to their homes, the Rhodians would fight even harder, and they could rely on reinforcements from the main allied fleet.³⁴ Hannibal's fleet was embayed, unable for the moment to advance, yet he still remained a threat.

This indecisive tactical result was in fact decisive strategically, since it immobilized Hannibal's fleet for long enough for a decision to be reached between the fleets in the Aegean. Regillus sent some of his ships to reinforce Eumenes, who was at the Hellespont, where Antiochos only had some smaller vessels.³⁵ This was a relatively minor matter for the present, but it was essential now that the approach of the Roman army was apprehended. It meant that the dispersal of the allied fleet had been repeated – or achieved, from Antiochos' point of view. It was therefore time for Polyxenidas to attempt to deal with the main Roman fleet.

Antiochos, having conferred with his admiral, brought his army into the Erythraian peninsula and laid siege to the small city of Notion. It seems clear that many of the coastal cities, here, as in Karia and Lykia, and elsewhere, had succumbed to allied pressure, and had taken the Roman side. Once they did so, of course, it was up to Regillus and Eumenes to protect them. This was what Antiochos, who had similar responsibilities, was counting on. Polyxenidas brought his fleet out of Ephesos in readiness; the Roman fleet came over from Samos to the peninsula to be ready to relieve the besieged city.

Regillus consulted his council, which in effect meant conferring with the Rhodian commander, Eudamos again. He had fifty-eight Roman ships and twenty-two Rhodian. Polyxenidas had the ninety ships he had commanded before, a slight preponderance, though the allies had been more active, and had claimed two victories (they claimed to have achieved one at Side). The

allies landed at Teos for supplies, somewhat to the west of Notion, before moving to relieve the siege. Polyxenidas hoped to catch the allied fleet half-in and half-out of the harbour, but his presence became known to Regillus before he could spring his trap. After a certain amount of confusion the allied line formed up, off Cape Myonnesos; the two fleets met with the Seleukid lines having a slight overlap, but Eudamos, who had been on the inshore station, pulled out his squadron and rowed to the outer station. The result was the decisive defeat of the Seleukid outflanking tactics, and at the same time the Roman centre broke through the Seleukid line. Half of the Seleukid ships were sunk or captured; the allies lost only three.³⁶

Polyxenidas took the surviving Seleukid ships back to Ephesos and reported his defeat to Antiochos. Regillus was now at last able to divide his fleet with safety. He sent part to the Hellespont, and this included, at their special request, a Rhodian contingent. There they joined Eumenes' ships and other Romans. The total of allied ships in the area now guaranteed local control. A message was sent to Scipio that the crossing had been secured.³⁷

The control of the whole Aegean was not, however, yet certain. Two Seleukid fleets, with seventy ships at least between them, still existed, and were out of reach of the allies. A Rhodian squadron remained on guard in the south to prevent Hannibal trying again to reach the Aegean. Regillus used the remaining part of his fleet to attack Phokaia. In part this was in revenge for the city's giving in to Seleukos' attack earlier, but the main reason was to gain control of the city's spacious harbour. This would allow Regillus to be less dependent on Eumenes' port at Elaia, and would place the fleet in a better position between the Seleukid ships to the south and the Hellespont. If Polyxenidas' fleet revived, and if Hannibal's fleet got past the Rhodians, Regillus would still be able to intercept them on their voyage north. The city resisted until a gap was battered in its wall, then negotiated a surrender when a message to Antiochos proved fruitless. But the Roman soldiers ignored the terms of the surrender and sacked and looted the place.³⁸ This at least solved Regillus' problem of controlling a possibly hostile population; it was no doubt still hostile, but much smaller than before and properly cowed, or 'liberated', as the Romans would claim.

Antiochos prepared for the main Roman land attack. He effectively abandoned the task of protecting the Asian coastal cities, and a decision had to be made over where he would fight the invaders. With a heavy allied naval presence – at least seventy ships – in the Hellespont, and several hostile cities available for their landing on the Asian side, there was little point in a forward defence. He ordered Lysimacheia to be evacuated, and this was done, despite the presence of the allied ships.³⁹ He thus re-acquired the services of 3,000 soldiers – but what were the allies doing to permit this?

The Roman army had been theoretically marching eastward since May. Myonnesos had been fought in September, but it was not until November that the army arrived at the Hellespont. There is some indication that fortified

camps had been built along the road, but there is no sign of any active resistance by the Seleukid forces in Thrace (most of whom were also presumably evacuated, though some certainly remained). Clearly there was no point in marching into this hostile country until after the control of the Hellespont had been secured. It was presumably necessary to bring supplies along from Macedon, but even so the Roman march was astonishingly slow. Once at Lysimacheia the crossing went ahead quickly enough, but then another delay occurred as Scipio Africanus was immobilized for religious reasons – though the army was busy enough preparing for the next march. This delay can be accounted for, not by Africanus' priesthood, but by the need to gather supplies; the army was about to advance into hostile territory and most food supplies would already have been commandeered by the enemy.

The Roman halt allowed negotiations. A visit by C. Livius Salinator (back in the region after reporting to Rome) to Prusias of Bithynia persuaded the king to join the Roman side; the presence of a large Roman army on his southern border no doubt helped his decision.⁴⁰ The city of Herakleia-Pontike secured an *amicitia* agreement, as a protection against Prusias, and then called on both sides to negotiate. Neither would do so.⁴¹ Antiochos sent an envoy, Herakleides of Byzantion, to discuss terms with Africanus (whose son had been captured; his release secured Herakleides access). He spoke to the consul's council and then to Africanus separately, offering to recognize the independence of the cities they had been disputing over and those which had joined the Roman side, and to pay half the war costs. It is possible that he also offered to abandon Thrace and Lysimacheia. But Herakleides found that the Roman war aims had expanded as their successes multiplied. Africanus piously commented that if the king had offered such terms before the Romans took Lysimacheia they might have been acceptable; now the Romans required the king to give up all of Asia Minor, 'this side of the Taurus'.⁴²

As Africanus no doubt both expected and intended this was so outrageous a demand that it was rejected out of hand by the king.⁴³ He had hardly spent years conquering and organizing Asia Minor only to abandon it at the whim of a Roman legate – and he might well find that the Roman demands expanded if he accepted these terms. Thus the Romans could continue with their invasion, their looting, and on to a potential victory. There is, of course, no reason to believe that Africanus was telling the truth in his claim that Antiochos could have had peace earlier – unless he had accepted the Roman demands several years before. He was deliberately demanding more than Antiochos could accept and was putting the demand so high that even a bargaining session would not be possible. It is also worth noting that after any negotiations with Africanus the consul would need to agree to the terms, and then the Senate had to ratify them – and the Senate normally increased the penalties it imposed on defeated enemies. The Romans had become very good at exploiting truces and peace negotiations to extract extra benefits for themselves – all within the letter of the agreement, of course, but regularly

violating its spirit.

A new problem now arrived. A Ptolemaic naval force raided Arados in Syria. The aim was never stated, though the inscription recording it comments that the raiders 'returned rich'. It was organized and commanded by a high Ptolemaic official, Aristonikos, a eunuch who had been active in the campaigns to suppress the southern rebellion. The raiders seized Arados Island, and raided into the mainland before returning to Egypt.⁴⁴ This was a clear violation of the peace treaty of 195, and would normally have produced a military reply, if not a declaration of war. Antiochos was already busy in Asia Minor, and Hannibal's fleet was in Pamphylian waters, and this had clearly left Arados undefended – its ships will have been with Hannibal. Apart from the loot it may well have been Aristonikos' aim to provoke a declaration of war, so as to become involved on the Roman side and thereby work towards recovering Koile Syria – as had already been attempted in the embassy to Rome earlier. He was a well-connected Ptolemaic official using Ptolemaic troops, and his deniability was wafer-thin, and indeed the record of the expedition appears in an official decree. Antiochos did not react, nor did the Romans welcome this distraction. But when Antiochos finally faced the Roman army his own army was rather smaller than might have been expected; presumably considerable forces had been left in Syria, just in case.

After the pause at the Hellespont the Roman forces then marched quickly south into Eumenes' territory, camping near Elaia and being supplied by Eumenes from the stores at Pergamon, which were clearly substantial, despite the ravaging of Pergamene territory by Antiochos earlier.⁴⁵ Antiochos' army was camped at Thyateira, placed so as to intercept the enemy whichever route south he chose. Once they were seen to be at Elaia, Antiochos moved to the west, to Magnesia-by-Sipylos. There he protected Ephesos and blocked the Romans' further advance. He camped at a battleground he had clearly earmarked in advance; in effect he invited a battle.⁴⁶

The Roman army moved on south. It was without Scipio Africanus who fell ill at Elaia, so the commander was his brother Lucius. They had heard that Antiochos was at Thyateira, but when they reached that area they found he had gone, and they had to follow him to Magnesia.⁴⁷ Scipio had two legions and the usual Italian allies, a total of about 25,000 heavy infantry; in addition he had brought 12,000 volunteers and recruits from Italy, while Glabrio had brought as many when he joined Baebius' original army. The Roman force therefore included, potentially, about 43,000 infantry, but there had been casualties and sick in the meantime, some of whom, like Africanus, had been left along the road from Macedon. The legionary cavalry amounted to about 2,000 men, who were reinforced by various Greek contributions, which added about 3,000 more cavalry; 4,000 peltasts had also joined, also Greeks. Scipio probably therefore had something under 50,000 men.

Antiochos' force included the usual two phalanxes, the Argyraspides and the citizens, 3,000 Galatians fighting as heavy infantry with the citizens'

phalanx, and 5,000 peltasts. His cavalry included the royal guard and the newly developed force of cataphracts, originally used successfully at Panion and apparently seen first in the eastern expedition; they were more heavily armoured than usual and so could be used as shock troops. Together with a unit of 2,500 Galatians, the light cavalry of the Dahai, and other units, Antiochos had over 12,000 cavalry. In total Antiochos' army was probably somewhat smaller than Scipio's, but stronger in what he clearly hoped would be the decisive arm, the horsemen. Neither side had many elephants – sixteen with the Romans, twenty-two on the Seleukid side.⁴⁸

Scipio faced Antiochos across the Phrygios River, at first camped on the other side. After staying there for a short time the Romans crossed the river and challenged Antiochos' forces from a distance of perhaps 2km. Antiochos did not move. He was in a better position, he had access to local supplies, and he could wait. Scipio finally moved closer, exposing his flanks which until then had been protected by the rivers; at this Antiochos brought out his army from its camp and both sides lined up to fight.

As usual after all this preparation, the battle itself did not last long. The Roman line was wholly traditional – L. Scipio was not an imaginative commander – and the two legions and the Italian *alae* were flanked by cavalry; the Greek peltasts were posted between the right wing cavalry and the *ala*, with most of the cavalry placed on the right, almost as though Scipio did not know what to do with them; Eumenes commanded there. Antiochos' line, on the other hand, was very unusual. The citizens' phalanx and the elephants were in the centre, and the phalanx of the Argyrasides towards the right wing, where it was flanked on the right by the light cavalry of the Dahai. Between the two phalanxes were two units of cavalry, the royal guard and 3,000 of the cataphracts. To the left of the citizens' phalanx was the light infantry, facing the Roman peltasts, and then 7,000 more cavalry, including the other 3,000 cataphracts.

Antiochos' forces attacked on both wings at the same time. He regarded the cataphracts as his battle-winning weapon, and began the battle with a charge by the cataphracts on the right directly at one of the Roman legions. The charge drove right through the infantrymen, and reached the edge of the Roman camp, but that was defended stoutly by its Macedonian and Thracian garrison, and the surviving legionaries turned to harass the horsemen. On the other wing, Antiochos had an advanced line of charioteers, which attacked first but were reduced to confusion by the opposing archers and javelineers. They turned back and in doing so disrupted the left wing group of cataphracts as they were about to charge. This brought Eumenes with the cavalry of the Roman right wing to seize the opportunity to charge, destroying the cohesion of the Seleukid left wing cavalry.

The cavalry charges by the two opposing wings had both succeeded, but the next phase was different. The Seleukid cataphracts on the right failed to recover their formation and became involved in the fight for the Roman camp

and with the legionaries, thereby failing to attack the rest of the Roman infantry as they should have. On the Seleukid left, the Roman/Greek cavalry under Eumenes did retain their cohesion and turned on the Seleukid citizens' phalanx; the opposing Roman infantry, a legion and an Italian *ala*, now also moved forward to close with that phalanx, which was soon also entangled with its own elephants. Neither the Roman infantry nor the cavalry was for a time able to penetrate the phalanx, but they bombarded it and the elephants with missiles until the elephants went berserk. This broke up the phalanx's formation and the pressure and the disruption induced the men to flee. The Seleukid camp was then attacked and was defended as fiercely as the Roman camp had been. No doubt this allowed large numbers of Antiochos' soldiers to escape. There is no mention anywhere of the actions of Argyraspides, or of the Roman left wing *ala*; presumably the Argyraspides withdrew from the battle intact without attacking the *ala*. Figures for casualties are utterly unreliable (Livy claims 53,000 Seleukid dead!), but several thousand on each side probably died either in battle or from wounds.⁴⁹

Had the result of the battle been dependent on imagination and war-making innovation, Antiochos would have won hands down. Scipio's generalship was woeful, and his own Roman and Italian soldiers were for the most part ineffective. The Roman victory was due to the Greek cavalry on the Roman right wing, commanded by Eumenes; the defence of the Roman camp was left to Macedonians and Thracians. If anything, this was a Greek victory. It would seem that the main mistake Antiochos made was to use the charioteers, whose attack was worse than useless; a cataphract charge on that wing instead would have been destructive of the Greek cavalry there, and would not have become entangled with the Roman camp as their fellows on the right did. The Roman victory was due therefore to a mistake by Antiochos and to a swift decision by Eumenes. Scipio and his commanders had little to do with it.

Antiochos escaped from the battlefield, riding hard for Sardis. He collected other fugitives on the way and had a sizeable force when he reached the city. Seleukos had also escaped and also collected a sizeable force. Then Antiochos, having made arrangements for the provincial government at Sardis, retired with his family and his Friends to Apameia-Kelainai.⁵⁰ Meanwhile Polyxenidas took the Ephesos fleet out to sea when he heard of the defeat at Magnesia and sailed to Patara (not being challenged by the Rhodians as he passed the island).⁵¹ Antiochos therefore still retained a considerable naval force, which was now largely concentrated close to Rhodes, and his army was reconstituting itself in the Asia Minor interior. He was thus able to discuss what to do next with some confidence.

The Romans found that the cities closest to the battlefield surrendered without serious delay, including Ephesos, once Polyxenidas' fleet had left, and soon they were able to march on and take Sardis. Within a relatively short time they controlled a solid block of territory south of Eumenes' kingdom as far as the Maiandros River, and as far inland as Sardis.⁵² Antiochos, having

taken stock, sent a herald, Mousaios, to sound out Scipio, who was agreeable to talks; Zeuxis and Antipater then arrived to discuss an armistice. Since it was now January and the Roman forces had been marching or fighting since March, an armistice was quickly agreed.

The armistice was, of course, the preliminary to the presentation of peace terms. These would be refined and agreed later, but they would be important in setting out the outlines of the later treaty. Africanus was once more put forward as the Roman spokesman; he set significantly more stringent terms that had been suggested in the discussions at the Hellespont. Antiochos was to surrender Asia Minor, and Thrace was now included as well; he was to hand over 500 talents, apparently as some sort of fine, in fact as a way of allowing the Roman invaders to pay their men; he was to pay the cost of the war, now computed at 15,000 talents, plus some money it was claimed had been owed to Eumenes' father; 5 named men were to be surrendered to Rome; 20 named hostages were to be delivered as guarantees of the armistice.⁵³

Zeuxis and Antipater accepted the armistice terms, which only included the payment of 500 talents and the delivery of the hostages. All the rest was supposed to be part of the negotiations for peace, and they presumably assumed that these would be real discussions. This interpretation could be backed up by Antiochos' continuing military and naval strength. The Romans, on the other hand, understood quite clearly that the real power now lay with the Senate, and that it would be the Senate's decision which would lay out the peace terms in detail.

The Roman army was thereupon dispersed into winter quarters. Zeuxis and Antipater went back to Apameia-Kelainai to report to Antiochos; the Roman commanders went to Ephesos. There the 500 talents and the hostages were soon delivered. Dispersing the Roman force, of course, made them into garrisons of the conquered area, and gave Rome an Asian base from which to resume the war, if necessary.

At Rome the Senate had delayed discussing terms with the Aitolians until after the elections, which took place in November (when the Scipionic army was at the Hellespont). The Aitolians, when finally the discussions began, were obdurate, and refused to accept the Senate's terms, which they regarded as humiliating; the Senate finally sent them home without an agreement. Their truce expired.⁵⁴ When Rome was ready, the war in Greece would resume, and meanwhile the Aitolians proceeded to recover some of the lands they had lost earlier. The new consuls were allocated to the two wars which were now clearly regarded in Rome as separate: M. Fulvius Nobilior was to deal with the Aitolians ('Aitolia and Kephallenia', in fact), using an army which had been sent to Illyria earlier, plus 12,000 reinforcements; Cn. Manlius Vulso was to go to Asia, taking over Scipio's army. Fulvius in fact spent all the campaigning season of 189 fighting the Aitolians, before eventually agreeing to terms rather less stringent than the Senate had hoped for.⁵⁵ But his campaign served its purpose; no Aitolian assistance to Antiochos was

possible.

Vulso arrived in Asia determined to conduct his own campaign. He was, of course, in theory constrained by the existence of the armistice, but he found a way to evade the clear spirit of that agreement, which was surely intended to suspend hostilities until peace was agreed. He had a major problem in that he commanded a large army, far from home, with nothing to do, a clear recipe for trouble. It also had to be paid and fed, and while he could to a degree rely on Eumenes for supplies, and on the tax-take from the occupied land, this would hardly be enough, either for their pay or for their supplies. In particular, the army also looked for rewards.

Vulso found his solution in the complexities of the political geography of Asia Minor. For a start neither Ariarathes of Kappadokia nor the Galatians had been included in the armistice terms, probably because they were a long way from Roman-occupied territory and Antiochos assumed they were, as his allies, necessarily included. But it was a fact that they had both fought on Antiochos' side at Magnesia and they were not listed in the armistice. The Galatians in particular were an inviting target, for if Antiochos was compelled to withdraw from Asia Minor there would be no one powerful enough to restrain Galatian raids, unless it was Eumenes. But if the Romans could deal them a serious defeat the region might settle down, and Roman power and the reach of its military arm would be demonstrated. The locals might even be grateful. And the Galatians had almost a century's worth of loot in their possession.

Antiochos had retired to Syria after the conclusion of the armistice, leaving Seleukos in command at Apameia-Kelainai, with garrisons in some of the local cities. Preparations had to be made in case the war had to be resumed, and, as after any major defeat, it was necessary for the king to be seen to be in authority in the rest of the kingdom. It must have seemed, however, unlikely that he would be able to resume the fighting. On the other hand, one cannot help feeling that if Antiochos had been in command in Asia Minor while Vulso went on campaign, the Romans would not have got away with so much bare-faced misinterpretation of the armistice.

Vulso's activity in 189, in fact, ensured that Antiochos really would not be able to fight again, and this may well have been part of his purpose. He collected an army, presumably leaving a substantial part of his force in garrison in the cities which the Romans had occupied, and set off to reach the Galatians by a roundabout route which both demonstrated Roman strength throughout western and central Asia Minor, and at the same time carefully avoided any place held by Seleukid troops – for he could not afford to break the truce by fighting them. At the same time he accepted cash contributions from other places in lieu of attacking them. Cities which welcomed him were spared, but gave him presents; those which were hostile were fined, either cash or food, or both (usually described in the sources as 'bribes'). He moved south as far as the border of Pamphylia, then turned north until he was east of

Apameia-Kelainai. By this time Seleukos understood what he was doing, and provided guides for the next stage; this was through Seleukid territory, and the route taken shows clearly that the Roman army was being guided well away from any Seleukid towns or cities. During all this process Vulso collected enough cash to pay his men, so reducing the risk of them becoming disorderly and looting independently or indiscriminately, and also gathered enough food supplies to staunch their hunger, collecting in total 275 talents and 60,000 *medimnoi* of grain. Grain was also contributed by Seleukos from the stores he held for his own forces; in effect this was confiscated by Vulso in lieu of ravaging Seleukid territory; thereby the chances of a revived war were sensibly reduced.⁵⁶

The Galatians were no doubt disgusted at the failure of Antiochos and Seleukos to do anything to deter Vulso's attack on them, but the armistice prevented any such assistance, which could only have been rendered by physically opposing Vulso's march. Vulso campaigned into Galatian territory, defeating the armies and ravaging the lands of two of the tribes, and gathering large quantities of loot.⁵⁷ The net result was that any credibility Antiochos still had in Asia Minor was largely destroyed. His long years of work and government were so undermined that even if the Romans were not to insist on him abandoning the land, he would have a very difficult task to restore his authority.

It remained for the Senate to pronounce on its peace terms. These, not surprisingly, were essentially those which Scipio Africanus had listed in the armistice discussions, with the addition of the surrender of Antiochos' ships and his elephants – the usual senatorial additions to terms which had been negotiated by the consul. The ships at Patara were burned; there is no record of what happened to the fleet Hannibal commanded. It is unlikely Antiochos had many elephants left after the Magnesia battle, but those which had survived were given to Eumenes by the Romans; any which were still in Syria were probably retained.⁵⁸

Without argument Antiochos accepted the terms and withdrew his forces from Asia Minor – those that did not want to remain, that is. He had no part in the complex settlement of Asia Minor by the Roman senatorial commissioners, which goes by the name of the Treaty of Apameia. The only other item he had to perform was to deliver the first instalment of the war indemnity, 2,500 talents. This was sent by way of Perge and Pamphylia in 188.⁵⁹ The sum had presumably been set in order to clear out the king's war chest for a time. Two of the commissioners, Q. Minucius Thermus and L. Manlius Vulso (the consul's brother) went to Antioch to administer the oath to the king.

The detailed terms may or may not have been complied with. It seems likely that some of the ships – Hannibal's fleet, for example – remained to Antiochos, possibly distributed among the Phoenician cities from whence they had been acquired; no doubt he also retained any of the elephants which were

in Syria. It is quite certain that the five men the Romans wanted to be surrendered to them were not – Hannibal survived in Armenia and Bithynia for several years; Thoas surfaced again later as an active Aitolian politician. To give up these men, who were his guests, will have been extremely repugnant to Antiochos; it may be concluded that the other three also survived. Rome clearly did not insist. It was not worth reopening the war for this matter.

Chapter Eleven

Return to the East

Antiochos had lost a substantial fraction of his army in the Roman War.

How many exactly is not known; some of the 10,000 and more he had taken to Greece had certainly been killed, and more will have deserted and been wounded; the destruction of the citizens' phalanx and the defeat of the chariots and the left wing cavalry at Magnesia will have been the cause of a greater loss, though it seems unlikely that any other units suffered badly. After breaking the phalanx the Roman legionaries had concentrated on taking the Seleukid camp, thereby allowing many of the defeated soldiers to scatter and escape. The unenterprising L. Scipio had made no attempt to pursue until the next day; his prisoners were very few.¹

Antiochos had also lost his ships, or many of them, but the rowers and marines of Polyxenidas' fleet had disembarked at Patara and made their way back to Syria.² At least those with Syrian homes will have done so; but since this fleet had been based at Ephesos for some years, no doubt a fair number of the seamen were from western Asia Minor; they will no doubt have gone home. The same will have happened with any of the soldiers who fought at Magnesia who were resident locally in Asia Minor. On the other hand it is probable that some will have put loyalty to the king and the dynasty first, and there was probably a movement of people from Asia to Syria, though one of the clauses of the treaty tried to prevent this. On top of the casualties, though, Antiochos had also lost his access to the military manpower in Asia Minor, both the citizens who were liable to service, and of the chance of recruiting mercenaries – another treaty prohibition.³

There will have been a substantial turmoil in Asia Minor, therefore, as a result of the Roman victory, and no doubt there was more when the measures of the Roman commissioners were announced and implemented. It will not have been to everyone's taste to become an Attalid subject, for Eumenes gained control of most of the former Seleukid territory.

The dynasts who now became subject to Eumenes are likely to have suffered as much as anyone. Those who were loyal to Antiochos probably left

Asia Minor and were compensated by the king with Syrian land. An example is probably the Lysias-Philomelos family, one of whose members had served as an envoy for Antiochos in Rome, and another was probably the regent of the kingdom in 164–162; a town called Lysias existed in North Syria, and could well be the family's new estate.⁴

For Antiochos there will therefore have been a considerable amount of work to do to arrange matters in the aftermath of the withdrawal to Syria. We know of one item: refugees from Aiolis, Euboia, and Crete were resettled in Antioch – others may have gone to other cities.⁵ These were presumably again people who had chosen to be loyal to the king rather than to the new rulers: Aiolians were from territories now under Eumenes' rule, an area which had been badly ravaged in the war; Euboians were escaping from the restored pro-Roman regime, following Antiochos' new queen; Cretans were no doubt men who had been recruited into the Seleukid forces, perhaps the garrison he had sent to Elis, which had been captured by a Cretan officer.

It was not until well into 188 that all these issues were sorted out – perhaps the last item was the delivery of the initial instalment of silver. And by then other matters had emerged to claim the king's attention.

However, it is not the case that the kingdom was seriously damaged. Asia Minor had never been a region firmly attached to the dynasty, unlike Syria or Babylonia.⁶ Since Alexander the Great's death in 323 (135 years before the Apameian settlement) it had been under the rule of Seleukid kings for no more than sixty years in total, in two separate periods, omitting the rule by Antiochos Hierax and Akhaios II. An alternative way of studying the region is to see it as normally ruled, after the death of Antiochos I, by a member of the family of Akhaios I, a linked group which would include the Attalids, as well as several Seleukids. Beyond that it is obvious, from a consideration of the work of Antiochos III, that Asia Minor had absorbed more of the king's attention and time than any other part of his kingdom. Since he became king he had spent half his reign in dealing with the region's problems.⁷ It was clearly an area of continuing difficulty for him, and these problems could be blamed also for dragging him into the Roman War and his defeat.

This may be why the king so readily and without serious argument accepted the drastic terms laid out by the Roman Senate. One reason was, of course, the march of Manlius Vulso, winding its way through and round and between Antiochos' cities and garrisons. The lack of response by Seleukos and his troops was presumably in part due to Antiochos' policy, but had he wished – and had Seleukos been more assertive – he could have blocked Vulso early on, perhaps by installing garrisons across all the routes leading out from the Roman-controlled area. That he did not rather suggests that Antiochos had given up on Asia Minor by that time. He knew, of course, that the terms propounded by Scipio Africanus at the Hellespont would be the basis for the Senate's terms, but even while still holding military control over central and eastern Anatolia, and in alliance with the Galatians and with Ariarathes of

Kappadokia, he put forward no arguments against them.

Antiochos' army may have been reduced in strength by the casualties of the war, but this was not a drastic amputation. Only two decades later Antiochos' son Antiochos IV could mount a parade of 50,000 soldiers at a grand display at Daphne – to which should be added as many troops again, who were left on duty elsewhere in the kingdom.⁸ In military terms therefore, the kingdom was certainly hurt, but was able to recover fairly quickly. There seems to have been no attempt to develop a new navy, however. Antiochos had lost many of his ships, had been restricted to possessing only ten by the treaty, and had been forbidden to send any ships he still had west of Cape Sarpedon in Kilikia.⁹ But there were always naval vessels in the ports of the kingdom, especially those along the Phoenician coast, and the financial and timber resources of the kingdom were quite adequate to build new ships if any of the kings wanted to do so; that they did not is partly a sign that they did not face any danger from a hostile navy once the Ptolemaic fleet had collapsed (there was no danger from Rome, which essentially lost interest in the eastern Mediterranean after 188); it is also evident that the kings following Antiochos III deliberately chose not to develop a naval arm, since their political concerns lay on land.

Nevertheless the defeat at Magnesia and the loss of Asia Minor, no matter how much its eventual effects can be downplayed, did have serious and extensive political effects on the kingdom. It is evident that the king's military power was not seriously damaged, at least in relation to his political enemies in Egypt and possibly in Asia Minor, and that any ill effects were fairly quickly repaired; but politically the effects were serious, especially when they were further affected by extraneous events.

At some point in the aftermath of the loss of Asia Minor, the two governors whom Antiochos had installed in separate parts of Armenia shifted into independence and took royal titles. By 189 Zariadris and Artaxias had been in office as *strategoi* in northern and southern Armenia respectively for over two decades, and as with some other men who held office for a long time they evidently identified with their provinces rather than with the kingdom as a whole – assisted, no doubt, by the fact that they seem to have been of Armenian origin. The exact date at which the two men declared themselves kings is not known – it was probably after Antiochos' death – but their assumption of independence was certainly one of the results of the Seleukid defeat. If it took place during Antiochos' reign the king may well have been tempted to recover control – a new conquest could have been a useful reminder of his continuing power. He did nothing, so far as we can see, and it may be that the two new kings did not emerge into independence until his reign was over and that of his son began, and the son was considerably less active. It is also possible that Antiochos was barred from Armenia by his exclusion from the lands 'beyond the Taurus', in the treaty of peace, or that the new kings indicated that they still accepted his suzerainty.

Elsewhere, Antiochos might also have retaliated against the Egyptian raid on Arados, but apparently did not. The Ptolemaic government attempted to involve itself in the Apameian peace process but without success, and it could be that this evident rebuff of Egypt by Rome was quite enough for Antiochos. It could also be that he found he had a more urgent and perhaps more congenial task to undertake.

The scheme of strategic balance through conquests and suzerainties which Antiochos had constructed in the eastern territories during his eastern expedition began to break down in the 190s. It is during this decade that King Euthydemos of Baktria died, to be succeeded by his son Demetrios. (The succession is not well dated, usually put at '200–190', but it had certainly taken place by 190, and so probably before the battle of Magnesia.¹⁰) This broke the treaty-link between Antiochos and the Baktrian kingdom which had been made in 206 at the end of the siege of Baktra. Demetrios' accession took place while Antiochos was busy in the west, first in the Thracian War, then in the Roman crisis, and then in the Roman war, and he could do nothing about the new situation until after the Apameian treaty had been finalized by his taking the oath of acceptance. But then he was free to attend to the changes in the east.

Demetrios was described in two separate sources as 'Glorious in Victory' and 'Invincible', though he claimed no such titles, or epithets, on his coinage.¹¹ It does seem that he can be associated with an invasion of 'India', however, since he featured his portrait on his coins wearing an elephant scalp, and put elephants on some of his other coins, and it is normal to associate these beasts on coins with conquest in India, as did Alexander the Great, Seleukos I, and Antiochos III. But exactly what 'India' signified in these references and suggestions is not clear. Demetrios' coins are found in Arachosia and in Sogdiana, but not in the Paropamisadae nor in India proper (that is, the Indus Valley).¹²

The sources for Baktrian history are notoriously difficult, relying as they do on numismatics in the main, which do not carry as much information as those who study them seem to believe. For example, that Demetrios' coins are found in Sogdiana does not necessarily mean he ruled there, only that his coins, made of silver and therefore independently valuable, were taken there by someone and probably lost there. If they are to be taken as evidence for his rule then they need to be confirmed by other sources. On the other hand Demetrios' coins are less numerous than his father's and if a considerable quantity are found in a particular region, it is likely that he did rule there. So we may assume that he probably ruled in Arachosia, where his coins are relatively common.¹³

So Demetrios' coins can be taken to imply an expanded territorial authority, and a strong connection with India, or at least with its borderlands. And this must also imply a hostility towards the Seleukid kingdom.

Antiochos III had established his suzerainty over the Paropamisadaean ruler

Sophagasenos in 206 or earlier. He had marched through Arachosia on his return to the west from Baktria. This may also have been part of Sophagasenos' kingdom, or it may have become part of Antiochos' directly ruled kingdom at that time. In both cases these lands had been ruled by Indian emperors in the recent past, and could therefore be legitimately considered to be 'India'. At some point therefore it seems that Demetrios made conquests in this region – probably in Arachosia, and probably not in the Paropamisadai. These conquests may not have been at the expense of Sophagasenos or his successor, and they may or may not have been permanent, since the kings who followed him in Baktria seem not to have had a presence there until Demetrios II a generation later – but any expansion from Baktria into Arachosia or Paropamisadai was at the expense of Antiochos' authority as suzerain, or even perhaps had encroached on his territory.¹⁴

The new situation in the east was therefore of direct concern to Antiochos. Demetrios, whatever he did and wherever he went on his campaigns, was clearly a warrior and a disruptive element in the east – so far as can be seen his father had operated only to the north after his treaty with Antiochos. But Demetrios was not constrained by a treaty, for that between Euthydemos and Antiochos expired with the former's death. For Antiochos the new situation called for another expedition to the eastern countries to restore his authority. His new joint-king Seleukos would be included in any new treaty, no doubt, in order that the new position which Antiochos achieved would continue into the next reign. No doubt more than the disciplining of Demetrios was in his mind.

The expedition is attested only by its ending, when Antiochos died. If he was aiming to re-impose his suzerainty on the new Baktrian king, then he will have taken a major part of his army with him. Seleukos was left in Antioch to act as king in the west while Antiochos was away, just as Antiochos the young king had acted as king when Antiochos was operating in Asia Minor and Thrace. He visited Babylon on the way, and carried out an elaborate celebratory ritual for Bel and Beltiya – no doubt especially elaborate to emphasize his continuing authority after the defeat. He also visited, and sacrificed at, the palace, Borsippa, and Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris.¹⁵ But Antiochos then went into Elymais rather than taking the direct road to Media through the Bisitun Pass. This suggests that he may have been aiming to approach Baktria (always assuming he was heading for that region) from the south – that is, through Arachosia.

As he did on his first expedition to the east, Antiochos located a major source of treasure, immobilized in the temple of Bel (or Zeus or Jupiter, depending on the language of the source) somewhere in Elymais.¹⁶ This is a region which has large quantities of remains from the Hellenistic and the later Parthian period, though they are usually referred to as 'Parthian'; however, if they are earlier than c.150 BC they should be called Elymaian.¹⁷ This was a region which had not apparently been much bothered by campaigners.

Antiochos had ignored it on his first pass through on his return in 205, though he had been nearby at Susa, and there is no sign that any earlier king had visited the area, except perhaps Seleukos I.

This must be the reason why the temple had a large store of treasure. Antiochos aimed to seize it, just as he had seized the silver from the temple at Ekbatana in 210.¹⁸ But this was a region of independent people, not overawed by the presence of a king and his army, and they came to the defence of their temple and its treasure. This, after all, could be reckoned to be their local bank, containing the community's emergency funds, and indeed some of the treasure had probably been lodged there privately, rather than presented to the god.

Antiochos apparently got into the temple and seized the treasure, but was attacked by the local people as he left. It is said that he and all his men were killed. If so, he clearly had only a small detachment of soldiers with him, probably assuming that he did not face a task of any real difficulty. This therefore cannot refer to the whole army, which would be far too large for a group of local untrained defenders to tackle.

The eastern expedition automatically stalled. The accession of a new king in a Hellenistic kingdom was always a moment of crisis, and Antiochos had piled up a huge list of treaty obligations during his long reign, and enmities as well. His main achievement, of course, had been to recover control over the essentials of the kingdom – North Syria, Babylonia, Media – to which he had added Koile Syria. His expeditions into Asia Minor and Thrace had also been successful in reuniting these lands with the main kingdom, but were then lost to others. The permanence of these losses was counter-balanced by the permanence of the acquisition of Koile Syria, so the kingdom as a whole was fundamentally rebalanced eastwards.

Seleukos was, of course, in post at Antioch for precisely such an emergency as Antiochos' sudden death – he had indeed been planning for such a crisis since appointing his eldest son as joint king back in 209. Once he received the news of his father's death Seleukos could easily assume full power. He had been joint-king since his brother's death six years before, he was married to his father's eldest daughter, and the kingdom as a whole had long been used to having a joint-king. He was an experienced commander and administrator. So in this matter Antiochos had been particularly successful. There is no indication that there was any adverse reaction to Antiochos' death; and an accession crisis did not happen.

On the other hand, despite his qualifications for kingship Seleukos' reign is probably the period of the least royal activity by any Seleukid king. Whereas his father went on campaign every year, Seleukos is credited with only one campaign, and that was called off as soon as it began. Historians have taken to implying that Seleukos was lazy, or ill, or merely unenterprising, and that the kingdom needed a period of peace after the frenetic activity of Antiochos' reign. What has not been appreciated is that Seleukos was in a particularly

difficult situation. His father's death had cancelled all his treaties. In the past century this had been the signal for a new Syrian war to begin – in 274, 260, 246, 219, and after Ptolemy IV's death, in 202. One of the first measures we must presume Seleukos took would have been to bring the field army back from Elymais and position it in defensive positions in Syria. As it happened, Ptolemy V (Seleukos' brother-in-law, though that relationship had no bearing on anyone's actions), was still fully occupied with the suppression of the Egyptian southern rebellion, and could not undertake a new Syrian war; as a result, once the Seleukid army was in position in Syria it was probably too late to begin one.

At the same time there was the possibility of trouble in the north, where, if they had not already done so, Zariadris and Artaxias made themselves independent kings. Artaxias employed Hannibal at some point between 188 and 183, supposedly to design his new city of Artaxata, but he would clearly be available for military duties if Seleukos attempted a reconquest.

One of the treaties which expired on Antiochos' death was that with Rome (and that with Eumenes as well, of course). Seleukos did not continue the payment of the instalments of silver; it was his father who had agreed to do so (though his successor made a loud point of paying off 'arrears' in the 170s). The obvious reason is not that he was short of money, but that he had no obligation to make the payments. Rome clearly did not insist, because the only way to do so would be to mount a military campaign into Syria, something the Roman army could not accomplish – and to get its surrogates (Eumenes and Rhodes) to attempt one would be to court defeat. Seleukos, however, had to be wary. It was always possible that some warfare might develop in the north, just as it might in the south after the final submission of the Egyptian rebels in 186.

Seleukos' reign was quiet, therefore, because he had lost the protection of the treaties his father had concluded with all his neighbours. The construction of the treaties Antiochos had made in the east also disappeared, and since Seleukos was pinned down by the potential trouble in the west, he could do nothing to recover his father's eastern domination. Presumably he could have negotiated new treaties, but to ask for them would be to advertise his dilemma, and he would need to make concessions; it was best to wait.

The reign of Antiochos III had been the longest in Seleukid history, at thirty-five years. It had taken all that time to revive the full strength and restore the kingdom to the full extent as it had been under the first king (whose reign was the second longest). He had done his work in exceptionally favourable conditions. Only the Ptolemaic kingdom had provided serious opposition, and then he had escaped from that by his treaty with Ptolemy IV in 217. From then on he had had a free hand, able to pick and choose his enemies (or victims) for a quarter of a century. And yet after all that time his restoration work was still incomplete. There were still cities in Asia Minor outside of his control, there were still large areas of Anatolia and the east

where the kings were either completely independent (and even defiant) or subject only to the most distant and minimal control.

In fact Antiochos was probably never likely to complete his self-assignment. Had he reached the east in 187, Demetrios is unlikely to have given in easily, any more than his father did, and within a couple of years Ptolemy V in the west would have been ready to inaugurate a new Syrian war – and all the more likely to do so if Antiochos had taken the main army off to the east; the Arados raid had indicated that he was not particularly constrained by the existing treaty, and creative statesmen can always find excuses for doing what they want to do. Above all, whatever work Antiochos did would probably have had to be redone by his successor. He had made some attempts to bind the future by concluding treaties in which both he and his eldest son were included, and may have done so with Seleukos as well (though no examples survive); and he had begun to institute a kingdom-wide cult of the dynasty as a binding agent. Yet these were feeble links, and were not resumed by his successors with the same keenness.

The collision with Rome removed Asia Minor and Thrace from his control, but also removed their problems from his concern. His new expedition to the east shows that he still had the same energy he had always shown. But when he died, all this work broke down. His final failure illustrates all too clearly the fatal weakness of the Seleukid kingdom: it was large and wealthy, but it depended for its continuance on the life of one man, and on constant activity by the king. The necessary institutions of government were not strong enough to hold it together in the absence of the king. That had been the problem he had inherited when he became king, and it was repeated when he died. It was an unhappy epitaph.

Notes and References

Chapter 1

1. Justin 27.3.9–10; Pliny, *NH* 7.158.
2. Justin 27.3.12.
3. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 68; Porphyry, *FGrH* 260 F 44; Hieronymos, *In Danielam* 3.11.10.
4. Polybios 5.40.5.
5. Polybios 5.41.2.
6. This interpretation of the balance of power in the council is different from that of E. Will, 'Les Premières années de la règne d'Antiochos III', *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, 75 (1962) pp. 75–129 (and in his *Hist. Pol.* 2.15–23); see also H. H. Schmitt, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos' der Grossen und seiner Zeit*, *Historia Einzelschriften* p. 6 (Wiesbaden 1964).
7. The first Akhaios' land holding is attested by an inscription of 267 from Asia Minor; Austin 168; Burstein 19.
8. A disputed matter; Ogden, *Prostitutes, Polygamy*, p. 120, finds the idea 'unpersuasive'; however, the idea of his being King Seleukos' son does make sense of the extensive intermarriage of his family with royalty.
9. Polybios 5.41.4.
10. Polybios 5.40.7.
11. Polybios 4.48.1–12; Polyainos, *Stratagems* 4.17.
12. F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybios*, vol. 1 (Oxford 1957) is an essential tool.
13. Polybios 5.43.1–4.
14. *Ibid.*
15. There were regular visits by kings and princes from the time of Seleukos I; for a particular case see S. M. Sherwin-White, 'Ritual for a Seleucid King in Babylon', *JHS* 103, 1983, 156–159; Sachs and Hunger, *Astronomical Diaries*, repeatedly mention royal visits.
16. Polybios 5.41.3; this is followed by an account of a quarrel in council between Hermeias and Epigenes.
17. Polybios 2.71.3 ad 5.34.1; the exact date is not known: late 222 or early 221 is the best we can do.
18. Polybios 5.41.1.
19. Polybios 5.42.7–8.

20. G. Holbl, *A History of the Ptolemaic Empire* (London 2000) p. 54, relying on a difficult papyrus source, P. Haun 6; this in turn is examined by A. Bulow-Jacobson, 'P. Haun 6: an Inspection of the Original', *ZPE* 36 (1979) pp. 91–100.
21. Polybios 5.34.1.
22. Polybios 5.43.1–4.
23. Polybios 5.43.5–6.
24. Polybios 5.43.7; 45.1–2.
25. Polybios 5.3.8; 45.3.
26. Polybios 5.45.4.
27. J. P. Rey-Coquais, *Arados et sa Peree* (Paris 1974).
28. Seleukos II had captured Orthosia in about 244, but had got no farther: Strabo 16.1.12; Porphyry *FGrH* 160 F 32.8
29. Leon Marfoe, *Kamid el-Loz, 14: Settlement history of the Bika' up to the Iron Age* (Bonn 1998).
30. Polybios 5.45.7–46.5.
31. Polybios 5.45.6; Polybios places Xenoetas' appointment before the invasion of the Bekaa, but it is just as likely that the invasion started first.
32. Polybios 5.46.7–8.
33. Polybios 5.46.6, 8.
34. Polybios 5.46.9–47.4.
35. Polybios 5.47.4–7.
36. Polybios 5.48.1–10.
37. Polybios 5.48.11–14.
38. Polybios 5.48.13–14.
39. E. T. Newell, *The Coinage of the Eastern Seleucid Mints* (New York 1938) pp. 85–86, 204–205.
40. Polybios 5.48.17–49.7.
41. Polybios 5.50.1.
42. Polybios 5.50.2–5.
43. Polybios 5.50.10–14.
44. Polybios 5.50.6–9.
45. Polybios 5.51.1.
46. Polybios 5.51.5.
47. Polybios 5.51.2–52.11; Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army*, ch. 8, discusses the strategy of the campaign and the conduct of the battle.
48. Polybios 5.52.1–8: 'forty stades'.
49. Polybios 5.52.9–14.
50. Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army* pp. 119–120.
51. Polybios 5.53.2–11.
52. Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army* pp. 121–122.
53. Polybios 5.54.1–5.
54. Polybios 5.54.6–8.
55. Polybios 5.54.8–9.

56. Polybios 5.54.10–12.
57. Polybios 5.54.12.
58. Polybios 5.55.1–3.
59. Polybios 5.55.4.
60. Polybios 5.55.7.
61. Polybios 5.55.9.
62. Polybios 5.57.1–3.
63. Polybios 5.34.1 and 36.1.
64. Polybios 5.56.1–13.
65. Polybios 5.56.14.
66. Polybios 5.56.15.
67. The dating of all these events has to be calculated by the references to winters, for no precise dates are supplied. It is now calculated that Seleukos III died early in 222. Molon's invasion of Babylonia was interrupted by his army going into winter quarters after the retirement of Xenon and Theodotos, which will be the winter of 222/221. A second winter intervened during Antiochos' march from Syria to the east, which will have been that of 221/220. When he was back in Syria, after the defeat of Molon, the expedition into Media and the killing of Hermeias, Antiochos sent his forces into winter quarters again. So we are now at the winter of 220/219. There were plenty of problems facing him, above all that of Akhaïos, but it turned out that this was not immediately serious. Antiochos was able to turn back to his Egyptian war.

Chapter 2

1. Polybios 5.34.1 and 36.1.
2. His career is summarized by Holbl, *Ptolemaic Empire* pp. 127–128.
3. Polybios 14.11.5.
4. Holbl, *Ptolemaic Empire* p. 127.
5. Polybios 5.38.5–39.5; Plutarch, *Kleomenes* pp. 37–38.
6. Polybios 5.40.1–2.
7. Polybios 4.48.10–11.
8. Polybios 5.41.4.
9. Polybios 5.57.3–5; Polybios in fact refers to Akhaïos as king before this, in his account of the Rhodian-Byzantine war (4.48.12).
10. Polybios 5.57.2 and 6.
11. Akhaïos is said to have begun his move while Antiochos was campaigning against Artabazanes, but this may be only a guess.
12. Polybios 5.72.3–4.
13. Polybios 5.57.6.
14. Polybios 5.57.2–11.
15. Polybios 5.57.1 and 58.1, for example.
16. Polybios 5.58.2–11.
17. Polybios describes the city's situation (5.59.4–11); not much in the way of

fortification is visible now, but a plan indicates the layout – see my *The Seleukid Cities of Syria* (Oxford 1990) – which fits well enough with Polybios’ description.

18. Polybios 5.60.1–61.2.
19. Polybios 5.61.5–62.2.
20. This is only briefly mentioned (Polybios 5.62.4–5), but clearly some sort of plan was made.
21. Polybios 5.66.1.
22. Polybios 5.63.5.
23. Polybios 5.63.8–65.11.
24. Polybios 5.67.4–10.
25. Polybios 5.67.12–13
26. Polybios 5.68.2–6.
27. Polybios 5.68.7; J. D. Grainger, *Hellenistic Phoenicia* (Oxford 1991).
28. Polybios 5.68.8; ‘Trieres’, otherwise unknown, is perhaps Tripolis.
29. Polybios 5.68.11–69.11; Bar-Kochva, *The Seleucid Army*.
30. Polybios 5.70.1–10.
31. Polybios 5.70.10–11.
32. Polybios 5.70.12–71.3.
33. Polybios 5.71.4–10.
34. Polybios 5.71.11–12.
35. Polybios 5.63.7.
36. Polybios 5.79.1–2, and 80.1–4.
37. Ptolemaic army: Polybios 5.65.1–10; Seleukid army: Polybios 5.79.3–13; discussed by Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army* pp. 128–125, who also discusses the site of the battle; see also E. Galili, ‘Raphia 217 BCE revisited’, *Scripta Classica Israelitica* (1967–1968) pp. 52–156.
38. Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army* p. 135.
39. Polybios 5.84.1–85.11.
40. Polybios 5.86.5–6.
41. Polybios 5.86.3–4.
42. Polybios 5.86.1–2 and 10–11; an inscription gives an indication of the revival of Ptolemy’s authority: A. Salame-Sarkies, ‘Inscription au nom de Ptolemee IV Philopator trouvee dans le Nord de la Beqa’, *Berytus* 34 (1986) pp. 207–209.
43. Polybios 5.87.1–5.

Chapter 3

1. Raphia: Polybios 5.79.12; Themisonion: G. M. Cohen, *Hellenistic Settlements in Greece, the Islands and Asia Minor* (California 1994).
2. Macedonians: Richard A. Billows, *Kings and Colonists, Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism* (Leiden 1995) ch. 6; Iranians: J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (London 1983) pp. 176–182.
3. Austin 168.

4. On all these, see Billows, *Kings and Colonists*.
5. Stephen Mitchell, *Anatolia, Land, Men and Gods in Asia Minor*, vol 1, (Oxford 1993) ch. 3.
6. Polybios 5.40.6.
7. Polybios 4.48.2 and 10.
8. Polybios 4.49.2.
9. Polybios refers to Akhaïos as king in his account of this mediation, but in a later account it is clear that Akhaïos only took the title some time after the Rhodian-Byzantine war ended. Polybios clearly has the sequence confused.
10. Polybios 4.48.1–3.
11. Polybios 4.49.1–3.
12. Polybios 4.50.5–7.
13. Polybios 5.51.1–6.
14. Polybios 4.50.1, 51.7–8.
15. Polybios 4.52.1–7.
16. Polybios 5.57.5.
17. Polybios 5.57.7–8.
18. Polybios 5.66.3.
19. Polybios 5.72.1–75.6.
20. Polybios 5.72.7–76.11.
21. Polybios 5.76.7.
22. Polybios 5.77.1.
23. Polybios 5.77.2.
24. Polybios 4.46.4.
25. Polybios 5.77.7–8.
26. Polybios 5.77.7–9.
27. Polybios 5.78.1–6.
28. Polybios 5.87.2.
29. Only two serious attempts have been made: E. Meloni, ‘L’Usurpazioni di Acheo sotto Antioco III di Siria’, in successive volumes of *Rendiconti della Classe di Scienza, Morali Storiche et Filologiche dell’Accademia dei Lincei* 8.4 (1949) pp. 535–55 and 8.5 (1950) pp. 161–183; Ma, *Antiochos III*, pp. 54–63 is shorter but more up to date.
30. Barclay V. Head, *Historia Numorum*, 2nd ed., (Oxford 1911) p. 762; E. T. Newell, *The Coinage of the Western Seleucid Mints from Seleucus I to Antiochos III*, 2nd ed., (New York, 1971) pp. 267–170.
31. Polybios 5.111.1–7.
32. Polybios 5.77.1.
33. Polybios 7.15.1.
34. Polybios 7.15.2–18.10.
35. Polybios 8.15.1–10.
36. Polybios 8.17.10–11.
37. Polybios 8.16.1–20.8.

38. Polybios 8.20.12; 21.2–3.
39. Polybios 8.21.5–9.
40. Authority in Mysia at this time is not clear, but R. E. Allen's argument, *The Attalid Kingdom, a Constitutional History* (Oxford, 1983) pp. 58–65, that the alliance of Antiochos and Attalos was a recognition of Attalos as an independent king, and that therefore Antiochos had no need to offer him territory, is good; it follows that anything Akhaïos had controlled reverted to Antiochos; see also Ma, *Antiochos III* p. 60.
41. P. Gauthier, *Nouvelles Inscriptions de Sardes* vol. II (Paris 1989); the relevant inscriptions are also published in Ma, *Antiochos III*.
42. In Mysia: Polybios 5.77.8; at Tralleis: Welles, *RC* p. 41; it has to be said that proof of the identity of the two is lacking, but it is a rare name, and it seems reasonable to link them.
43. Josephus, *AJ* 12.147–153.
44. Gauthier, *Nouvelles Inscriptions* p. 2, = Ma, *Antiochos III* document 2.
45. H. Malay, 'Letter of Antiochos III to Zeuxis with his covering letters (209 BC)', *Epigraphical Anatolica* 10 (1987), pp. 7–17 (= Ma, *Antiochos III* document 7).
46. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 1.
47. He is said to be a Macedonian (Ma, *Antiochos III* document 7), but by this time this may mean either a native of Macedon, or a descendant of a Macedonian emigrant; 'the Macedonian' was part of the royal titulature of Seleukid kings.

Chapter 4

1. Polybios 8.23; Strabo 11.14.1–16; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, *Samarkhand* pp. 190–197.
2. Polybios 8.23.4.
3. For an explanation of the persons of Antiochos' family see Ogden, *Prostitutes, Polygamy* pp. 133–140.
4. Polybios 9.43.
5. P. Bernard, 'Heracles, les grottes de Karafto et le sanctuaire du mont Sambalos en Iran', *Studia Iranica* 9 (1980) pp. 301–324.
6. Military pay is discussed by G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1939) pp. 274–307; this seems to be the definitive word on the subject.
7. This is the estimate of G. G. Aperghis, *The Seleukid Royal Economy* (Cambridge, 2004) pp. 189–204.
8. Polybios 10.29.4–31.3.
9. Polybios 10.49.1–15.
10. Justin 41.5.7 claims the force had 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry, which Aperghis (note 7), 193, takes seriously, 'though these figures have obviously been rounded up'; but no Seleukid army ever had anywhere near these numbers of men.

11. Polybios 10.29.5.
12. This is assuming not only that this was the same man, but that he still held the post of satrap of Media after ten years; it seems probable that Antiochos was willing to keep a man in such a post if he trusted him – Zeuxis' twenty years in Asia Minor is another example.
13. Polybios 10.28.6 and 29.6.
14. Polybios 10.31.12.
15. Polybios 10.29.6.
16. Ibid.
17. Polybios 10.49.12
18. Polybios 10.27.10–13.
19. Malcolm A. R. Colledge, *The Parthians* (London, 1967) pp. 25–27.
20. The best ancient source for the process is Justin, books 41–42; for the sequence and dating of the Parthian kings see G. E. Asser, 'Genealogy and Coinage of the Early Parthian Rulers – I', *Parthia* 6 (2006) pp. 69–97.
21. For Baktria, see Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, *Samarkhand* pp. 103–105; at greater length and more detail see the several books by Frank M. Holt, *Thundering Zeus, the Making of Hellenistic Bactria* (California, 1999) and *Lost World of the Golden King* (California, 2012).
22. Polybios 11.39.11.
23. Ogden, *Prostitutes, Polygamy* p. 134.
24. Polybios 10.28.1–7.
25. Polybios 10.29.3–31.4.
26. Polybios 10.31.5–13.
27. Sherwin-White and A. Kuhrt, *Samarkhand* pp. 79–80 (Aria) and 82–84 (Margiana); the British-Kazakh excavations at Merv are reported in *Iran* 40 and 41 (2002 and 2003).
28. Polybios 10.48.1–15.
29. Polybios 11.39.1–10.
30. Ma, *Antiochos III* pp. 288–292 (with references); the date is now determined to be 103 of the Seleukid era (= 209 BC).
31. Polybios 11.39.11–12.
32. Ibid.
33. P. M. Fraser, 'The Son of Aristonax at Kandahar', *Afghan Studies* 2 (1979) pp. 9–21, and *Cities of Alexander the Great* (Oxford, 1996) pp. 132–140; Romilla Thapar, *Asoka and the last of the Mauryas* (Delhi, 1997).
34. Charles Allen, *Ashoka* (London, 2012) photographs on 243 showing a band of musicians who appear to be Greeks, and on 273, of a sculpture at Bharhut, showing a 'Greek mercenary', but he wears a fillet and is in 'civilian' clothes – could he be a Greek king? The date of the sculpture is late third century. For India from the Hellenistic point of view, see Klaus Karttunen, *India and the Hellenistic World* (Helsinki, 1997).
35. Polybios 11.39.12.

36. Polybios 11.39.10.
37. Polybios 11.39.13–14.
38. Welles, *RC* 31–34; K. J. Rigsby, *Asyilia, Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World* (California, 1996) nos 69–71; Austin 189; Bagnall and Derow, no 154.
39. Austin 180.
40. G. M. Cohen, *Hellenistic Settlements in the East from Armenia and Mesopotamia to Bactria and India* (California, 2013) pp. 185–187; an archaeological survey of the Bushehr region, R. A. Carter *et al.*, ‘The Bushehr Hinterland; results of the first season of the Iranian-British Archaeological Survey of Bushehr Province’, *Iran* 44 (2006) 63 and 104, contained no mention of Antioch, and no reference to the Seleukid presence in the region, both of which omissions seem quite extraordinary.
41. P. Naster, ‘Notes d’épigraphie monétaire de Perside: *fratakara*, *frataraka*, ou *fratadara*?’ , *Iranica Antiqua* 8 (1973) pp. 74–80; Josef Wiesehofer, *Ancient Persia* (London, 1996) pp. 109–110.
42. Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, *Samarkhand* p. 76.
43. Pliny, *NH* 6.138–139.
44. Cohen, *Hellenistic Settlements* pp. 109–117.
45. Sylvia A. Matheson, *Persia, an Archaeological Guide* (London, 1972) pp. 245–246; Pliny *NH* 6.111 referred to an island called Arakia, with a temple of ‘Neptune’, which may be Kharg; see Cohen *Hellenistic Settlements* pp. 183–184.
46. J. F. Salles, *Failaka, Fouilles Françaises 1983* (Lyon, 1984); Charlotte Roueche and Susan M. Sherwin-White, ‘Some Aspects of the Seleukid Empire: the inscriptions from Failaka in the Arabian Gulf’, *Chiron* 15 (1985) pp. 1–39.
47. The major study of the Gulf is by D. T. Potts, *The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity* (Oxford, 1990) 2 vols; the Seleukid period is outlined on pp. 10–17 of vol. 2.
48. Cohen, *Hellenistic Settlements* pp. 138–140; G. W. Bowersock, ‘Tylos and Tyre; Bahrain in the Graeco-Roman World’, in S. H. A. al-Khalifa and M. Rice (eds), *Bahrain through the Ages* (London, 1986) pp. 399–406.
49. Matheson, *Persia*, p. 252.
50. J. F. Salles has discussed the whole issue of Hellenistic use of the Gulf in ‘The Arab Persian Gulf and the Seleukids’, in A. Kuhrt and S. M. Sherwin-White, *Hellenism in the East* (London, 1987).
51. Polybios 13.9.2–5.
52. Cohen, *Hellenistic Settlements* pp. 128–129.
53. Bowersock, ‘Tylos and Tyre’.

Chapter 5

1. Polybios 11.39.14–15.

2. Bar Kochva, *Seleukid Army*, is the major study of this army; see also M. Launey, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques* 2 vols (Paris, 1949–1950).
3. S. M. Sherwin-White, ‘Aristeas Ardibeltaios: some Aspects of the use of Double names in Seleucid Babylonia’, *ZPE* 50 (1987) pp. 209–221.
4. Josephus, *AJ* 12.147–153.
5. E. Olshausen, *Prosopographie des hellenistischen Königsgesandten* 1 (Louvain, 1974).
6. H. Malay, ‘Letter of Antiochos III to Zeuxis with two Covering Letters’, *Epigraphica Anatolica* 10 (1987) pp. 7–17 (= Ma, *Antiochos III* document 4).
7. Sachs and Hunger, *Astronomical Diaries* p. 204.
8. The campaign is discussed by Ma, *Antiochos III* pp. 66–71,
9. For the fluctuating nature of Ptolemaic authority, see R. S. Bagnall, *The Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt* (Leiden, 1976).
10. Polybios 20.31.6, discussed by Ma, *Antiochos III* appendix 5.
11. Antigonos I: Diod. 19.68.5–7 and 64.3–6; Doson’s campaign: Polybios 20.5.11; Trogus, Prologue 28; Olympichos: Polybios 5.19.1; J. Crampa, *Labraunda III, the Greek Inscriptions Part 1: the Period of Olympichos* (Lund, 1969), and J. and L. Robert, *Fouilles d’Amyzon en Carie* (Paris, 1983); Ma, *Antiochos III* pp. 69–70, suggests that it was Ptolemaic pressure which brought down Olympichos’ regime.
12. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 6.
13. Ibid, document 15.
14. Ibid, document 16.
15. L. Robert, *Le Sanctuaire de Sinuri, pres de Mylasa* (Paris, 1945) p. 12.
16. The point is made by Ma, *Antiochos III* p. 68.
17. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 14.
18. Ibid, document 10.
19. Ibid, documents 9, 10, 11.
20. Ibid, appendix 2; Ma argues for the earlier of the suggested dates, which is accepted here.
21. Ibid, documents 17–18.
22. Ibid, document 19; P. Herrmann, ‘Antiochos der Grosse und Teos’, *Anadolu* 9 (1965) pp. 29–59.
23. Ma, *Antiochos III* documents 9 and 10.
24. *OGIS* 233.
25. Ma, *Antiochos III* documents 2 and 3.
26. Ibid, document 18.
27. Justin 30.2.6; Holbl, *Ptolemaic Empire* 133 and n. 38.
28. Polybios 15.25.3; this meeting was a relic of the old Macedonian process of the army assembled to acclaim a new king; it had degenerated to the ratification of murder and a coup.
29. Holbl, *Ptolemaic Empire* note 38 on 149–150.

30. An account of the rebel state is in Holbl, *Ptolemaic Empire* ch.5, with references to others; see also A. E. Vieisse, *Les 'Revoltes Egyptiennes', Recherches sur les Troubles interieurs en Egypte du Regne de Ptolemee II a la Conquete romaine* Studia Hellenistica (Louvain, 2004).
31. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 18, lines 8–10.
32. Polybios 15.20.1.
33. Polybios 15.25.13.
34. Polybios 15.25.15.
35. Polybios 15.25.13.
36. Polybios 15.25.14.
37. Polybios 15.25.14.
38. Polybios 3.2.8, 15.20, 16.1.9 and 10; Livy 31.14.5; Appian, *Macedonian Wars* 4.1; Justin 30.2.8.
39. Austin 192; F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge, 1940) pp. 108–137; R. M. Errington, 'The Alleged Syro-Macedonian Pact and the origins of the second Macedonian war', *Athenaeum* 49 (1971) pp. 336–354; E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Coming of Rome* (California, 1984) pp. 387–389; Ma, *Antiochos III* pp. 74–82.
40. H.-U. Wiemer, 'Karien an varabung des 2 Makedonischen Krieges', *Epigraphica Anatolica* 33 (2001) pp. 1–14.
41. Polybios 15.25.20–33.
42. Polybios 16.21–22.
43. John of Antioch, *FHG* IV, 557, a chronicle of the fifth century AD in an unreliable tradition of Syrian works; the date has been suggested by H. H. Schmitt, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos' des Grossen und zeiner Zeit* (Wiesbaden, 1964) p. 28.
44. Strabo 11.14.5 and 15; the planner of Artaxata is said to have been Hannibal, which dates the city to between 195 and 183.

Chapter 6

1. O. Morkholm, 'The Ptolemaic Coinage in Phoenicia and the Fifth Syrian War', in *Egypt and the Hellenistic World* Studia Hellenistica (Louvain, 1983) pp. 243–251.
2. Polybios 15.25.15.
3. This episode is in Polyainos 4.15, and ascribed to 'Antiochos son of Seleukos'. This might be Antiochos I or III, and is usually ascribed to the former. It is more likely to be the latter, who was as capable militarily and more successful. The origin of Polyainos' anecdote is unknown, but Polybios is the most probable source.
4. For a useful history of the city, see R. Burns, *Damascus* (London, 2007).
5. Polybios 16.22a. The basic study of the Palestinian part of the war is M. Holleaux, 'La Chronologie de la Cinquieme Guerre de Syrie', *Klio* 8 (1908) pp. 267–281.
6. Polybios 10.29.6.

7. C. P. Jones, and C. Habicht, 'A Hellenistic Inscription from Arsinoe in Cilicia', *Phoenix* 43 (1989) pp. 317–346.
8. Polybios 5.65.3.
9. D. Gera, 'Ptolemy son of Thraseas and the Fifth Syrian War', *Ancient Society* 18 (1987) pp. 63–73.
10. Josephus, *AJ* 138–144.
11. Polybios 15.21.9–23. 10.
12. Polybios 15.24.1–3; F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Oxford, 1940) pp. 114–116.
13. Neither Walbank (*Philip V*) nor Will (*Hist. Pol.* Vol. 2) considers this aspect, which to be sure is not noted in any ancient source, but it is worth bearing in mind that, until the 'Secret Pact', relations between Seleukids and Antigonids had not been good for some time. Later events also suggest that Philip and Antiochos were by no means allies, or even friends, except for this one case of plundering Ptolemy.
14. Livy 31.15.8 and 31.4
15. Appian, *Macedonian Wars* 4.1; Polybios 3.2.8; 14.24 and 9.7.6; Livy 31.31.4.
16. Polybios 16.15.1–8.
17. Polybios 16.2.1–9.5.
18. Livy 33.18.4–7; Ma, *Antiochos III* appendix 5, 'Stratonikeia'.
19. Polybios 16.24.1.
20. Polybios 16.1.8–9 and 24.6.
21. Egyptian appeal: Justin 30.2.8.
22. Livy 31.18.1; Justin 30.3.3–4; Polybios 16.27.5.
23. Walbank, *Philip V* pp. 130–131.
24. Livy 31.16.4–6; Polybios 16.29.3.
25. *Prosopographia Ptolemaica* 19, 14592.
26. Polybios 15.25.16; Livy 31.48.
27. Herwennefer's year 6 was also Ankhwennefer's Year 1, which is 201/200, but the exact date of the change is unknown. One might assume a period of confusion at the change of king, which would certainly reduce the pressure on the Ptolemaic forces; K. Vandorpe, 'The Chronology of the Reigns of Hurganophor and Chaonnophris', *Chronique d'Egypte* 61 (1986) pp. 294–302; A. E. Vieisse, *Les 'Revoltes Egyptiennes'. Recherches sur les Troubles interieurs en Egypte du Regne de Ptolemee III a la conquete romaine* Studia Hellenistica 41 (Louvain, 2004) pp. 11–18, lists the chronological documentation; B.C. McGing, 'Revolt Egyptian Style: Internal Opposition to Ptolemaic Rule', *Archiv fur Papyrologie* 43 (1997) pp. 273–314 at 284.
28. L. Torok, 'To the History of the Dodekaschoenos between ca. 250 BC and AD 298', *ZAS* 107 (1980) pp. 71–86; A. Farid, 'The Stela of Adikhalamani found at Philae', *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologische Instituts, Abteilung Kairo* 34 (1978) pp. 53–56, suggests that the Nubian king

(Adikhalamani) was supporting the Ptolemies in his intrusion northwards; if so, this could have been a result of Ptolemaic diplomacy; A. D. Welsby, *The Kingdom of Kush* (London, 1996) pp. 66–67, makes several suggestions, but the evidence is really too weak for conclusions to be drawn.

29. Austin 283, lines 22–24.
30. Polybios 16.39.1; Josephos, *AJ* 12.3.3; Porphyry, *FGrH* 260 F 45–46.
31. Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army* ch. 12, makes no attempt to do so.
32. Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army* assumed this was the future Antiochos IV, but it was in fact the king's eldest son, the joint king Antiochos, aged 20 by this time, and the same age as Antiochos I at the battle of Ipsos in 301.
33. The only source for the battle is Polybios 16.18.1–19.11, but what remains is his criticism of another historian, Zeno of Rhodes, so, as Bar-Kochva remarks 'we have at our disposal only those details which Polybios found to be unlikely' (*Seleucid Army* 146); cf. also Walbank 2.523. It was clearly a complicated battle, and ancient accounts were necessarily difficult. I follow here Bar Kochva's reconstruction in his chapter 12.
34. Polybios 16.39.3.
35. Jerome, *In Danielam*, 11.15–16.
36. Polybios 16.39.4 (from Josephos, *AJ* 12.3.3.).
37. So it is to be assumed from Josephos *AJ*, 138–144 (= Burstein 35); see also discussions of the relevant evidence by Gera (note 9), and Jones and Habicht (note 7).
38. Jerome, *In Danielam*, 11.15–16.
39. Jerome, *In Danielam*, 15–16, is the only indication of the terms; Livy 31.43.5–7 reports Skopas as recruiting still more troops in Aitolia for service in Egypt, the numbers given being 6,000 infantry and 500 horse. This was clearly not a large enough force to have any effect in Syria by this time, and was presumably for use in Egypt.
40. Houghton, *Seleucid Coins* p. 409.
41. Livy 33.19.8.

Chapter 7

1. So also the Roman description of the Seleukids as 'Syrian' kings, as too many historians do, is misleading; it arises, of course, from the fact that by the time Rome took over the last bits of the kingdom it had been reduced to Syria only; it has been all too readily followed by later historians.
2. F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge, 1940) pp. 133–138.
3. Polybios 15.20.1–8.
4. Livy 31.43.5.
5. Will, *Hist. Pol.*, 2.118 (apparently speculative, for he gives no source).
6. M. Holleaux, 'Le Chronologie de la Cinquieme Guerre de Syrie', *Klio* 8 (1908) pp. 267–281.
7. Livy 33.19.8.

8. Walbank, *Philip V* ch. 5 is the best modern account; he suggests that in his defeat, Philip came to hate Antiochos because of his success (184–185); this is speculation, but it is a fact that they never again had friendly relations.
9. Livy 32.8.9–16.
10. Livy 32.8.13.
11. Livy 33.19.9; some have accepted that these are actually sons of Antiochos – Ogden, *Prostitutes, Polygamy* pp. 139–140, and Holleaux, *Etudes*, 3.183–193, for example – and assume that they changed to royal names later (an idea I accepted in my *Prosopography*). It is better to accept a mistake on Livy's part, perhaps caused by a careless compression of Polybios – that Mithradates was a nephew in Polybios 8.23, and he was named Antiochos in the Panion battle. See also J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy Books XXXI – XXXIII* revised ed., (Oxford, 1989) p. 285, who identifies them as I do.
12. Mithradates in fact is later seen to be in command of a detachment, Ardys is not mentioned again.
13. Livy 33.19.10.
14. Polybios 5.61.5.
15. Polybios 3.28 and 16.2.4; Livy 31.31.4; Appian, *Macedonian Wars* 4.1.
16. Hieronymos, *In Danielam* 11.15 = Porphyry, *FGrH* 260 F 46; I have discussed this campaign in *The Roman War of Antiochos the Great* (Leiden, 2002) ch.2.
17. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 20; the parentage of Themison is not stated, but he must surely be related to the founder of the city of Themisonion; he is presumably the same man in command at Raphia (Polybios 5.79.12 and 5.82.11), and so was adult and experienced by 217; he can hardly be an actual 'nephew' of Antiochos in that case.
18. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 21.
19. Hieronymos, *In Danielam* 11.14–15; Livy 33.19.4–6.
20. For a useful description of Korakesion (now Alanya), cf. G. E. Bean, *Turkey's Southern Shore* (London, 1968) pp. 76–82.
21. Livy 33.20.1–2; Livy interprets this as Rhodes acting for Rome and in Roman interests, but this is clearly mistaken; Rhodes was acting in its own interests, and perhaps marginally in Ptolemy's. Rhodes had no wish for an overwhelming Great Power like Antiochos to establish a major naval presence in the Aegean.
22. John D. Grainger, *The Cities of Pamphylia* (Oxford, 2009) pp. 116–124.
23. Livy 33.20.8–9.
24. Livy actually gives no details of the negotiations; the terms have been reconstructed from the results which followed.
25. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 20 and pp. 93–94.
26. Livy 33.20.1–13; Hieronymos, *In Danielam*, 11.15–16; Polybios 12.40a.
27. Agatharchides of Knidos, *FGrH* 96 F 16.

28. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 25 (= *Inscriptions de Mylasa* 962).
29. Ibid, documents 26 and 28.
30. Ibid, documents 29 and 30.
31. Ibid, documents 31 and 32.
32. Ibid, document 22.
33. Polybios 30.3.6; Livy 31.18.22; Ma, *Antiochos III* 277–278.
34. There is no evidence for Miletos, which had been much disturbed by Philip.
35. Livy 30.20.10.
36. See note 29.
37. Polybios 18.55.3–6.
38. Polybios 18.53.1–55.8.
39. L. Koenen, *Eine agonistische Inschrift aus Agypten und fruhptolemaische konigsfeste* (Meisenheim, 1977) pp. 73–75; Holbl, *Ptolemaic Empire* 139 and note 69.
40. Livy 33.38.1–14; Schmitt, *Untersuchungen* 289–295; Ma, *Antiochos III* 86–88; if a commander of the expedition to the north is required, Ardys would fit the bill.
41. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 32.
42. The date of Thyateira's transfer from Attalid to Seleukid control is not known, but it was certainly by 190: Livy 37.8.7.
43. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 33 (= *Inschriften von Ilion* 37 = Welles, *RC* 42.)
44. Livy 33.38.3.
45. Livy 33.38.9.
46. Livy 33.38.10–13.

Chapter 8

1. Livy 33.30.1.
2. Livy 33.31.1–5.
3. Livy 33.34.2; Polybios 18.47.1–4.
4. Livy 33.34.3–4.
5. This is implied by Polybios 18.4.3.
6. Polybios 18.48.2; Livy 33.35.3.
7. Livy 33.39.2.
8. Livy 33.30.4.
9. Polybios 18.48.2; Livy 33.35.2.
10. *OGIS* 591.
11. Tacitus, *Annals* 5.56.5.
12. Livy 33.40.4–5, where Antiochos cited Seleukos I.
13. Seleukos I: Appian, *Syrian Wars* 62; Memnon, *FGrH* 434 F 8; Pausanias 1.10.2; the others: Justin 27.3.9–11 and Trogus, *Prologue* 27; Porphyry, *FGrH* 32F 8; Polyainos 4.17.
14. Livy, 33.38.14.

15. P. Frisch, *Die Inschriften von Ilion* (Bonn, 1975) no 45; E. Tasliklioglu and P. Frisch 'New Inscriptions from the Troad', *ZPE* 17, 1975, 101–106; E. Piejko, 'The Treaty between Antiochos III and Lysimacheia', *Historia* 37 (1988) p. 157; J. L. Ferrary and P. Gautier, 'Le Traite entre le roi Antiochos et Lysimacheia', *Journal des Savants* (1981) pp. 327–345.
16. V. Zirra, 'Le probleme des Celtes dans l'espace du Bas-Danube', *Thraco-Dacia* I (1976) pp. 175–182, especially the map, p. 179; F. Papazoglu, *The Central Balkan Tribes in pre-Roman Times* trans. M. Stansfield-Pohovic, Amsterdam (1978 (pp. 271–391, on the Scordisci; J. Collis, *The European Iron Age* (London, 1984) pp. 23–25.
17. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 6.
18. Polybios 5.53.2 and 5.39.6; Livy 37.40.5 and 13.
19. *OGIS* 591.
20. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 6.
21. Ma, *Antiochos III* document 35.
22. It retained *libertas* and *immunitas* for some time in the Roman period: H. B. Mattingly, 'Rome's Earliest Relations with Byzantium, Heraclea Pontica and Callatis', in A. G. Poulter (ed.), *Ancient Bulgaria* (Nottingham, 1983) pp. 239–252; it defied Severus four centuries later, to its destruction.
23. Walbank's suggestion, *Philip V* 190, note 5.
24. Ptolemy, *Geography* 3.11.6; J. Youroukova, 'La presence des monnaies de bronze des premiers Seleucides en Thrace: leur importance historique', *Studia P. Naster Oblata* I (Louvain, 1982) pp. 115–126, and A. Stepanova, 'Observations sur la monnaie de bronze d'Apollonie du Pont', *Thracia Pontica* 2 (1985) pp. 272–282.
25. Livy 33.38.16.
26. Livy 33.39.1–2.
27. Livy 33.35.2.
28. A. Fol, 'Le developpement de la vie urbaine dans les pays entre le Danube et la mer Egee jusqu'a la conquete romaine', *Etudes Balkaniques* 2–3 (1966); M. Chichikova, 'The Thracian City of Seuthopolis', and V. Velkov, 'The Thracian City of Cabyle', in A. G. Poulter (ed.), *Ancient Bulgaria* (Nottingham, 1983) pp. 289–303 and 233–238; D. P. Dimitrov and M. Chichikova, *The Thracian City of Seuthopolis* British Archaeology Reports, Supplementary Series S 38 (Oxford, 1978).
29. L. Ghetov, 'Sur l'histoire politique de la Thrace a la haute epoque hellenistique', *Dritter Internationaler Thracologischer Congress* vol. II (Sofia, 1984) pp. 134–136.
30. Strabo 7.6.1–2 and frag. 47; Livy 38.40.7; I. Venedikov, 'Les Migrations en Thrace', *Pulpudeva* 2 (1976) pp. 162–180, at 177–178.
31. He sailed for Syria in time to be caught by a storm off Cyprus, but before the close season for sailing arrived: hence September.
32. Livy 33.39.2.

33. Polybios 18.52.1–5.
34. Polybios 18.50.4; E. Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos the Great: a Study in Cold War', in *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford, 1964) p. 119; F. W. Walbank, *An Historical Commentary on Polybios* vol. 2 (Oxford, 1967) p. 621.
35. Polybios 18.47.4.
36. Hieronymos, *In Danielam* 3.11.17.
37. Polybios 18.53.1–59.9; for the dating, cf Walbank, *Commentary on Polybios* 2.623–624.
38. Polybios 18.50.4–52.5; Livy 33.39.3–41.4; Diodoros 28.12; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 2–3.
39. Badian, 'Rome and Antiochos', 119–121, accepts the accounts in Livy and Polybios at their face value, despite their implausibilities.
40. Polybios 18.50.4; Livy 33.39.3.
41. Polybios 18.50.5–9; Livy 33.39.4–6; Polybios puts L. Lentulus as the spokesman; Livy merely says it was what 'the Romans' demanded.
42. W. Blumel (ed.), *Die Inschriften von Iasos* (Bonn, 1975) 4, might be interpreted as indicating that Philip's troops were in Iasos when Antiochos' forces arrived. If so they only wanted to return to Macedon; there was no fighting and the Iasians do not say that the king removed the Macedonians.
43. Livy's rhetorical questions (33.39.7) are best ignored.
44. Polybios 18.51.1–10; Livy 33.40.1–6.
45. Polybios 18.50.7.
46. Polybios 18.52.1–5.
47. S. L. Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World* (California, 1996) pp. 215–218.
48. Livy 33.41.1–2.
49. Livy 33.41.4–9.
50. Livy 33.41.7.
51. This is assumed from the subsequent marriage, but no direct evidence exists.
52. Livy 35.13.4.
53. Holbl, *Ptolemaic Empire* pp. 155–156.
54. W. Clarysse, 'Ptolemaic Papyri from Lycopolis', *Actes du XVe Congres Internationale de Papyrologie* (Brussels, 1978–1979) pp. 101–106.
55. M. Alliot, 'La Fin de la Resistance Egyptienne dans le Sud sous Epiphane', *Revue des Etudes Anciens* (1952) pp. 18–26.
56. Livy 34.35.1–2.
57. Livy 34.33.12.
58. Livy 33.41.4 and 34.33.12.
59. Flaminius had two legions plus Latin alae: Livy 31.8.5–6, plus reinforcements: Livy 32.8.2, minus casualties; with his Greek allies he was assaulting Nabis of Sparta at the time with 27,000 men (Walbank,

Philip V [as in n. 12], 186).

60. E.g., Walbank, *Philip V* (as in n. 12), 190; Errington in *CAH* VIII(2) dismisses the whole affair in two half sentences (on pp. 277 and 278) and puts all the military activity in 195 and 194.
61. Livy 34.43.4.
62. Livy 37.33.1 (the Romans crossed the territories of the two cities) and 37.60, 7 (Antiochos' troops were evacuated from the cities).
63. N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* vol III (Oxford, 1988) 44 (by Hammond), claims Antiochos advanced 'as far as Maroneia' in '196/5', but he cannot have taken Ainos and Maroneia while still at peace with Rome when Rome had so recently freed those cities.
64. Livy 37.32.1.
65. O. Leuze, 'Die Feldzüge Antiochos des Grossen nach Kleinasien und Thrakien', *Hermes* 53 (1923) pp. 187–229 and 241–287; E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic Monarchies and the Coming of Rome* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984 p. 630, n.90; M. Holleaux, 'L'entretien de Scipion l'Africain et d'Hannibal' in *Etudes d'epigraphie et d'histoire grecques* 2me partie, *Rome, la Macedoine et l'Orient grec* (Paris, 1957) pp. 184–207, at p. 194, n. 1 and in *CAH* (1) 206, rejected the expedition; Walbank, *Philip V* (as in n. 12), accepted it.
66. Livy 37.31.1–2.
67. Ibid 60.7.
68. Livy 38.40.7.

Chapter 9

1. Appian, *Syrian Wars* 4; for a discussion see Ogden, *Prostitutes, Polygamy* pp. 134–16.
2. Polybios 21.20.8–9; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 5 – but the evidence is in a report by Eumenes to Rome.
3. Diodoros 31.19.
4. Livy 35.14.1; there were Pisidians in Antiochos' army at Magnesia four years later: Livy 37.40.14.
5. C. Habicht, 'Athen und die Seleukiden', *Chiron* 19 (1989) pp. 7–26.
6. J. D. Grainger, *The Roman War of Antiochos the Great* (Leiden, 2002) pp. 101–107.
7. E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* (California, 1984).
8. Livy 34.57.6; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 5, lists a third envoy, but he is never mentioned again or elsewhere; for the other two see J. D. Grainger, *A Seleukid Prosopography and Gazetteer* (Leiden, 1995) p. 91 and 105.
9. Livy 34.25.2–3.
10. Livy 34.57.4–6.
11. Livy 34.43.3–8.
12. Livy 33.49.5–7; Diodoros 28.10; Justin 31.2.5; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 4.

13. Livy 34.57.6–59.3; discussion in Grainger, *Roman War* pp. 134–139.
14. Livy 34.59.8; Livy adds a third envoy, but he is never mentioned again.
15. Livy 35.13.6–7.
16. Livy 35.14.1.
17. Livy 35.15.1–6.
18. Ogden, *Prostitutes, Polygamy* pp. 135–136.
19. Austin 200 (Nihavand); Welles, *RC*, 36/37 – with the date corrected to 119 of the Seleukid era (Kermanshah); L. Robert, ‘Encore une inscription grecque d’Iran’, *Comptes Rendue de l’Academie des Inscriptions et des Belles-Lettres* (1967) pp. 281–296 (Eriza); all these are conveniently translated in Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, *Samarkhand* pp. 204–205.
20. Originally published, and suggested restorations made, by B. Haussoullier, ‘Inscription grecque de Suse’, *Anatolian Studies presented to Sir William Mitchell Ramsay* (London, 1923) pp. 187–193, and repeated in Welles, *RC*, 159–160.
21. Livy 35.15.5.
22. The death of Laodike is a disputable matter; cf Ogden, *Prostitutes, Polygamy* pp. 136–137; on mortality at Antioch see Ronald Syme, ‘Governors Dying in Syria’, *ZPE* 41 (1981) pp. 125–144.
23. Austin 150.
24. W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge inscriptionem Graecarum* (Leipzig, 1915–1924) vol 3, 565, line 60.
25. Livy 35.12.3–6.
26. Livy 35.12.10–15.
27. Livy 35.12.7–9.
28. Livy 35.12.15–18.
29. Livy 35.13.6–14.1.
30. Livy 35.22.1.
31. Livy 35.20.10–14, 22.2.
32. Livy 35.20.12.
33. Livy 35.32.2.
34. Livy 35.25.2–12.
35. Livy 35.31.3–32.1.
36. Livy 35.32.3–11.
37. Livy 35.33.8.
38. Livy 35.32.12–14.
39. Livy 35.32.2–6.
40. Livy 35.34.4–11.
41. Livy 35.37.4–39.2.
42. Livy 35.35.1–37.10.
43. Livy 35.24.7–8.
44. Livy 35.42.3; this may be only assumption on Livy’s part; Antiochos seems to have gone from Lysimacheia straight to Greece.
45. Livy 35.43.3–6.

46. Livy 35.43.7–45.9.
47. Livy 35.46.2–13.
48. Livy 35.48.1–50.2.
49. Livy 35. 50.3–51.4; where these Roman soldiers came from is a mystery, but Serranus' fleet was at the Peiraios later; alternatively they could have been Flamininus' guard, or sent by Baebius. Livy does not help by saying that the soldiers were caught unawares while sightseeing.
50. Livy 35.51.6–10.
51. Livy 35.50.6 and 36.6.1; the Boiotians had insisted on him addressing them personally.
52. Livy 36.5.1–3 (Elis); the Messenians and Eleians were later attacked by the Achaians (Livy 36.31.1–3).
53. Livy 36.5.3–8; S. I. Oost, *Roman Policy in Epirus and Acarnania in the era of the Roman Conquest* (Dallas, TX 1954).
54. Livy 36.10.10–11.
55. Livy 36.11.8–11.
56. Livy 36.11.1–2; Athenaios 10.4393 – f (= Polybios 20.8.1–4).
57. Livy 36.11.5–8.
58. Livy 39.12.5–8.
59. Livy 36.12.10.
60. Plutarch, *Cato Maior* 12.4–7; A. E. Astin, *Cato the Censor* (Oxford, 1978) pp. 56–57.
61. Livy 36.13.2–3.
62. Livy 36.14.7–10.
63. Livy 36.15.1–4.
64. Livy 36.16.8–11.
65. Livy 36.18.2–19.3; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 18–19; Plutarch, *Cato Maior* 13. 1–7; Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army* pp. 158–162.
66. Livy 36.19.9.
67. Livy 36.20.7–8.
68. Livy 36.21.1–3.
69. Livy 36.33.1–7.
70. Livy 36.22.1–4 and 25.1.
71. Livy 26.21.3–4.
72. Livy 36.22.5–24.11 (Herakleia); 36.35.1–7 (Lamia).
73. Livy 36.29.3–11; Polybios 20.10.16–11.10.
74. Livy 36.29.1 and 30.1.

Chapter 10

1. Livy 36.21.1.
2. Livy 36.19.1; Polybios 20.8.6.
3. Livy 36.51.3–4.
4. Livy 36.42.1–7; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 22.
5. Livy 36.51.6–7.

6. Livy 36.43.1–3.
7. Gary Reger, 'Athens and Tenos in the Early Hellenistic Age', *Classical Quarterly* 42 (1982) pp. 365–383.
8. Livy 36.33.8–10; J. H. Thiel, *Studies in the History of Roman Sea Power in Republican Times* (Amsterdam, 1946) p. 299.
9. Livy 36.43.9–10.
10. Livy 36.43.11–45.4; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 22; Thiel, *Studies* pp. 306–309; Grainger, *Roman War* pp. 264–265.
11. Livy 36.45.5–8.
12. Livy 36.45.9 and 37.1.7–2.1.
13. Livy 37.2.3.
14. Livy 37.8.6–7.
15. Livy 37.8.3; for the ship sizes, see Thiel, *Studies* pp. 273–276.
16. Livy 37.9.1–4; Polybios 21.6.1–2.6 (Phokaia); Livy 37.40.10; 27.25.4 (Prusias).
17. Livy 37.3.9–11.
18. Livy 37.6.4–7; Polybios 21.7.1–4.
19. Livy 37.9.7–11 and 12.1–4.
20. Livy 37.10.1–11.13; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 24; Polybios 21.7.1–4; Thiel, *Studies* pp. 318–322.
21. Livy 37.11.13–14 and 12.5.
22. Livy 37.11.1; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 25.
23. Livy 37.11.7–9; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 25.
24. Livy 37.11.6.
25. Livy 37.13.11–12 and 14.1–4.
26. Livy 37.13.7–10 and 17.3–4.
27. Livy 37.16.1–13 and 17.3–4; Thiel, *Studies* p. 334 and 348 is scathing in an attack on Regillus' strategy, but this is unjust; he was no worse than Livius, and in the end he was successful.
28. Livy 37.18.7–9.
29. Livy 37.18.10–19.6; Polybios 21.10.1–10.
30. Livy 37.19.8 and 21.6–9; Polybios 21.10.12–14.
31. Livy 37.60.7.
32. Livy 37.23.2–23.1.
33. Livy 37.23.2–24.9; Cornelius Nepos, *Hannibal* 8.4; Thiel, *Studies* pp. 341–344; Grainger, *Roman War* pp. 299–300.
34. Livy 37.24.9–11.
35. Thiel, *Studies* pp. 348–349.
36. Livy 37.26.5–30.10.
37. Livy 37.31.3–6.
38. Livy 37.31.7–32.14.
39. Livy 37.33.1–2; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 26.
40. Livy 37.25.4–14; Polybios 21.11.1–2.
41. Memnon, *FGrH* 434, F 19.1–9.

42. Livy 37.34.1, 35.1–4 and 36.1; Polybios 21.14.1–3; Justin 31.7.8.
43. Livy 37.36.9; Justin 31.7.9.
44. G. Daressy, 'Un decret de l'an XXIII de Ptolemee Epiphane', *Receuil des Travaux* 33 (1911) pp. 1–8; a second copy is published in vol. 38; see Grainger, *Roman War* pp. 315–316 and appendix 2.
45. Livy 37.37.1–8; Diodoros 29.8.2.
46. Livy 37.37.9.
47. Livy 37.38.1–2.
48. Bar-Kochva, *Seleucid Army* pp. 165–169, though he rather overstated the numbers; he gives full references to the various units; Grainger, *Roman War* pp. 318–323.
49. Livy 37.40.12–42.8; Justin 31.8.6; Appian, *Syrian Wars* pp. 35–36.
50. Livy 37.44.5–6; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 36.
51. Livy 37.45.2; Thiel, *Studies* pp. 361–362.
52. Livy 37.44.4; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 38.
53. Livy 37.44.4–5; Polybios 21.16.1–17.8; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 38; Diodoros 29.10.
54. Livy 37.49.1–8; Diodoros 29.9.
55. For this campaign see J. D. Grainger, *The League of the Aitolians* (Leiden, 1999) ch. 21.
56. For the full details of this campaign see Livy 38.12.8–15.15; for a full examination see J. D. Grainger, 'The Campaign of Cn. Manlius Vulso in Asia Minor, 189 BC', *Anatolian Studies* 54 (1995) pp. 23–42.
57. Livy 38.16.1–27.9; Polybios 21.23 and 37.1–39.14.
58. Livy 37.55.3 and 38.38.2–17.
59. Livy 38.37.9–11; Polybios 22.26.

Chapter 11

1. Livy 37.44.3.
2. Livy 37.45.2.
3. Livy 38.38.10.
4. The grammatical qualifiers in this paragraph indicate that this is speculation, but the repetition of the name Lysias through Seleukid history is very suggestive.
5. Libanios, *Orations* 11.119. A Chalkidian, Euphorion, became head of the library at Antioch (*Suda*, s.v. Euphorion).
6. One historian (Barbara Levick, *The Roman Colonies of Southern Asia Minor* (Oxford, 1976) even suggests that Antiochos 'did not lose much' in being evicted from in Asia Minor; it is doubtful if he would have agreed.
7. During the periods 216–213, 205–203, 197–190.
8. Polybios 30.25.1–26.9.
9. Livy 38.38.9.
10. A. K. Narain, *CAH VIII*, appendix 1, has these dates for Demetrios, and they seem to be generally accepted, but Euthydemos' death is likely to be

closer to the end of that decade than earlier.

11. P. Bernard *et al*, 'Deux nouvelles inscriptions de l'Asie centrale', *Journal des Savants* (2004) pp. 227–365, quoted in F. L. Holt, *Lost World of the Golden King* (California, 2012) p. 124 ('Glorious in victory'); 'invincible' is on one of the commemorative coins of Agathokles.
12. Narain, *CAH VIII*, appendix 2.
13. Holt, *Lost World* p. 156.
14. Any account of this period in Bactria must be tentative, in particular it is not always possible to distinguish the actions of the two Demetrios: Holt, *Lost World* pp. 156–157, lists the evidence for Demetrios I.
15. Sachs and Hunger, *Astronomical Diaries* p. 187; quoted in Sherwin-White and Kurht, *Samarkhand* p. 216.
16. Diodoros 28.3 and 29.15; Strabo 16.1.8.
17. Sylvia Matheson, *Persia, an Archaeological Guide* (London, 1972) pp. 161–165.
18. Sherwin-White and Kurht, *Samarkhand* p. 216, insist that this was an unusual action, but Antiochos, as noted, had done the same at Ekbatana, and in his visit to Babylon he had been given 'presents' of gold by at least two authorities and perhaps others; his sacrifices were of cattle and sheep, with gifts of precious objects; his 'presents' were clearly much more negotiable.

Abbreviations

- Austin – M. M. Austin, *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 2006).
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- CAH – *Cambridge Ancient History*.
- FGrH – F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der Griechische Historiker*.
- Holbl, *Ptolemaic Empire* – Gunther Holbl, *A History of the Ptolemaic Empire* (London, 2000).
- JHS – *Journal of Hellenic Studies*.
- Ma, *Antiochos III* – John Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor* (Oxford, 1999).
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- OGIS – *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones selectae*.
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- ZPE – *Zeitschrift de Papyrologie und Epigraphik*.

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